

The Queen's Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies



Volume 1 | 2021 - 2023

The Queens Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies is an annual interdisciplinary publication that strives to promote a better understanding of race, racialization and settler colonialism.

We amplify student voices, giving the community a platform to share their writing, creative expressions and experiences of marginalization.

QJERS recognizes our position on Indigenous land and works to challenge, question, and educate ourselves and others on the processes of settler colonialism.

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Letter from the Editors

As we reflect on the first publication of QJERS, we hope this volume serves as a time capsule that highlights current stories, experiences and perspectives of on racialized issues at Queen's.

The contents of this journal challenge and question the settler colonial state that we live in today. These topics are not light, and we hope that everyone reading will use this as an opportunity to critically examine your own role in the perpetuation of these issues.

We are proud of the diverse group of passionate contributors, whose works address a wide range of topics and struggles faced by racialized and ethnic communities worldwide. We hope this journal provides new understandings that will have a lasting impact on readers.

It has been an honour to serve as the editors-in-chief of QJERS' first published edition, and we hope you enjoy the excellent work the Queen's community has put forth.

Sincerely,
Karishma and Samara

About the QJERS Team

Amanda Ackenhurst - Editor

Amanda Ackenhurst, a political studies, and philosophy undergrad student, and editor for the Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies. Passionate about making space for the creative expression and flourishing of BIPOC.

Fatima Baloch - Editor

I'm Fatima, and I am a Political Studies major in my fourth year. I joined QJERS because it aligned with my passion for advocacy and amplifying the voices of marginalized communities. I enjoy reading works and looking at art made by BIPOC communities who offer a diverse range of insightful and often moving perspectives that I can learn from. In my spare time, I enjoy thrift shopping and making collages.

Salma Kinawi- Editor

I'm Salma, and I am a Science major at Queens in my first year. Although my heart is devoted to the wonders of science, part of me also cherishes reading and everything to do with literature. I enjoy reading about different opinions and people's experiences and reflecting on different perspectives. Contributing to editing this journal has been an extremely rewarding experience, since I have been able to retain so much information on equity and racial injustice. Some other things about me are that I play the piano and love music, as well as, that I am Egyptian and Lebanese!

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About the QJERS Team

Samara Lijiam - Editor in Chief

I am in my last year of Political Studies at Queen's. I am passionate about politics, intersectionality and promoting positive social change inside and outside of the classroom. While working with the Ontario Public Interest Research Group (OPIRG) Kingston and the Social Issues Commission (SIC), I became particularly interested in abolition theory, carceral justice, sexual violence and financial accessibility. I am currently the Chief Analytics Officer for Step Above Stigma, where I am leading research around civilian alternatives to crisis intervention. I believe in the importance of uplifting marginalized voices, and am grateful to have helped create more diverse representation in academic and creative spaces.

Karishma Doodnauth - Editor in Chief

I'm Karishma and I am a fourth-year history major that will be attending law school after graduation. My research interests have focused on race-relations, gender in north America, and the experiences of marginalized groups in Canada. I cherished the opportunity to work with like-minded individuals and give students an opportunity to share their creativity and be heard.

Two Sides of A Different Coin

By Sheldon Alveres

I am a second-year life science student who writes mostly poetry and short essays. I picked up writing over the pandemic and used it as a tool of expression. I hope my work invokes some emotion or resonates on a personal level.

When I look at you I want to believe we are the same.

But the more I see you the more I realize you're not.

Maybe it's because my hair is tougher and curlier than yours.

Maybe it's because I'm a little darker than you.

Maybe it's because when people look at me they don't really see me.

I'm intelligent, driven, and kind.

I take responsibility, and I take care of those who rely on me.

But that doesn't matter does it?

All you see is a threat.

Possible danger, an angry brown man that could harm you.

The truth is I am angry.

I'm angry I don't get a fair shot.

Angry I have to be twice as good to get half the praise.

Angry that people judge me at first glance and write me off.

So angry I wrote you this letter.

Telling you all the things that boil my blood, and keep me up at night.

The truth is I don't want to be angry anymore.

I don't want to be overlooked.

I don't want to be underestimated.

I want to see you eye to eye

But that won't happen any time soon.

So I spill my rage on this page

Hoping someone finally sees me

Dev Patel is Conventionally Attractive - He's Just Not White

By Pravieena Gnanakumar

Pravieena Gnanakumar completed her undergraduate degree at Queens with a major in Global Development Studies, minor in Gender Studies, and a Certificate in Law. Since completing her Masters of Arts with the Department of Gender Studies at Queen's, she has been working in numerous diversity, equity and inclusion roles within the GTHA. In her spare time, she loves creating vision boards, watching early-2000s sitcoms and baking all sorts of desserts!

Sometimes, I look at a man and wonder if he's actually attractive or if I'm just jumping on the bandwagon. But Dev Patel isn't one of those people—Dev Patel is objectively and incredibly hot.

In an interview with Ellen DeGeneres, even Mindy Kaling, who's well known for only casting white men as her love interests in her show, *The Mindy Project*, praises Patel's attractiveness. Kaling justified her choice by saying, "I mean did you see him at the Oscars? Hello, Dev Patel."

The YouTube comment section was filled with people arguing about whether Patel is actually attractive or not. Some even commented that Kaling was racist for finding him attractive, or that he was dreamy solely because of his race.

Growing up, I found myself watching movies in which the conventionally attractive 'boy next door' was almost always white. As I got older, it seriously affected the features I found "attractive" in myself and others. Eurocentric beauty standards had me in a chokehold.

I used Zac Efron, Chris Pine, and Channing Tatum as the standards for men's attractiveness. The men who never made the cut in my head were usually brown men who shared similar features to myself.

This was my self-hating brown girl era, when I was constantly wishing for blue eyes, thin lips, blonde highlights, and lighter skin. While I so desperately wanted to embrace my brownness, I wanted to look white so that white guys would like me instead of questioning why I wasn't paying attention to non-white men.

I'd placed white men on a pedestal. This isn't to say that white men aren't attractive, but I was equating "white" with a classic heartthrob who would turn my life into a romantic comedy.

I didn't think brown men could give me what I wanted because movies never let brown men be the romantic leads. They were always the funny friend the main character vented to or the IT guy who ended up with the nerdy and shy girl at the end of the movie.

Though they aren't cast in typical leading roles, there are successful brown men in Hollywood: Dev Patel, Kumail Nanjiani, Riz Ahmed, and Sendhil Ramamurthy are just a few.

Sendhil Ramamurthy, who plays the dad in the Netflix original, *Never Have I Ever*, is ridiculously attractive—and I know I'm not the only one who thinks so. Many people on TikTok have pointed it out, too. But aside from myself and the very niche section of TikTok, I wish we took more time to praise the brown men in Hollywood.

On some days, I wish we could just obsess over brown men for being hot. I'm tired of the media only celebrating brown men in Hollywood at select times for very pointed racial reasons.

At the end of the day, equity, diversity, and inclusion are necessary in the film industry. However, representation cannot be isolated to being purely trauma focused.

We need to maintain our appreciation for brown men in Hollywood in the same way we celebrate their white counterparts. Brown men in Hollywood like Dev Patel remind me that we can find them attractive without forcing a larger and overarching narrative.

If the number of politicized conversations about actors of colour in Hollywood were cut in half, perhaps that other half would just be regular conversations about the actors—no baggage, just thirst. Representation doesn't mean that every movie needs to turn into such a big deal that it results in an Instagram activism-infographic.

If I think Dev Patel or any other brown man is attractive, you shouldn't need an explanation. Dev Patel's name followed by a smirk should say more than enough.

Ethnocentrism and identity formation: de Beauvoir on racialized women

By Alysha Ahmad

I'm a political studies and philosophy student who has a passion for social justice and equity. In my free time, I enjoy reading political theory, taking film and digital photos, and spending time with my cat.

White women have dominated current conceptions of feminism and notions of equality, effectively contributing to the erasure of the thoughts and experiences of non-white women. While Simone de Beauvoir's phenomenology, that posits woman as the Other in male-dominant societies, essentially holds true, it falls short in its whole legitimacy due to its adherence to the western notions of inequality and equality. De Beauvoir's view that woman is the Other relies on the white account of the Other, as opposed to an account by the "Other" of colour. It does not consider what it is like to be a racialized woman, nor does it evaluate the legitimacy of western notions of equality. De Beauvoir's lack of intersectionality is apparent when we compare her works to that of Nkiru Nzegwu and Patricia Williams, who outline their experiences as Black women operating under the western concepts of inequality and equality. In this paper, I will briefly outline the arguments of de Beauvoir, Nzegwu and Williams while highlighting the similarities among their arguments. Then, I will describe how de Beauvoir fails to take into consideration the multiple factors of identity formation in her construction of the Other, while highlighting the key differences in the arguments of the aforementioned writers.

In the introduction of *The Second Sex*, Simone de Beauvoir posits that women are defined relative to men as the Other while men are considered the One, which ultimately informs and shapes women's reality. Woman is the Other since man has defined himself as the Subject, as essential, to which everything else is relative including women. Man, as the One, can live as freely as he chooses with the freedom to pursue any ambition, while woman is merely the reproductive Other to man. To illustrate alterity between women and men, de Beauvoir highlights other historical instances of subordination and domination including slavery and the Holocaust. Accordingly, de Beauvoir argues that men and women continue to be inextricably connected, similar to the dynamic of master and slave.

In *Gender Equality in a Dual-Sex System: the Case of Onitsha*, Nkiru Nzegwu writes about how the common notion of inequality is unfounded due to its foundation in western and ethnocentric thought. She demonstrates this argument by comparing dual-sex systems to mono-sex systems while having writers from the respective regions engage in hypothetical dialogue. That is, she compares conceptions of sex and gender roles in Onitsha with that of the sex and gender roles in western societies. Nzegwu argues that the western notion of inequality and feminism wrongly lacks the consideration of the value that institutional structures assign to particular roles. In western societies, the roles of women are deemed worthless which is why western feminism greatly focuses on obtaining an equal-standing, or "sameness," to men.(1) However, this desire is groundless since the roles they posit as "worthless" are those that men

believe are worthless. That is, western feminists affirm the dominant notion that traditional women's work is useless. The notion of equality that Nzegwu advances is within the context of a dual-sex system. Gender-identity is constructed differently due to the skills that the respective sexes bring to community-establishment; so, the roles of men and women are complements and have equal value.(2) Similar to de Beauvoir, Nzegwu affirms the Othering of women in mono-sex societies. At the beginning of her essay, Nzegwu writes about how men in individualistic societies deem themselves the proprietor of his own person, and how they owe nothing to their societies. (3) This is similar to de Beauvoir's idea that men are able to conceive of and realize their ambitions, while not thinking of the Other or society.(4)

In *On Being the Object of Property*, Patricia J. Williams writes about the dispossession of Black people, with an emphasis on Black women. She posits that Black people have been reduced to objects and market commodities. This is reminiscent of their treatment as slaves, as demonstrated by Williams' comparison of historical accounts of oppression, and present accounts of oppression. Williams illustrates instances of injustice, including her great-great grandmother's experiences as an 11-year-old sold into slavery, to demonstrate how major institutions codify the objectification of people of colour. Accordingly, white people, those in power, see Black people as a means to an end since they believe that Black people lack self-determination and "pure will" and therefore require direction. In demonstrating how Black people are reduced to objects, Williams writes about how white people did not actually see her but through her. Generally, Williams says that Black people continue to be

constructed as objects, as demonstrated by societies in which white people are the dominant class. Williams' assertion that Black people are objectified is similar to de Beauvoir's notion of the Other. Black people are not thought of as having intrinsic value, analogous to how women are only evaluated relative to the men in their lives; this is a connection that de Beauvoir makes explicit in her writing. (5) Black people only have instrumental value to white people, similar to how women in male-dominant societies are made for men to project their ambitions.

De Beauvoir's phenomenology relies too heavily on western conceptions of knowledge, as demonstrated by her aspirations of equality. De Beauvoir desired to rid women of the status of the Other through gaining equal standing to men, which is what her conception of feminism means. The primary issue with this idea is the affirmation of the implication that women's roles are inferior. That is, the devaluation of the roles of women in western societies are due to men positing them as worthless. So, the desire to leave behind traditionally feminine roles and fill traditionally masculine roles affirms this worthlessness to the roles of women. It should be noted that de Beauvoir's ethnocentric thought is informed by her status as an elite white woman in academic settings, where men especially dominated during her time. By being a woman within a male-dominated field, de Beauvoir feels as if she is affirming feminist notions and can inform others. This is demonstrative of Nzegwu writing that, "patriarchal ideology tightly bound white women to white male authority." (6) In doing so, elite women like de Beauvoir frame the emancipatory struggle in terms of their needs. Moreover, as Nzegwu describes, the desire to obtain sameness to men is

rooted in the individualistic ideas that comprise western societies, in which people are “self-sufficient” beings.(7) In collective societies, where the needs of the community are emphasized as opposed to those of the individual, particular gender roles do not possess an increased value over others. Accordingly, notions of equality look different. In Onitsha, a society that operates under a dual-sex system, equality does not mean the sameness of the genders, the genders instead operate in a manner that is complementary.(8) So, de Beauvoir’s notion of equality is a western conception. The case of Onitsha also demonstrates that she is wrong in stating that women from all societies are posited as the Other, since the roles of men and women in this dual-sex system have equal value.

By conceptualizing equality in western notions, de Beauvoir lacks an inclusionary lens in her construction of the Other and maintains an ethnocentric perspective. Speaking from the perspective of a white woman, de Beauvoir likens the experience of a woman to that of those who are members of marginalized communities including Jews and Black people in America, to make apparent the idea of alterity.(9) In doing so, de Beauvoir implies that alterity is limited to a single factor of one’s identity, and that there is a separation of race and gender. De Beauvoir does not consider what the interaction of race and gender looks like. She writes about the master-slave dynamic, likening it to the relationship between men and women. By using this analogy, de Beauvoir erases the factor and influence of gender to race. She does not consider the experiences of Othering that racialized women experience, which is discussed by Williams. To de Beauvoir, gender and race are mutually exclusive and operate under a

black and white binary. Williams' experiences as a Black woman demonstrate the interaction of gender and race, and how these interactions mould a nuanced experience of oppression. The commodification of Black women demonstrates a drastically different means of Othering than that of white women, which de Beauvoir does not describe. Williams, on the other hand, describes how racialized women are objectified, and made to be the Other in a society that prioritizes both whiteness and men. Williams describes how Black people are forced to separate parts of their identity to gain advancement in particular spaces, which is determined by their being in a white-dominant society. This is evident when Williams' mother told her that law was in her blood – in the part of her that was disenfranchised.(10) Williams' mother did not view herself as the powerful figure that Williams should use to ready herself for law school; instead, she tells Williams to subscribe to the whiteness in her blood in order to successfully operate in a society that prioritizes whiteness. In doing so, Williams' mother devalues and objectifies herself in the face of white society. Throughout her paper, Williams describes the consistent objectification she experiences from white people and white institutions, that are reminiscent of the commodification of Black people in the past. She cites the case of a white doctor sterilizing ten Black Latina women without their consent and knowledge to further demonstrate this objectification.(11) The non-consensual sterilization of these women demonstrates their being objectified by the white doctor and not viewed as people. Additionally, Williams describes having to often assert her presence due to being viewed as transparent by white people, who literally look through her.(12) The commodification of Black bodies is based on the idea that Black people lack pure will and can only be made useful. They are merely looked at as vessels to

project white desires. This is not the case with white women, since the experiences of Black people, especially Black women, is incredibly nuanced. De Beauvoir completely ignores these nuances. By using the analogy of master and slave to demonstrate (white) women's oppression, de Beauvoir is engaging in the very Othering that Williams describes – she merely looks through racialized people and uses them to fill her argument, without actually considering their nuanced experiences. By using this analogy, de Beauvoir engages in the commodification of Black bodies; she uses the analogy in an instrumental manner to simply strengthen her argument.

Ultimately, Simone de Beauvoir posits the Other in black and white terms without consideration of the multiple factors that go into identity formation, which is a result of her operating under the western conception of equality and inequality. The perspectives of Nkiru Nzegwu and Patricia Williams demonstrate the ethnocentrism and one-dimensional aspect of de Beauvoir's argument. Nzegwu uses Onitsha to demonstrate how notions of equality are informed by societal structures, and that the traditional roles of women are made to be lacking value. De Beauvoir's idea of equality is influenced by western patriarchal ideology and, accordingly, reeks of ethnocentrism. De Beauvoir's western idea of equality informs her lack of intersectionality in her construction of the Other. She does not consider the multiple factors to identity formation, completely dismissing the nuanced experiences of racialized women. The experiences of racialized women in white societies are explained by Williams' argument that Black people are objectified. Accordingly, de Beauvoir is a product of her western environment, causing her to dismiss the experiences of racialized women.

The “Other” and the European Fortress: the racialization of border security in Europe

By Alysha Ahmad

“I see European people with blue eyes and blond hair... being killed every day,” is what the former prosecutor general of Ukraine told BBC News in an interview.(1) This statement, a belief held by many Europeans, demonstrates that the conflict in Ukraine has revealed that racism remains a dominant force in global politics, particularly in the European Union (EU). The double-standards of the treatment of Ukrainian asylum-seekers , and asylum-seekers of colour , reflect the hypocrisy of liberal governments in the west as demonstrated by their refusal to permit asylum-seekers of colour. Accordingly, my research question aims to address the following question: in what ways does the contemporary border regime of the EU reflect its racialized securitization of migration movements and contradict the notion of "liberal governance"?

In this paper , I will argue that the security measures employed by the European Fortress are weaponized against racialized migrants through policies that Otherize them, as demonstrated by the contrasting treatment of Ukrainian asylum-seekers and asylum-seekers from the racialized Global South. I will begin by defining key terms then move on to describe the security measures employed by the EU, as well as discuss its liberal hypocrisy. Next, I will explain how these security measures marginalize migrants of colour, due to their racist assumptions. Finally, I will compare the experiences of asylum-seekers of colour with that of asylum-seekers from Ukraine to further illustrate the legitimacy of my argument.

Key Terms

Racialization refers to the processes by which a group of people is defined by their race.(2) This process occurs by assigning racial meaning to people's identity which impacts their experience in institutional systems. Those who are racialized appear from the Global North, including countries in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America that were previously colonized by countries in Europe.(3) Racialized people are subject to rigid securitization policies. Securitization occurs when state actors believe that their region is under threat and enact countermeasures to manage the threat, while making others believe that the threat is viable through the deployment of propaganda material.(4)

Securitization requires enacting stricter border control measures, including the implementation of border security forces and stricter visa measures. Issues concerning securitization are urgently implemented and, accordingly, bypass democratic procedures. Securitization best operates in regions that have a border regime. A border regime refers to the system that controls people's ability to move and live, depending on their immigration status.(5) Specifically, it refers to a set of rules that apply to migrants. The regime is influenced by a "multiplicity of actors, movements and discourses."(6) The border regime is shaped by bureaucracy differences and "band-aid" type of fixes to emergency situations, as a result of constant tension and conflict at borders. The border regime primarily operates under the governance of the Global North, which is a liberal governance. Under liberal governance, law is cooperative, rests on mutual gain and is meant to benefit all participating parties.(7) This requires the liberalization of both social rights and the global economy.

The European Fortress

The security measures employed by the European border regime ultimately contribute to the marginalization of asylum-seekers of colour, despite supposedly operating under a liberal notion of governance. In current geopolitics, the European Union is referred to as “Fortress Europe,” which is reflective of its current policies regarding migration.(8) These securitization policies include deterrence and border externalization measures, which require the assistance of countries in the Global South. Among these policies include the following actions by European states to prevent migrants from entering Europe where they can claim asylum: maritime interceptions, readmission agreements and outsourced migration controls.(9) Maritime interceptions involve the intercepting of migrant-carrying vessels and returning them from the country of transit. Readmission agreements refer to the return of an irregular migrant to their transit country. Outsourced migration controls involve the extension of sovereignty to beyond a state’s borders to deter irregular migration. Moreover, externalization has become a primary tool of deterrence under EU policy.(10) States deploy externalization policies by engaging in extra-territorial methods of securitization, including the implementation of carrier sanctions, the expansion of border agency Frontex, and the introduction of drone surveillance by the European Border Surveillance System.(11) The ability of the EU to move beyond and within sovereign states through externalization demonstrates the regime’s desperate desire for securitization. By moving beyond the sovereign and operating under extra-territorial methods of securitization, the EU can detect migratory flows in the early stages, thereby preventing the attempted entrances of migrants. Surveillance of migrants is facilitated by the Seahorse Mediterranean Network, which

shares information about migratory movement in the Mediterranean region and prevents irregular migration. 12

This demonstrates the surveillance that the EU conducts to prevent migrants from entering the region. Member States of EU have struck deals with countries in the Global South, which involve their intercepting of migrant-carrying vessels and facilitating their returns.(13) For instance, the EU created an action-plan to prevent African migrants from entering Europe by allowing authorized ships to enter the territorial waters of African countries in order to intercept and quickly return the vessels to African shores.(14) Another externalization method is the EU-Turkey action-plan, which requires Turkey to stop irregular migrants from reaching Greece and accept irregular migrants that have been returned from Greece for resettlement, in exchange for €6 billion.(15) However, Turkey opened its borders with Greece, due to the political tensions with the country, resulting in thousands of refugees at their door. These refugees were met with violence and denied entry by Greek authorities. Accordingly, Greece was pledged €700 million by the EU for securing its borders and praised as the “shield of Europe.” (16)

Europe has possessed open borders for a number of years until the refugee crisis, wherein it closed the respective borders of its countries. Even though the EU operates under a liberal governance and claims to welcome refugees, it has implemented anti-migration and securitization policies that only marginalize asylum-seekers; thereby contradicting its existence as a renowned liberal entity. As demonstrated by the aforementioned security measures, the liberal notion of cooperation for the sake of mutual benefits is not practiced by the EU. Rather, it is clear that the EU is protecting its personal interests rather than the interests of the global

community, as evident in the closing of its borders and its use of rigid securitization methods. Instead, the EU is merely a liberal entity within itself, primarily operating for the mutual cooperation of countries within the organization and the global periphery. The EU frames its securitization policies under a humanitarian framework, arguing that it is only deterring migrants from making long and dangerous journeys, in which they risk their lives. However, the EU truly does not care for the well-being of migrants since they leave them susceptible to violence. The EU's hypocrisy and non-adherence to the liberal values it claims to purport is demonstrated in its denial and blatant violation of the principle of non-refoulement. All of the member states in the EU, as well as many other countries in Europe, are bound to this principle which the EU has essentially codified against through its methods of securitization. Accordingly, in violating the principle of non-refoulement, the EU disavows its global perception of liberal governance and openness. The EU's hypocrisy and resulting security measures make it particularly difficult for asylum-seekers of colour to claim asylum in Europe, which will be discussed in the next section.

The "Other" and the European Union

The security measures employed by the European border regime are targeted towards asylum-seekers of colour which Otherize them, even though the European Union theoretically operates under a liberal notion of governance. The European Union's securitization measures have racial underpinnings influenced by Europe's history of colonialism, which is best demonstrated in the denial of African asylum seekers. Specifically, it is rooted in the African slave trade and historical European domination and subjugation of visible minorities. Accordingly, white nationalism is deeply

embedded within Europe and its institutions, especially within its migration policies. European colonizers, including Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the UK, still possess power over African countries through “financialized power and land grabs.”(17) Precisely, it is through the promotion of neoliberal policies that Europe continues to maintain this power. These policies include trade agreements, with policies of “capital investment and neoliberal liberalization at the expense of local producers,” which perpetuate inequalities.(18) Local livelihoods are devastated due to these agreements, as demonstrated by Europe’s fishing agreement with Mauritania, that has caused local fishing vendors to experience decline and lack of sales. (19) Despite the European causes of devastation in Africa, African asylum-seekers are rarely permitted to seek asylum in Europe with only 3 percent gaining entry into Europe.(20)

Europe weaponizes racism and successfully facilitates racialized securitization by developing an “Other.” While constructing the Other, the history of European white nationalism develops an ideology of an “Us” vs “Them” dichotomy, that informs its migration policies. The “Us” refers to the host-state, and “Them” refers to migrants. These policies construct the migrant as a threat that will not assimilate into whiteness and use their natural barbarian tendencies to enact violence.(21) It is also this line of thinking which is why the refugees portrayed in media are typically light-skinned and adhere to the European beauty standards. This portrayal of the migrant is more acceptable and less threatening to Europeans and European authorities than the African or racialized migrant. This double-standard will be discussed in more detail in the next section. The racist securitization policies of the EU can be demonstrated in the

double-standards of the treatment of asylum seekers in west and asylum seekers in the Global South, particularly in case of Libya. The EU utilizes securitization methods such as externalization to control migration to their region. For instance, the EU has externalized its border security measures to Libya through a collaboration strategy with Italy, called the EU-Libya Cooperative Agreement. Italy is thought of as a gateway into Europe, so the need to securitize its borders and externalize migration control was deemed a necessity by the EU. The EU is providing support to the Libyan Coast Guard in intercepting migrants and asylum seekers attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea. After catching migrants, the Libyan Coast Guard takes them back to Libya and places them in detention sites, where there are “inhuman and degrading conditions.”(22) The EU asserts that this collaboration strategy has humanitarian means: halting the business of smugglers and preventing dangerous migration via boats.(23) However, externalization allows for states in the Global North to avoid the legal responsibilities of asylum-seekers.

Since the implementation of externalization policies in Libya, the chance of dying at sea nearby the coasts of Libya has increased; thus demonstrating one of the ways the EU has increased risk of death for migrants.(24) Additionally, the treatment of migrants in detention sites certainly violate international law, as migrants are subject to “torture, sexual violence, extortion and forced labour.”(25) The EU knows about this degrading treatment, since it has provided support to ameliorate it; but this support has done little and the EU continues to fund the Libyan Coast Guard nonetheless.(26)

As previously mentioned, liberal states that have a colonial legacy are merely using humanitarian causes as a mask for the

racial underpinnings of their securitization methods. Italy colonized Libya during the early 20th century, and it continues to share major economic ties and agreements with Libya today, in a neo-colonial fashion. The “Us versus Them” mentality permeates EU policy, which informs Italy’s agreement with Libya. Italy’s history as a colonizing country demonstrates proof of nationalist and fascist ideology within its institutions, including migration policies. Since migration policies control who is allowed in a country and who is not, Italian policy-makers views migrants from Libya as a threat to its well-being, particularly to its security and economic opportunities. These migrants do not look like them. Accordingly, it wants to retain its reception of the material benefits it affords from its whiteness, thereby implementing Otherizing policies.

The racialized underpinnings of EU migration policy do not apply to white asylum-seekers in the same manner that it does to asylum-seekers of colour. During the Ukrainian conflict, millions of asylum seekers were welcomed with open arms to numerous countries in the Global North, including within the EU and periphery countries. This welcoming attitude has not been seen regarding migrants of colour, as demonstrated by countries on the receiving end of externalization policies including Turkey, Morocco and Libya. Under the EU-Turkey deal, approximately 3.7 million Syrian refugees live in Turkey which is 1 million more than in 2016. ²⁷ Moreover, from March 2016 to March 2021 more than 21,000 Syrian refugees were resettled in the European Union from Turkey, even though the EU was supposed to settled 71,000 refugees in accordance with their deal with Turkey.(28) However, due to EU’s refusal to accept the agreed-upon number of refugees and provide visa liberalization to Turkish citizens, Turkey

allowed for migrants to leave Turkey and make their way to Greece. Accordingly, thousands of migrants were captured and subject to violence after reaching Greece. The EU offered each asylum seeker €2,000 to return to their country of origin. 29 Since 2021, there has been over 125 documented deaths of refugees nearby the Turkey-Greece border.(30) This demonstrates how asylum seekers are simply pawns to European countries, particularly those in the EU, and how they are used as leverage by states for offers of political advancement. Moreover, this is further demonstrated by the Spain-Morocco agreement. The EU has provided 140 million Euros to Morocco for measures including speedboats to enable migration controls.(31) Now, there has been a decrease in migrants arriving to Spain by sea, compared to 2018. As of 2021, there are approximately 500,000 migrants residing in Libya.(32) Under the Italy-Libya collaboration agreement, there have now been 12,000 asylum-seekers being detained in 27 prisons and detention sites across Libya.(33) Additionally, approximately 1500 people have died attempting to cross the central Mediterranean in 2021.(34)

The EU has assisted Italy in providing the Libyan Coastguard with financial support and technical assets, thereby demonstrating their complicity in these deaths.(35) The EU does not care for migrants and only acknowledges them when they attempt to cross into Europe. This apathy is showcased by the experiences of 23-year-old Kouassi, who was detained by Libyan forces. After being caught by the Libyan Coastguard, Kouassi was fitted with shackles on his ankles and wrists and taken to a prison where he and nine other prisoners were demanded the equivalent of \$900 USD.(36)

This is a not an isolated case of extortion, as many migrants in Libya are subject to this abuse and worse. The EU

has both directly and indirectly supported the abuse of asylum-seekers in Libya through these externalization policies. The desperation of asylum-seekers' desire of obtaining safety by entering Europe does not prompt European compassion.

Moreover, the refusal to allow Syrian refugees into Europe reflects the increasing anti-Muslim sentiment prominent within European regions, which has not prompted compassion from Europeans. The requirement of Europe in maintaining its whiteness , paired with the rise of its subscribers of far-right ideology , are greatly influential in the development of its anti-migrant policies. In Europe, public opinion surveys reveal fear of and opposition to Muslims in Europe, since they are viewed as threatening to European national identity and national security.(37) Specifically, Europeans view Muslims as unable to integrate to European culture and adopt European norms, since they believe that Islam is incompatible with western values even though Muslims are not a monolith.(38) As previously mentioned, European colonial history views non-white people as inherently barbaric. For instance, the desire of Europeans to keep Europe white is presented by the Prime Minister of Hungary referring to Syrian refugees as “Muslim invaders” that should be denied asylum in order to “preserve cultural and ethnic homogeneity.” Accordingly, the development of an Other, or a “Them,” occurs. As discussed by Georgi, the increased liberalization of neoliberal policies contributed to a relatively open Europe that allowed for the migration of economically beneficial migrants.(39) As a result, Europeans also view migrants as a threat to their economic opportunities and the phrase of “job-stealing immigrants” is presented. Muslim migrants, or those who are from Muslim majority

countries, are viewed in this manner, hence the increased securitization of Europe in the wake of the Syrian conflict.

This treatment starkly contrasts with the treatment of Ukrainian refugees in the wake of the Ukrainian conflict, which demonstrates the means by which refugee protection should operate. Approximately 7.8 million Ukrainian refugees have settled across Europe, due to the receptive attitude of European leaders.(40) Ukrainians have been allowed entry without valid travel documents and visas into countries including Slovakia, Poland and Ireland.(41) The EU has also implemented the Temporary Protection Directive, in which Ukrainians are given three years of temporary protection within countries in the EU, without applying for asylum.(42) Accordingly, Europe's liberal governance reappears although this is not practiced regarding asylum-seekers from the racialized Global South. The underlying reasons for the swift assistance of Ukrainian asylum seekers the need to preserve a cohesive, white identity within Europe which is not possible with asylum-seekers of colour. The issues of racism among white Europeans is not limited to asylum-seekers from the Global South – it also applies to racialized Europeans. For instance, Black Ukrainians have been denied means of escaping the country in favour of white Ukrainians, as demonstrated by Black people being pushed off of trains leaving the region.(43) Additionally, migrants of colour who have entered the country legally, including students with visas, were also met with violence in their attempts to flee Ukraine, at the hands of Ukrainians. The refusal to assist Black Europeans and student-migrants in fleeing war is reflective of the colonial history of Europe, that continues to permeate the attitudes of everyday-people; it is a reminder that racism cannot be possible without the participation of individuals.

Moreover, a threat of security is not present with Ukrainian asylum-seekers since only non-white asylum-seekers are thought of as inherently dangerous. For example, the prime minister of Bulgaria said this regarding the wave of Ukrainian refugees: “these people are Europeans... this is not the refugee wave we have been used to, people we were not sure about their identity, people with unclear pasts, who could have even been terrorists.”(44) This is reflective of the “Us vs Them” idea discussed earlier; this policy-maker’s statement essentially says that “we must protect our own,” referring to white people. Furthermore, this statement blatantly assumes that asylum-seekers of colour all have the potential to be dangerous, while this cannot even be conceived of in regards to white asylum-seekers. Consequently, asylum-seekers of colour suffer despite the possibility of their assistance by the EU.

Concluding Remarks

As is demonstrated by the contrasting treatments of Ukrainian asylum-seekers and asylum-seekers of colour, the border-securitization measures employed across Europe are racially motivated and weaponized against racialized migrants, despite the region operating under a liberal governance. Accordingly, migrants of colour are subject to extreme violence and death even though it is possible for the EU to assist all asylum-seekers, as evident in their generous and swift assistance to Ukraine. The EU has a responsibility to assist asylum-seekers, regardless of their origin, as they have pledged to do so within the principle of non-refoulement. However, the use of securitization methods, including externalization, demonstrates the EU’s evasion of this principle and their lack of adherence to the liberal idea of mutually-beneficial operations. The EU has externalized its

migration-control to countries in the Global South: Turkey, Libya and Morocco are a few of these countries.

The securitization measures deployed by Europe is a means of protecting its border regime which is comprised of a cohesive white identity. Europeans have constructed an Other that they deploy these securitization methods against, who are racialized people that are viewed as threatening to the security and economy. This construction of the Other has its foundation in the colonial history of Europe, which remains deeply embedded within European institutions. Accordingly, asylum-seekers of colour remain vulnerable and are left to fend for themselves.

White-Tinted Glasses

By Dalyah Schiarizza-Lawson

My name is Dalyah Schiarizza (she/her) and I'm a third year Con-Ed student with joint honours in English and Gender Studies. I am a biracial writer who's just starting to understand this aspect of my identity. Writing is my way of healing and finding peace at a time in my life where everything is supposed to be ever-changing as someone who struggles to communicate verbally. I am most inspired and motivated by my close circle of friends, their presence in my life has changed me into the woman I am today.

I've only begun reflecting on what it means to be a woman of colour. For most of my life, it hardly even crossed my mind. I had an ignorance that protected me for so long until I came to a point in my life where that protection vanished. I find that I was socialized like a White person in an entirely White family. My brain was crafted in a way that shielded my understanding of the effects racism has had on my life, previously and currently. That doesn't mean I grew up not knowing what racism is. It just means I had the minimal understanding that racism is wrong, but it's essentially over, a thing of the past. It took me a long time to come to the harsh realization that racism exists in all facets of society, and it will influence my wellbeing, whether or not I'm aware of it. I say I wore white-tinted glasses for 18 years, and it's just now that I'm beginning to navigate and understand my identity as a biracial woman. It's taken me one more year to establish this partially nuanced understanding and how it has influenced my life.

I want to start at the beginning; I spent a large portion of my life in a tiny and predominantly White town. I was the only Black person in my classes and family, so I grew up exclusively by and around White people. I learned to see the world as a White person, but obviously, it doesn't work like that for me. I didn't even know the world would be different for me and; it took me a very long time to let it sink in. These white-tinted glasses acted as a double-edged sword. It was a form of protection that shielded me from recognizing a lot of microaggressions and isolation. Still, it was blocking me from understanding who I am and the culture I could have had. In hindsight, I now recognize that I was being denied the truth of what it means to exist in this world, and I found myself shocked and underprepared.

Throughout school, I usually faced a lot of racist jokes, suggesting I could run fast or that I couldn't be seen in the dark. They would comment on how I probably liked fried chicken and watermelon or how I was "loud" and talked "ghetto." My peers would make these comments and laugh at me. In those moments, they didn't impact me because, for some reason, it didn't click how my peers directed those jokes at me. I was the butt of their joke, and I was who they projected their narrow-mindedness onto. Often I'd just laugh it off since I didn't get it was about me and likely because I didn't want to seem so different from everyone else. I wish I understood and said something, so maybe I would have earlier understood who I was. I wish it clicked a lot sooner that what they were saying was targeted at me. I had white-tinted glasses on, I had a very underdeveloped understanding of racism and of myself as a racialized person in situations like this. For example, when they said I couldn't be seen in the

dark, I laughed because it was just an assumption, or that's how I understood it. Exactly like how the White kids around me understood it as just an assumption. Now, I realize that what they were saying was targeted at me in a racist way.

Even in public, strange things would happen to me because people had racist assumptions, and I never realized it. There have been a few times when I'd go into stores with my friends or family, and there would always be at least one store employee watching me. Even if I'd have been to that store fifty times and nothing ever happened when I was there, employees constantly watched me. I didn't realize it; I just thought that maybe they did it because I was young, I was freshly 14 at the time, but it never crossed my mind that they did it because I'm Black. I also remember being asked to leave my purse outside of a dressing room because of "new anti-theft policies," but the staff asked no one else to do that. At the time, I didn't understand why they had only asked me. I assumed that maybe the employee forgot to ask the others. I'd say these were a couple of instances where I had on my white-tinted glasses, and they blinded me from understanding these micro-aggressions.

Even though I wish I didn't grow up with white-tinted glasses, I realize now that they were a form of protection. If I did understand that those kids were being racist and that store employee stereotyped me as a thief because I'm Black, what could I have done? Who could I relate to? Would I tell my teacher and there be a discussion about not saying racist things when only one person of colour is in the class? I grew up without a diverse community or friends of colour, but I never understood that either. I was granted protection from a

lot of isolation and loneliness from actively realizing I'm the only one not like the people around me.

The most crucial part in my journey of realizing my identity as a woman of colour was when I lost my white-tinted glasses. Like many others, I was exposed to the well-disguised reality of police brutality towards Black people in May 2020 when the entire world watched the death of George Floyd. For me, that's when my white-tinted glasses fell off and shattered in front of me. I was exposed to a whole new world, the reality that I needed to face as a woman of colour. A reality that has hurt me and will continue to hurt me that I was entirely oblivious to.

I was overwhelmed because when I lost those glasses, I felt dumb like I was missing information that everyone else had. I felt like I was an idiot for not knowing how extensively racism has impacted and will impact my life, especially in predominantly white spaces. I also felt invalid as a woman of colour because I did not know since I was never raised around Black culture. When people would ask me questions about racism and Black history, I had no clue how to answer them seven times out of ten. Those interactions were very invalidating, not because people asked me, but because I didn't have the slightest clue on how to answer them. Those white-tinted glasses blinded me from the world around me. When I lost them, I had no understanding of myself because I only understood the world from a white perspective.

Another very detrimental impact of losing my white tinted glasses was how I became extremely anxious. I found myself worrying a lot more about the environments I was in. For

example, I was worried that someone was watching me all the time or that people I saw had intentions of hurting me. This was not the case, but my brain panicked because the sense of self I had growing up was shaken, and nothing felt familiar anymore. Those glasses likely protected me from a lot of isolation as a kid, but they ruined me when I was eighteen. I was terrified and felt like a shell of myself. Based on my upbringing, half of my identity was underdeveloped and never understood. I only began to process that about a year and a half ago.

I can say I've made a lot of progress since losing my white-tinted glasses. I've reflected on my experiences and related it to the phrase "white tinted glasses" as a start. Now that those glasses and I have parted ways, it has created the opportunity for a valuable journey of self-discovery. I wish I could tell you that I have it all completely figured out, but I don't. I am only getting started. One thing that was very important to me was meeting other people of colour, especially Black women since I never grew up around other people of colour. I want a sense of community because I don't want to go through this experience alone. I'm not the only person who has dealt with anti-Black racism or is a woman of colour in primarily white spaces. It's vital to have a community because it can help me rationalize my insecurities and questions about my Black features. For example, caring for my curly hair or how my appearance is often fetishized as "caramel." That's part of the reason I was inclined to attend some QWOCC meetings last year and write for them this year. I am starting to feel connected to other women of colour with similar experiences and backgrounds.


I have also realized that I shouldn't be ashamed to learn and do so publicly and actively. In the past, I've felt very ashamed of not having the understanding I do now about racism and the Black identity. I deserved to have it, but it was never my fault because I was young and couldn't control it because I didn't even know what it was. Six months ago, I couldn't imagine writing so honestly about one of the biggest obstacles in my life right now, but I am doing so unashamedly. Learning about what it means to be a biracial Black woman has become very important to me. I now understand that I have a unique positionality, but I want to know the nuances of my identity, too. How will my specific identity influence my future, and how has it impacted events in my past? My questions are not answered yet, but I am nevertheless very committed to discovering their answers. I know that there's no 100% right or wrong answer, but I want to entrench myself in this and navigate these questions and find what makes the most sense to me.

My reflection on being a woman of colour has just begun, as my story has shown. It took me a long time to get to this point, but I am glad I made it and am excited to keep moving forward. I wish I were brought up around Black culture and people, so I didn't have to live with my white-tinted glasses for as long as I did, but that process has made me stronger. I am more dedicated to learning and understanding it as an adult with an open mind to rationalize and connect the patterns between the institutions of our society and the events of my life. Every day, I am grateful I've lost those glasses because regardless of how scary it was at first, I can now live my life more authentically and experience and understand my reality correctly now.

Why Doesn't It Love Me

By Cathy Huang

Hi, I'm Cathy Huang and I'm a first-year Fine Arts/Con-Ed student here at Queens. I enjoy making art that reflects my experiences of growing up in Canada as a Chinese woman of colour.



The Value of ‘Chineseness’: How the ‘Culture as a Resource’ Discourse Manifests Itself into the Gentrification of Vancouver’s Chinatown

By Jady Kuah

Jady Kuah (she/her) is a graduating fourth-year student in Global Development and Environmental Studies. Throughout her undergraduate career, she has been active in the Queen’s community through environmental activism as the Co-President of Queen’s Backing Action on the Climate Crisis (QBACC) and equity work with the Queen’s Advocacy Coalition. Her essay was written about her hometown of Vancouver and draws on her experience as an Asian-Canadian in different spaces.

Located on the east side of Vancouver’s bustling urban centre, Chinatown has remained a vitally important site of cultural heritage and authentic local businesses for many Asian-Canadians and the rest of the city’s diverse population. Chinatowns worldwide serve as a culturally safe space for Chinese minorities and are perceived as ‘ethnic enclaves’ by Western hegemonic society. From the 1800s, the Canadian Pacific Railway’s construction facilitated Chinese immigration primarily from Southern China, where immigrants began settling in the neighbourhood. Facing anti-Asian racism and backlash from the white majority, the area was cited as ‘dirty’ and undesirable from its founding and has remained somewhat constrained within these prejudicial narratives, as the neighbourhood has failed to rapidly develop with the remainder of the city.

In this research paper, I will answer the question, “how does the discourse of ‘culture as a resource’ manifest itself in the context of Vancouver’s Chinatown’s gentrification?” I will examine the intersections of culture and development within Western settler societies and how culture is valued or antagonized based on its economic contributions by the white majority. Background on the contextual history of Chinese immigration to Canada, the connection between racialized spaces and culture, and Indigenous land dispossession are relevant to contemporary debates surrounding Chinatown and the neighbouring Downtown Eastside’s (DTES) development. Although the neighbourhood faces significant issues including its ageing infrastructure and low-income residents, I argue Chinatown’s gentrification commodifies the neighbourhood’s rich history, culture, and notions of the romanticized Orient for the rising white ‘creative class,’ while failing to address historic and systemic inequities of its original residents. The lack of investment over the centuries and especially over the last few decades provides an opportunity for the government and developers to ‘preserve and refurbish’ Chinatown under the guise of “cultural revitalization” whilst causing unaffordable housing and cost of living, resulting in the displacement of the residents who built up Chinatown to what it is today.

Asian Diaspora & Migration to Vancouver

During the 1800s, Chinese migrant workers rushed to North America under “the promise of escape [from political instability] and the prospect of wealth,” notably during the height of the Gold Rush and Canada’s industrial development westward (Lui, 2004). Beginning in 1881, the Canadian Pacific Railway’s construction sparked an influx of Chinese

immigrants and settlement, amassing over seventeen thousand Chinese workers receiving half the wage paid to whites (ibid). During its erection, hundreds of migrants died and were viewed as ‘throwaways,’ often accepting unsafe work on the sides of mountains or in dynamite blasts. The Chinese peoples were seen as an inferior class both morally and economically, impeding economic growth by sending their small remittances back to their families instead of investing locally (ibid).

Notably, over the 19th and 20th centuries, anti-Asian sentiment was rampant, as the white ruling classes feared Chinese infiltration within government and the economy. In 1907, anti-Asian mobs rampaged through the streets, breaking every storefront window, damaging up to twenty-six thousand dollars’ worth of property, and displacing over two-thousand people (Lui, 2004). Chinatown was perceived as “a place of filth and sin” that would overrun and corrupt the City (ibid). This is the following recount of a white woman’s perception of Chinatown in 1923:

Secret tunnels. Opium dens. White slavery. Inscrutable celestials in pigtails, with knives hidden up their silk sleeves. Gorgeous slant-eyed beauties with bound feet. Shadowy, sinister doorways. Ancient love drugs. Medicines from the tongues of wild serpents (Lui, 2004).

Reflecting the majority’s disgust with the Chinese, the federal government passed racist and discriminatory policies, including the Head Tax which was soon replaced by the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1923, to prohibit additional immigration for new workers or families. Treated merely as

disposable labour, the disempowered Chinese were to be sent back to famine-stricken China when they could no longer work or were forced to seek refuge in a network of underground tunnels.

Post-World War II, attitudes of the white majority slowly shifted towards racial acceptance. Chinese soldiers fought for Canada as the military was desperate for men. Their contribution to the war effort was rewarded in repealing the Exclusion Act, allowing families to reunite and even vote in state elections. Gradually, Chinatown's economic value was recognized and became a hub for ethnotourism, peaking as a popular cultural spot in the 1970s for all (Pottie-Sherman, 2013). The neighbourhood and its immigrant population's significance has made the City a hub for Asian investment and migration, creating a divide between city officials, who have encouraged investment for development purposes, and Vancouver's population, who have grown frustrated with an exponential increase in the cost of living. A different kind of anti-Asian sentiment is currently directed at new immigration from Mainland China as the middle-class 'falls behind,' and government fails to address affordable housing all over the City. To the state, new Asian immigration is accepted and increasingly valued based on their significant economic contributions to mainstream capitalist society and linear industrial development; however, those who fail to contribute in large sums, such as the Chinese aging population, are viewed as dependents.

BIPOC-Settler Relations & Indigenous Land Dispossession

To situate Chinatown within the context of settler-colonial society, it is essential to acknowledge the long history of

dispossession and displacement in Vancouver, particularly within the neighbouring DTES for the white upper-middle-class, beginning with removing the Squamish, Musqueam, and Tsleil-Waututh Nations on their unceded territories. While the Chinese population made positive strides in their perception by the state and society post-WWII, other racialized and working-class peoples were intended to be displaced under the discourse of “urban renewal” through legislation and urban planning (Kruger, 2019). Reproduced over the 20th century, other minority communities of colour have been forcibly displaced for ‘healthy’ white settlement and moralized as a form of ‘cleansing’ and ‘slum clearance’ (ibid). These neighbourhoods include the Japanese Canadian community on Powell Street who were justifiably uprooted based on national security threats during WWII; the Black community living in Hogan’s Alley during the 1960s; and the DTES’s Single Room Occupancy housing evicted for tourism during the 1986 World Expo (ibid). Immersed within global property markets, the rise of the real-estate capitalist class is increasingly pushing the urban poor out of Metro-Vancouver with little government protection, outpacing the creation of affordable housing. Today, the DTES’ population is two-thirds Indigenous from various communities across the country due to legal land dispossession. The DTES is a product of land appropriation, Indigenous social control by the settler state, BIPOC erasure, and the entrenchment of capitalistic blasé attitudes towards Indigenous peoples and non-contributors, such as the ageing Chinese population (Schatz, 2020). The colonial history of the treatment and lack of social services towards Indigenous peoples and non-conformers has manifested itself into pressing issues of substance abuse, sex work, and violence.

Chinatowns as ‘Ethnic Enclaves’ within Western Hegemonic Society

While Chinatowns can serve as cultural hubs and ‘safe spaces’ for Chinese immigrants and their descendants, they are an example of racial segregation and systemic racism within urban spaces (Anderson, 1987). Chinatowns represent histories of Western urban exclusion justified on the grounds of their inferiority. As mentioned, Asian immigrants were depicted negatively as subhumans in line with Darwinist and Orientalist views of the East as “lawless; opium addicted... [and] as evil and inscrutable,” unworthy of living in the same vicinity of their white counterparts (Anderson, 1987).

In both time and space, Chinatowns appear to be of an “unchanging nature, as some core traits of an ‘ethnic group,’” (Barbanteseva, 2016). In this manner, Chinese people are deemed to “belong to a different time and place of origin (and are therefore struggling to integrate [into the development of contemporary society]),” (ibid). Cultural traditions, such as Chinese New-Year festivals, and ethnotourism cater predominantly to Western tourists reinforce “temporal images of Chineseness,” freezing them in time and space; “spatial and cultural demarcation creates a delineation of space in restrictive terms, associated with a narrowly conceived cultural tradition,” thereby contributing to the exoticized, narrow, and eternal image of “Chineseness” to silence the agency of Chinese Canadians in combating restrictive narratives (ibid). Moreover, the presence of a large elderly population adds to “an additional aura of Chineseness and a sense of different, slow-paced, ageing and frail temporality to the area,” (ibid). These images of spatial representation of the migrant community is a societally “accepted and commodified

representation of difference,” in which Asian Canadians are seen as ‘forever foreigners’ in a society that is not ‘theirs’ (ibid). Thus, this portrayal of China in opposition to the West depicts this duality in which Chinese culture must be ‘rescued’ from the influences of modernity while simultaneously excluded from Vancouver’s urban modernization, resulting in its demise.

Response to Gentrification & City Development

For the last few decades as Vancouver developed into a world-renowned global city, Chinatown and the DTES have remained mostly isolated and untouched because of its perception as a ‘dirty,’ violent and undesirable as “Canada’s poorest postal code.” Particularly over fears of Hong Kong’s handover back to the Chinese republic in the 1980s, an influx of new immigrants arrived in Vancouver; however, this wave of immigration turned towards Richmond, a southern suburb, with more open space and aesthetically beautiful landscape, and lower property values compared to the central business district (Pottie-Sherman, 2013). Richmond’s rapid development with a majority Chinese population has ‘eroded’ the original Chinatown’s cultural and economic value through heritage tourism and offering of a uniquely authentic Chinese culture. In this manner, Richmond presents the same if not a more diverse experience of Chinese and other Asian cultures without the fear of poverty or crime (Pottie-Sherman, 2013). In the hopes of attracting people back to visit Chinatown, the Chinatown Night Market was launched but ultimately lost its short-lived competition to the ongoing Richmond Night Market that catered to the growing suburban Chinese population in 1999 (ibid).

Stemming from the 1800s, racist ideology towards Asian and Indigenous populations manifests itself into contemporary development contexts (Anderson, 1987). The lack of investment, crime, and crumbling infrastructure provide an opening for the government and real-estate capitalists to intervene and gentrify Chinatown. Under discourses of “cultural revitalization,” these powerful entities assume a moral position of divinity to save Chinatown from the ‘unintelligent, destitute, and poor Orientals,’ further reinforcing patronizing and hierarchical “us [white majority] vs them [minorities]” logic (Moreton-Robinson, 2011). This attitude of white saviourism affirms white people as the mediator to articulate the ideas of the racialized ‘Others’ and realize their full economic potential using their once-shunned culture as a resource to usher the neighbourhood into modernization and keep up with the rest of the City. The response to the gentrification of Chinatown and surrounding areas, in which these neighbourhoods are forced to either define that space as a ‘pure’ and ‘authentic’ cultural artifact or forced to change by the majority along with new fashionable city development (Barabantseva, 2016). In this case, Vancouver’s Chinatown does both by characterizing its space as a place of difference based on Chinese aesthetics and welcoming upscale developments driven by new entrepreneurship; however, it pivots from its original demographic of Chinese immigrants to young white people, who are largely ignorant to its history of racist exclusion and contemporary displacement as a result of gentrification. The municipal government masquerades its gentrification as ‘cultural revitalization,’ but that begs the question, who for?

City planners “feel strongly that Chinatown will not survive

if it continues to rely on the packaging of ‘traditional’ Chinese culture for tourists,” and thus, must cater to the young (Pottie-Sherman, 2013). Chinatown’s rich history, culture, and notions of the romanticized Orient all contribute to its economic value. Drawing on its rich iconography and stereotypes, urban developers promote “consumptionscapes,” that offer an alternative to normative consumption to make spaces more desirable, catering to “the live-work-play philosophies of baby boom professionals and the ‘creative class’,” (ibid). Chinatown’s ‘authentic feeling of difference,’ exotification, and even poverty is highly attractive to this class of young thrill-seekers as Chinese immigrants and their children have moved into the suburbs. More ‘traditional’ “herbal shops, hair salons, and ‘knick-knack shops’” do not keep pace with twenty-first century models of business, relying too heavily on regular customers and unchanging to demands of greater consumption (ibid). Transforming low-culture into high-culture, new cafés, restaurants, nightclubs, and housing developments are increasingly tailoring to the needs of young white people, while failing to create affordable housing and social services for low-income Chinese elders or homeless residents. Moreover, the regeneration of the marketplace excludes local populations that have depended “on the space for access to cheap goods or a source of employment,” ultimately relocating the poor and “diminishing ‘levels of social mix, ethnic diversity, and immigrant concentration,” (Pottie-Sherman, 2013).

Analyzed within advertisements of Vancouver’s culinary scene in Chinatown and the DTES, the presence of racialized, marginalized, and poor residents is commodified for adventure seekers, offering a “affordable locales with a certain

edge – either gritty or ethnic – that places them appropriately outside the mainstream,” (Burnett, 2014). Local media and critics praise these establishments over their bravery to open in such seedy neighbourhoods and inspire curiosity within the upper-middle class for a unique dining experience while reproducing colonial and Oriental perceptions of both Chinese and Indigenous peoples. This kind of voyeurism accelerates the process of gentrification yet relies heavily on discourses of “the imagined spaces of an ungentrified DTES,” (ibid). In this manner, although general views towards the Chinese peoples have improved, notions of ‘the Other’ and culture are exploited and commodified for profit and economic development of capitalist society and marketed as a ‘revitalized out-of-the-norm’ experience without confronting the structures of oppression that maintain poverty and racism within Vancouver’s urban centre.

Conclusion

Over the course of two centuries, Vancouver’s historic Chinatown has undergone several changes, beginning with the settlement of Chinese immigrants during the Canadian Pacific Railway’s construction. The original Indigenous inhabitants of the land and other minority communities have been displaced from the City’s urban centre for white settlement. With the recent development of Richmond, Chinatown and the neighbouring DTES have deteriorated, lacking investment and access to basic social services and affordable housing. The discourse of ‘culture as a resource’ is instrumentalized by the municipal government and urban developers, commodifying Chinatown’s rich history, ‘feeling of difference,’ and poverty to the young up-and-coming class for consumption and economic profit under neoliberal urbanism, while

while simultaneously exacerbating income polarization, social exclusion, and displacing its original ethnic inhabitants. Nonetheless, Chinese and Indigenous community activism continues to apply pressure on the government to adequately respond to the affordability crisis and gentrification even if actively involved in the neighbourhood's redevelopment.

lost in translation

By Michelle Zeng

Michelle Li Zeng was born and raised in the GTA. Her short fiction and poetry has been published in Lake Effect 10 and Quilt. She enjoys exploring the concepts of home, belonging, and liminality in her writing.

曾维嘉

a name that is
yours
yet isn't

the brushstrokes
are inkblots
like words
on that scroll
of chinese calligraphy

that you never learnt how to read.

曾维嘉

a name that your
laozu gave you
but

not the name
on your birth certificate
(that one's in roman letters)

you fear that
when your parents
and family
are gone
your name

will disappear with them.

曾维嘉
a name from
your father's family
but

it breaks tradition
rupturing generational names
stretching back forever –

like how you are born
across the world
from the homeland

and the first word
you learn to write
is in

english, not chinese.

The Nature of Power Relations Between the Regime, the Religious Institutions, and the Minorities: The Case of Copts in Egypt From 2013 Till Present

By Lilian Estafanous

Lilian Estafanous is a senior Ph.D. candidate at Queen's University. Lilian's primary field is Comparative Politics. As a Teaching Assistant/Fellow, Lilian has taught a wide range of classes, including, Politics and Government, Governing Difference, Contemporary Regimes, and Diaspora in world Politics at Queen's University and the Royal Military College of Canada. She is a recipient of several academic fellowships and awards, including the Robert Sutherland Fellowship, Senator Frank Carrel Fellowship, Queen's Graduate Award, and Ontario Graduate Scholarship. Lilian's current research seeks to explain the political mobilization of the Egyptian Coptic Orthodox Community in Canada and the United States. Her doctoral research focuses on diaspora studies, the political mobilization of ethnic and religious minorities, and social movements studies.

The Copts are the native and indigenous religious community of Egypt that belongs to the Coptic Orthodox Church. In Egypt, Copts have maintained an ethnic identity distinct from Muslim Egyptians in terms of their history, culture, language, and religion. Copts survived the Byzantine Roman persecutions under the emperor's decree to enslave Christians, destroy all churches, and burn all holy books. The decree was conveyed for three years, a period that was known as the "Era of Martyrs".(1) The persecution of Copts continued during the Arab invasion of Egypt in the seventh century. Discrimination

Since 2013, the Egyptian government has taken critical but limited steps toward improving religious freedom conditions. El-Sisi has administered several reforms that returned a relative level of stability. Despite these positive signs from Egyptian leadership, there remain significant challenges to religious freedom in Egypt. How has the nature of power relations between the church and the regime been since 2013? How does the regime establish its legitimacy on a practical level among Copts in Egypt? Is the political role of the church desirable? Should the church withdraw from the political sphere and allow Copts to defend their interests by joining political parties and movements? How has the regime managed its relationship with organized Coptic advocacy groups and protest movements in Egypt and the diaspora? All these questions are part of this article's subject matter that highlights the relationship between the church as an institution, the Egyptian regime, and the Coptic population. The first section of this article will present the Copts' situation after the 2011 revolution and precisely the period between 2011-2013. The second section will provide a snapshot of the factors contributing to the ongoing institutionalized discrimination against Copts. The third section of this article will discuss the Copts' complex relations and their contested politics.

1. The Copts' Situation After the 2011 Revolution

The sense of anger among Egyptians escalated into general protests involving Copts and Muslims who pushed side by side against Mubarak's police and thugs on January 25, 2011. One of the most consequential outcomes of the January revolution was the rise of a revolutionary stream specific to the Copts. Coptic grievances were based on several concerns,

such as struggles over national identity, the sectarian character of Egyptian society, and the problematic institutional relationship between the Egyptian state and the Coptic Church. By February 11, Mubarak was gone. The Coptic Community became more disappointed with the unfolding of the post-revolution events, which contributed to their growing sense of despair. While Copts were initially optimistic about the revolution, they frequently mentioned that the numerous forms of injustice experienced under the Mubarak regime persisted after the revolution.

The transition period after the fall of Mubarak was a time of hardship that is characterized by: increasing polarization of Egyptian society, continued attacks against Copts , an increasing number of crimes, as well as general social, economic, and political instability. In 2012, after more than a year under the interim government of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, elections were held, and the Islamist Mohamed Morsi became the first democratically elected head of state in the entire history of Egypt in June 2012, only to be ousted in July 2013, after mass protests against his agenda. The opposition to Morsi was fueled both by religious minorities fear of discrimination and many Moderate Muslims' concern about a total Islamization of society. Throughout his presidential campaign, Morsi emphasized that he believed in equal citizenship for all, irrespective of religious affiliation. Most of Egypt's Coptic Christians were suspicious of voting for Morsi and had profound fears of the rise of an Islamist president.(2) Therefore, in the first round, many voted for other nominees, namely, Hamdin Sabbahi or Ahmad Shafiq. After a year into Morsi's presidency, sectarian violence has increased in

frequency and intensity. The Coptic minority realized they did not overestimate the threat to their rights. The Muslim Brothers and their Freedom and Justice Party could not ensure public safety, especially for Copts, as they had no vision or experience of state power. Morsi did not have a single Coptic advisor, someone with the slightest familiarity with the lives and practices of Copts. Even though the sectarian violence's record, is either incomplete or unreported in most cases. Data from the Egyptian press show that the number of sectarian attacks rose from 45 in 2010 to 70 in 2011, the year of the revolution that toppled Hosni Mubarak, to 112 in 2012.(3) Undoubtedly, Christian and Muslim Egyptians suffer the effects of lack of security, robberies, break-ins, kidnappings for ransom, and verbal and severe cases of verbal and sexual assaults on women.

From February 2011 through July 2012, Copts have been active in street politics regarding both national issues and communal grievances. In 2012, there were 15 reported protests on the cases of individual Copts or matters of religious discrimination. The participants were organized Coptic movements and ordinary citizens, Christian and sometimes Muslim. Crucially, the protests were happening at public sites rather than church sites. The protesters' demands, however, have been met only very rarely. Finally, as the grassroots anti-Morsi Tamarod gained steam,(4) Copts called for Morsi's removal from office and new elections.(5)

Clashes between Morsi's critics and supporters in late June 2013 culminated in massive anti-Morsi protests on June 30, the first anniversary of his inauguration. The protests were the largest since the ouster of Mubarak and included calls from

Copts among liberal, moderate Muslim Egyptians for the military to intervene to oust Morsi. Many were injured, and more than a dozen were killed. The Church's patriarch, Pope Tawadros II, endorsed the July 2013 military intervention against Morsi. Since then, the Brotherhood and its supporters have seen the Copts as a conspiracy against Morsi. Pro-Morsi protesters, angry at the Church's backing of the military takeover, have attacked more Coptic churches and properties. In July 2013, the army announced the ousting of Morsi in response to the millions of Copts and Muslims demonstrations demanding his resignation.

Further violence, not stability, followed the coup. Islamists have targeted Copts since the military's ouster of former President Mohamed Morsi. Since Morsi's ouster on July 3, attacks on Christians have taken place in governorates across Egypt, including Minya, Luxor, North Sinai, Marsa Matrouh, Port Said, and Qena. After Morsi's removal on July 2013 by the military, pro-Morsi demonstrators gathered near the Rabaa al-Adawiya mosque in the Nasser City district of Cairo. The protesters refused to move before returning Morsi to the office. On August 14, 2013, the Egyptian police and armed forces cleared the demonstration camps after the military failed to end the six-week sit-ins by peaceful means. The result was the killing of more than 800 protesters. Thousands of pro-Morsi protesters found the Rabaa incident as a catalyst for more waves of church burnings. In August 2013, arsonists destroyed no less than 43 churches in Upper Egypt, Beni Suef, and Fayyoun and attacked 207 properties.(6) Many human rights advocates stated that the surge in attacks was coming from disgruntled Morsi supporters.(7)

In such a tense and polarized situation, authorities should be on high alert to prevent sectarian violence, hold the perpetrators accountable, investigate whether security forces and the police took adequate measures to stop the attacks, and bring prosecutions as appropriate. However, this was not the case, and while Islamists were sometimes the aggressors, law enforcement officials often enabled the attacks. As in most attacks against Copts, security forces failed to take necessary action to prevent or stop the violence, and the authorities never even identified the culprits. The end of the Islamist government carried a sense of relief to Coptic communities. However, it remains to be known whether the transition delivered security or reproduced the regular practices of state officials who manipulated sectarian tension rather than addressing it. In 2014, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi was elected with 97 percent of the votes after a military coup. Many Egyptians saw the appointment of El-Sisi as a sign of inter-religious cooperation. Therefore he was welcomed by the Copts in Egypt and the diaspora alike. The Copts perceived in al-Sisi as a savior from the Muslim Brotherhood government. They found great support in the church reconstruction policies; religious tolerance and Copts recognition discourse; elimination of radical ideas from the Islamic discourse; calls to revolutionize Islam, and his firm declarations regarding punishing those guilty of sectarian violence. On many occasions, El-Sisi spoke of a new republic in Egypt that accommodated everyone without discrimination. El-Sisi appointed Manal Awad, the first Christian woman to hold that post, as the governor of Dumyat in September 2018. In late December 2019, El-Sisi appointed a committee to combat sectarianism. In January 2021, Egypt's Grand Mufti permitted Muslims to construct Christian churches as paid

labor. A month later, on February 9, 2022, the first Coptic Christian Judge, Boulos Fahmy Eskandar, was appointed as head of Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court, the highest judicial authority in the country. 8 The appointment was a promising step toward greater Coptic inclusion and representation in Egypt's public sphere. El-Sisi has also administered several reforms that returned relative stability, such as launching a government program and initiatives to promote inclusivity, addressing religious intolerance in rural areas, and eliminating intolerant references in the elementary public school curriculum.

The Copts' situation might have slightly improved in some aspects since 2013. However, as we approach the third decade of the 21st century, Copts are still deprived of their fundamental rights. Most importantly, the regime still deals with the Coptic concerns as a mere dossier or a file in the hands of national security rather than being a high-priority citizenship issue under the president's responsibility. The following is a snapshot of the enduring discrimination against Copts that have existed in the past and persisted after 2013.

2. A Reality Snapshot: Factors of Persistent Institutionalized Discrimination

2.1. The Census of Copts: Due to discrepancies between Coptic statistics in the Egyptian Census and the Coptic Orthodox Church's estimates, the exact number of Copts residing in Egypt is in question. The National Civil Status Administration does not release accurate records, even though it has records of all citizens born after 1900.⁹ Census officials attempt to determine faith from a superficial examination of names, resulting in inaccurate statistics.⁽¹⁰⁾ Most experts

and media sources state that there are more than 15 million Copts in Egypt, making them the most extensive Christian Egyptian denomination and the most significant Christian domination in the Middle East and North Africa.(11)

The absence of reliable statistics on the Coptic community exemplifies the political sensitivities surrounding the Coptic issues in Egypt. In his book *Aqb ā t al- mahjar* , Magdi Khalil indicated that the government insists on denying the actual number of Copts because revealing the real number will permit Copts to demand their rights in proportion to their declared numbers which will open the door for more confrontations that the government is not ready for. 12 Sedra indicated that counting Copts means intervening in longstanding debates about fair representation and equality before the law.(13)

2.2. The Constitution: The question for the Copts is not only about identity, but the standing originated from their identity; are they to be given equal treatment before the law or, according to some extremist Islamist claims, forced to revert to a minority rank in a state ruled by the Shari'a (Islamic law)? The constitution declares that Islam is the state religion; therefore, even though the constitution states that Egyptians are equal before the law and that religious opinion is absolute, national identity, in constitutional terms, is linked to Islam. Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution indicates that all legislations are based on sharia law. Therefore, despite areas in the constitution that guarantee religious freedom rights, article 2 negates them all. The same goes for the rights of assembly, free speech, women's rights, divorce, and adoption, among others.

2.3. Executive, Judicial, Legislative and Government Positions:

Of the 33 ministers and 15 deputy ministers (as of December 2019) in the Egyptian government, there is only one junior Coptic minister (since September 2015). Of the 27 appointed governors and 23 deputy governors, there are two Copts, including a woman.(14) Out of 524 government-appointed heads of city, districts, or town councils, there is barely a single Copt.(15)

To prove Egypt's advancement concerning women, on March 3, 2022, 98 female judges took the oath to assume judicial roles in the State Council. This step is an unprecedented achievement; since its inception 75 years earlier, no woman had sat on the podium of the State Council court. Nevertheless, non of the new hires is a Christian. The percentage of Copts in the judiciary bodies is kept below two percent, while there was not a single Copt in the supreme judiciary council before 2022.(16) Copts account for 10-20% of the nation's population. Therefore, at least 10 of 98 should have been Copts for proper representation.(17)

Egypt currently has 135 ambassadors abroad and about 20 consul-generals. No Copts were appointed to any major Western, non-Western capital, international organization, or Arab or Muslim country, and no Copts were appointed consul-general.18

In the current parliament, Of the 596 parliament members, there are 39 Copts. That represents barely six percent. Their representation is also linked to the constitutional provision (Art. 244) of temporary unspecified measures to favor particular groups (Women, Copts, Farmers, and workers) to

be elected on a restricted list.(19)

2.4. Army, Police, and Special Services: Copts have also been excluded from high-ranking Egyptian police and armed forces positions. Copts' acceptance rate each year at the military and the police academies is always below two percent. Also, no Copts are among the National Defence Council members. Copts are also prohibited from working for intelligence services or national security apparatuses.(20)

2.5. University Positions: In the 25 public (state-run) universities in Egypt. These public universities include over 450 faculties, with more than 1,550 leadership positions (university president, vice president, dean, and vice dean); Only a handful of these are occupied by Copts.²¹ In 2022, the president of Cairo University, Muhammad Uthman al-Khosht, assigned 31 new directors, deputy directors, managers, and researchers to head several departments, not one of them being Christian.²² Moreover, admission to regular military and police colleges is limited to Muslim students.

2.6. Freedom of worship: Examples of persisting religious constraints are: 1) Religious affiliation is still a requirement in the ID cards and all official and private application forms, commercial contacts, and notarized acts; 2) The authorities can instantly change one's religious affiliation in case of conversion to Islam, but the reverse is impossible; 3) dozens of women are coerced to convert to Islam, including several cases of underage girls; 4) a unified law to regulate the building of all houses of worship has been rejected. Instead, a separate church law was adopted, which left the entire process

in the hands of the national security department. Caroline Doss, Coptic solidarity executive committee president, stated during one of the Coptic Solidarity conferences, “the 2016 church law is intrinsically discriminatory, and it doesn’t advance the life of Copts because it is not unified.”(23) Moreover, the Church Building Law of 2016 (Law 80/2016) is considered the first Law of its kind in Egypt to grant building approvals for churches. However, governors have approved only eight new churches since the passage of the Law, including three properties in new and currently uninhabited urban developments.(24) They have issued few to no permits for new churches in Christian-inhabited communities such as Upper Egypt, where thousands of Christians have no local churches, which doesn’t contribute to the Copts’ growth.(25)

3. Complex Relations and Copts’ Contested Politics

Although Copts’ activists have seemed to be effective in raising awareness of the Copts’ dilemma after the revolution, the Copts’ inability to overcome the existing challenges can be explained by the following set of complex relations, whether in the homeland or the diaspora.

3.1. The Rift Between the Church, the Regime, and the Copts

The relationship between the Church as an institution and the Egyptian regime, as well as the Church and the Coptic population, is volatile, at times highly cooperative, and at others highly conflictual. The relationship between the Copts and their Church remains complicated as the Church’s and the Copts’ interests are not always aligned. Since the 1950s, The Coptic Orthodox Church has been the sole political and social representative of the Coptic community through its alliance with the Egyptian government.(26) Copts were

marginalized from national politics, which included the activism of Coptic political parties and social movements. Mariz Tadros describes the treatment of Copts by the state as a patron-client relationship in which the state offers the Coptic community limited services (e.g., concessions of church permits) to guarantee its political loyalty.(27) Paul Rowe also describes this church policy as a mutually reinforcing neo-millet partnership in which the church supports the state, and the state awards legitimacy to the church.(28) Nevertheless, none of these services addresses the country's uneven legal and institutional policies. Adel Guindy explained, having the Church as the main interlocutor between the state and the people appears to be a strategy to exert pressure indirectly on the Copts.(29) Therefore, for years, the Church's attitude towards any oppositional political activity from the Copts was negative and restricting.

There is no doubt that hierarchal institutions such as the Church generally consider obedience one of its primary principles. By encouraging Copts to depend on the Church to channel their political demands, many Copts in Egypt became isolated and discouraged from joining political parties or civil movements to defend their rights.

2011 has witnessed the active participation of Copts outside formal directions of the Church and the previous regime's support. The Maspero Youth Union and the Coalition of Copts for Egypt are good examples. The Maspero Youth Union, mobilized in October 2011, is one of the most prominent Coptic youth activist groups of the 2011 Egyptian revolution. Its vision was to contest the hegemony of the Coptic Orthodox Church in Egyptian national politics and

and invite the Church to withdraw from the political sphere. Therefore the group encouraged young Copts to express their grievances and advocate for themselves by joining political parties and movements. The demonstrations were no longer in front of the Cathedral in Cairo or in a local church to mobilize the church as an intermediary with authorities, but they were held in open public spaces where they could be directly heard by the state and other citizens.(30) Initially, the Maspero Youth Union had organized a protest in front of the Maspero television building in Egypt to react to the September 30 attack on the Mar Girgis (St. George) Church in Marinab, Aswan, in which the police and public prosecutors failed to investigate the incident and issued an order to settle the inter-communal conflict by informal reconciliation committees.(31) The youth protests led to the Maspero massacre of October 9, 2011, which ended in a shocking confrontation between the military, unknown thugs, and the protesting youth, lasting throughout the night. The result was twenty-seven deaths and more than three hundred wounded after Egyptian military vehicles ran over protestors marching from Dowaran Shoubra to the Maspero state television building. (32) In the aftermath of the shock, Copts activists accused the military and the police of severely attacking freedom of peaceful assembly and expression. Nonetheless, the authorities did not take any legal action against the perpetrators. The authorities' passive attitude, which has become familiar and predictable over time, heightened the tension in the Egyptian community and deteriorated the relationship between Copts and Muslims.

Although this movement presented itself as a civilian movement and promoted liberal civil ideas, it did not shy

away from its unique Coptic identity. The MYU has attempted to promote political secularism as a remedy to intra-communal conflict over the position of the Coptic Orthodox Church. Meanwhile, the group has stressed its Coptic identity through religious symbols at protest events. By asserting a distinct Coptic cultural identity in the public sphere, outside of Church walls, the MYU has challenged the limits of state and Church regulation on religious expression and resisted the demands of the Church for political quietism. To a certain extent, the Church's leadership started to step away from the corporatist approach of Pope Shenouda. For example, Bishop Musa, the Bishop for Youth, has emphasized that Copts, as citizens, have the right to demonstrate without violence or offensive slogans. (33)

3.2. The Relationship Between the Authorities/ Police In Egypt and Copts

Copts Activists found it challenging to lead a change in the Egyptian policy towards the Coptic minority without changing discriminatory legislation or the Egyptian authorities' attitude towards the perpetrators of violence. The following two examples can explain the attitude of the police and the authorities in Egypt towards sectarian violence.

The cases of human trafficking and forced conversion of girls in Egypt documented the following emerging trends: 1) in each case, no investigative report has been completed, meaning there is complete immunity for those who traffic Coptic girls and women; 2) the police refuse to use words such as disappeared or kidnapped when writing the report. They use the word absent, even when there is evidence of trafficking; 3) when families know the name of abductors and

individuals involved with the crime, police refuse to include the suspects' names in their initial police reports; 4) in most cases where the Coptic woman or girl is returned to her family, the police order the family to stop speaking publicly about the kidnapping and are often complacent about those disappearances; 5) the police drop charges without presenting the case to courts. Therefore, none of the known perpetrators have been brought to trial; 6) This reveals that police often know details of the trafficking and where the women are being held if they can suddenly recover them without any new leads in the case. (34)

Throughout August 2022, eleven Coptic churches in Egypt "caught fire" over two weeks of spam. Two incidents (Imbaba and Minya) were significant, while others were minor. In every one of these fires, the firefighters were absent, as they did not receive an order from the police to take action. Most importantly, Egyptian authorities denied the motivation, citing causes such as faulty wiring or electric overloads. Ibrahim explained that the idea of arson being responsible for at least some of the fires is apparent because, over the decades, fanatic Muslims have set hundreds of Coptic Christian churches aflame in Egypt.(35) The fires occurred during Virgin Mary fast (Aug.7-21), an important holiday on the Coptic Orthodox calendar, when churches were incredibly packed. Moreover, that timeframe coincided with the anniversary of Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers torching 62 Coptic churches in Egypt in 2013. Finally, not one Muslim mosque caught fire during this same timeframe, and the 11 incidents barely received any attention in local media. The government was rapid to call them accidental fires. The government's lack of response and lack of investigation is part

of the problem.

3.3. The Relationship Between the Egyptian Government and Copts Diaspora Activists

Copts in Canada and the U.S., the two largest Coptic communities outside of Egypt. Different estimates suggest that by the late 1990s, of the approximately 1.7 million Egyptian émigrés, there were about 450,000 to 500,000 Copts in the US and 250,000 to 350,000 in Canada, and at least a total of 200 Coptic Orthodox churches in North America.(36) As of 2013, researchers estimated that about 350,000 Copts settled in the U.S. before the 2011 revolution and 100,000 additional Copts settled in the US after the revolution.(37) Many came to the U.S. and Canada on grants of asylum. By 2018, there were half-million Copts in the United States, and there were more than 250 Coptic churches compared to 50 Coptic churches during the 1990s.(38)

Diaspora Activism grew within an exceptional environment of intolerance and anxiety. However, despite the Egyptian authorities' attempts to monitor and intimidate Copts' diaspora activists, the latter defended Coptic rights beyond the limits of political organizations in Egypt. For example, the continued attacks against Copts after the revolution contributed to the growing sense of despair among the Coptic diaspora. Therefore, the sites of the most significant inflow of Coptic immigrants in North America (e.g., Toronto, Montreal, and New York) witnessed the highest volume of mass demonstrations and public political rallies. The established Coptic associations in North America have sought to globalize the socio-political grievances of Coptic Christians in Egypt. However, they may have promoted different

ideological or strategic approaches to achieving this end.

To understand the current interactions between the government and the Copts' diaspora, it is crucial to identify past relationships. In his book *Aqb ā t al- mahjar* , Khali further argues that the government's treatment of the Copts diaspora as a threat is due to two factors: first, the non-understanding of the nature of living abroad and the freedoms provided and, second, the desire to silence Copts diaspora to mislead the public opinion in Egypt instead of dealing with the Copts issues directly.(39) Up to the early 1970s, The Egyptian government perceived the Coptic diaspora as a population that would contribute to Egypt's economic development. Afterward, Copts in the diaspora became a risk to the national cause, no longer partners in it. Eventually, political suppression and renewal of mutual and agreeable relations between the Church and state in Egypt paralyzed the role of diasporic organizations. Consecutive governments in Egypt framed diaspora activism as an ideological threat to destabilize Egyptian society and its economy. They frequently characterized the Copts' diaspora as fanatics, extremists, unpatriotic, and inherently less loyal for choosing to leave. (40) Correspondingly, churches began to criticize diaspora activism, and many immigrant church bishops who supported diaspora activism to relax the situation in Egypt were dispatched by the Pope. According to Copts activists, the main problem is the government's denial of the presence of a significant national crisis and the minimization of the challenges the Copts face. Therefore, the Copts' diaspora experience with the Egyptian government was discouraging as the government's discriminatory policies added extra dimensions to the problem. The homeland's lack of support

and intense opposition to outside nationals have resulted in problematic relationships, limited diasporic engagement in homeland politics, and compromised the diasporas' overall lobbying abilities.

Another significant aspect of the diaspora activists' relationship with the Egyptian government is the fear of retaliation. The government-diaspora relations appear complex and laden with suspicion, resentment, and ambivalent feelings. Consecutive governments have described diaspora activism as being hostile to Egypt, unnecessarily politicized pressure, a conspiracy against Egypt that constitutes a sovereignty threat, and an illegitimate way of external intervention in Egypt's internal affairs. Most activists, during interviews with the researcher, expressed their concerns due to the history of the reprisal mechanisms that the government used to silence opposition, whether in Egypt or the diaspora. They explained that the successive Egyptian regimes intended to undermine, silence, and punish "disloyalty" among their diaspora using mechanisms of transnational repression such as retraction of citizenship and restriction of homeland visits to harassment once they decide to visit their home country, confiscation of property, and persecution of their direct families in Egypt. In other words, the threats posed by transnational repression propagated fear and mistrust, significantly constrained activists' abilities to talk about home-country politics with other co-nationals in-person or online, and relegated minority mobilization to fringe exile groups.

Conclusion

The Copts, who participated in the modernization movement

in the late 19th century and fully engaged in the national revival movement of the early 20th century, after some initial reluctance, joined in the 2011 uprising that ended in toppling Mubarak's regime and the 2013 popular movement that ended with the toppling of the Brotherhood regime. In all these cases, the hope was to build the foundation for a more inclusive and egalitarian system. Nevertheless, most of the Copts feel they are chasing after the wind.

The complex relationships between Copts, the church, and the state provided a robust explanation of the factors that impacted the cohesions and sustainability level of Copts' advocacy work in Egypt and the diaspora. The analysis demonstrated that these complex relationships limited the Copts' ability to mobilize as human rights advocates and provided a non-sustainable and incohesive level of activism.

Copts recognize the complexity Coptic Leaders in Egypt face in dealing with the multidimensional persecution of Copts. However, The importance of this news is not so much that intolerance against Christians in Egypt exists but that it seems to invade all aspects of life. In other words, whereas violence and persecution against Egypt's Christians are not uncommon, institutionalized and open discrimination against them infiltrates every aspect of Egyptian society. Therefore, the problem is not about electing the wrong people but that the elected leaders did not address the structural shortcomings of the legal and political system.

While Copts have great faith in El-Sisi himself, the question of why these incidents are persistent remains unanswered. The relationship between the Police, army, president, Copts, and

Islamists remains puzzling and ambiguous. The current situation can be seen in this light: Coptic complaints about Morsi grew stronger during his twelve-month period. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists showed the Copts' political dilemma and struggles wide-open. Thus, the termination of Egypt's first Islamist presidency did not necessarily present a golden age for Muslim-Coptic relations. The absence of a practical legal framework for all Egyptians and institutional guarantees for rights explains why violence against Copts continues to shake the country. To produce a more inclusive and stable government and prevent future bloodshed, Egyptian leaders must go beyond scapegoating Islamists and promote citizenship. Together, leaders and state security should uphold the rights of religious minorities, take measures against sectarian violence, and facilitate the safe and voluntary return of people who had to flee their homes. On the other hand, the Church should allow Copts to defend their interests themselves by joining political parties and movements. The Coptic Church should also transform itself from a state-oriented Church into a civil society that defends universal ideals such as human rights and social justice, and supports developmental projects for both Muslims and Christians. Such an approach will help bridge the gap between the two religious communities, particularly in Upper Egypt, where religious affiliations are predominant and state institutions are fragile .

Secession or Death? Towards Resolving the Protracted Conflict in Western Sahara

By Nicholas Donaldson

Nicholas Donaldson is a 4th Year Undergraduate at Queen's University from Vancouver, British Columbia. He is majoring in Political Studies, specialising in International Relations, with a minor in History. In the fall of 2023, he will be pursuing an MSc in International Relations in the Netherlands. His research interests include international political economy, political ecology, EU-Middle East Relations, the Western Sahara conflict, and authoritarian neoliberalism.

Introduction

In a protracted conflict such as that of the Western Sahara, resolution becomes a question of diffusing tensions and mitigating violence whilst appeasing both sides. Despite numerous attempts to bring both sides to the table, none of the belligerents have been entirely pleased with the processes. Talks have stalled and good will has stagnated. The question remains – how one resolves a multi-generational conflict over territory, political sovereignty, and autonomy in a state characterized by hybrid authoritarianism, corruption, and violent repression. As such, in this paper I will argue that the deadlocked nature of the Western Sahara conflict has exacerbated tensions in the region. Rather than attempt to graft an autonomous region onto Morocco, secession and demographic repatriation as a means of last resort may become a necessary policy response in light of the resumption of conflict in 2020. However, this carries with it significant consequences.

The first section will be dedicated to the historical contexts of the Western Sahara while the second briefly explores the territorial claims of both sides in the conflict. The third will detail its deadlocked nature. Consequently, the final two sections will attempt to explain why the most recent Moroccan proposal for the regional autonomy of the Western Sahara has failed and why bilateral or regional negotiation in a bid to promote recognition of the SADR might prevent further hostilities and permanently resolve the conflict. It must also be noted the original draft of this research article was written prior to the nullification of the 1991 Ceasefire Agreement in November of 2020 and has undergone revisions to better reflect current realities on the ground.

Historical Context

The Spanish Sahara was ruled as a Spanish colony from 1884 to 1976. Conflict in the Western Sahara first arose in the 50s during the Ifni War when Moroccan independence forces, free from French colonial rule, began incursions into the Spanish territory in a bid to regain control of what it believed was its former and rightful territory (SSI, 2013). The conflict ended with the northernmost enclaves of Spain changing hands to Morocco. The United Nations (UN) made calls to decolonize and hold a referendum in the region numerous times between 1966 and 1974 (1966; 1975). During this time, Spain gradually ceded the territories of Tarfaya and Ifni to Moroccan military and international pressure as conflict and protest flared up throughout the Spanish Sahara (SSI, 2013; Besenyő, 2017). However, with the signing of the Madrid Accords on November 14th, 1975, and their later ratification in Spanish parliament following fascist dictator Francisco Franco's death, Spain ceded the territory of the Spanish Sahara to

Mauretania and Morocco, a move in contravention with international law (Arkell, 1991). Days earlier, King Hassan II of Morocco led a strategic mass demonstration on November 6th of 350,000 Moroccan peoples escorted by some 20,000 Moroccan soldiers in opposition of Spanish involvement in the region called the Green March (Weiner, 1979). The move was opposed by the international community and prompted a mass exodus of tens of thousands of Sahrawi refugees fleeing to Algeria, the interior of the Sahara, and into occupying Morocco (Jensen, 2013). Locally, loose militias and rebel fighters opposed to both colonial rule and the expanding Maghreb powers waged a guerilla conflict (Jensen, 2013; SSI, 2013; Besenyő, 2017). They will quickly organise into the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro, or the Polisario Front, backed by Algeria. In resistance to the aggression of Mauretania and Morocco, the Front launched a civil war in support of the newly declared Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). They used military training and equipment they had gained during the previous Ifni War and their familiarity with the local environments (SSI, 2013; Besenyő, 2017).

The annexation of territory left the SADR in exile in Algeria, with the Polisario Front coordinating their insurgents and assaults in unison. The SADR was forced to engage in guerilla tactics due to inferior budgets, training, and equipment (Besenyő, 2017). Despite this, asymmetric warfare would prove effective and remain a common factor. The disproportionate use of violence by Morocco, for example the white phosphorus, napalm, and fragmentation bombing of refugee camps, merely strengthened the resolve of the Front and its people (Jensen, 2013). The war raged for sixteen years

with little end in sight as UN and state-sponsored efforts had failed. While Mauretania backed away from the conflict, Morocco remained vigilant.

The Front sought international and political legitimacy through the establishment of stable leadership and bureaucratic institutions, the provision of services to diaspora and refugee populations, and the development of democratic structures (Wilson & McConnell, 2015). Morocco's response was the gradual construction of a 2,700-kilometre-long sand berm equipped with tens of thousands of mines and soldiers, solidifying their control over 80% of the territory and enabling exploitation of the region's economic potential (AOAV, 2018; Dahir, 2020). Change came when the UN, seemingly unable to deter Hassan II's claims of the bay'a, brokered an agreement for a free and fair referendum on the nature of the self-determination, autonomy, or integration of the Sahrawi peoples in exchange for a ceasefire with the Polisario Front in 1991 (UNSC, 1991). Despite this victory for the Sahrawis, it quickly dissolved into turmoil with renewed hostilities and apparent concerns from the Kingdom of Morocco surrounding what the parameters and results of the referendum might be. Haggling over whether descendants of refugees or current occupants of the territory would be allowed to participate in the referendum forestalled progress (Daadaoui, 2008; Crivelente, 2018; Grass, 2019; Lovatt & Mundy, 2020). To this date, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has been extended for almost thirty years, and in spite of the agreement, a referendum has yet to be held.

The situation of the Western Sahara can only be characterised

as colonial. Imperial rule from the monarch and his collection of carefully negotiated business interests and faux parliamentary procedure has enabled extraction of minerals (Brour, 2020; Allan & Ojeda-Garcia, 2021), fish (Lovatt, 2021), major agribusiness (Benamar, 2018; Bossenbroek & Ftouhi, 2021), and green energy investments (WSRW, 2021), mass human rights violations (HRW, 2019; 2020), and cultural suppression akin to genocide (Gall, 2015). It has been likened to the experience of the Black majority in Apartheid South Africa or of Palestinians in Israel (Williams, 2015; Lovatt & Mundy, 2021).

Territorial Claims

The enduring nature of the Western Saharan conflict can be explained simply: both sides represent irreconcilable positions entrenched in centuries of nationalism and the belief in self-determination.

The Kingdom of Morocco's claim to the territory lies in a historical legal tie between the Sultans of Morocco and the tribes of the Sahrawi, known as Bay'a or fealty (Daadaoui, 2008). In return, the Sahrawi chiefs would be appointed as qaids or "civic governors over their respective peoples," collecting taxes for the Sultanate (Pham, 2020: p. 4). This is a claim the Kings of Morocco have maintained in proclaiming the restoration of Greater Morocco, invoking the pervasive nationalist vigour amongst the citizenry to gain support. As stated by Jerome Weiner:

To view Morocco's campaign to annex the Western Sahara in purely economic or imperialist terms is to ignore massive evidence of the deeply-felt Moroccan belief in historical and

legal claims based upon Islamic concepts of allegiance and sovereignty (1979: p. 33).

This is to say that, undoubtedly, the Moroccan public supports, and would be angered by the failure of, the policies pursued by both King Hassan II and his successor, King Mohammed VI. Despite this, it is worth noting that, prior to the invasion, King Hassan had used this nationalistic fervour to “maximise support” for the monarchy (Joffé, 2010: 375). This political project of conquest and colonisation is intensified by the longstanding tension between the monarchs’ ambitions for the forced settlement and redevelopment of tribal/nomadic communities and their land (Arkell, 1991).

However, the Polisario Front maintains the position that while the Bay’a existed, it is not evidence of sovereignty, an assertion supported by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) . The Front contends that they represent the Sahrawi people and the SADR and the call to decolonise the Spanish Sahara and grant self-determination by the United Nations (UN) in 1965 remains. They affirm that “ the inalienable right of the peoples of Ifni and Spanish Sahara to self-determination” are guaranteed by General Assembly (GA) resolution 1514 (XV) and cannot be stymied by the Moroccan government (United Nations, 1965). This opinion was reaffirmed by both the ICJ and the EU Court of Justice, with the ICJ issuing a unanimous advisory opinion that the “legal ties did not entail territorial sovereignty” between any entities, and the European Court of Justice not only recognizing their right to self-determination but acknowledging the illegitimacy of the Moroccan exploitation of the region (ICJ, 1975; Leigh Day, 2019).

The African Union (AU) has similarly recognized both the claim of Sahrawi independence and the legitimacy of the SADR (Cowell, 2013). This is rooted in several rationales: a) the distinct colonial histories of French Morocco and the Spanish Sahara, b) the membership of the SADR, and c) the UN GA resolution 1514. These were foundational in the early assertion of West Saharan sovereignty and led to Morocco's political exile from the AU and regional African politics for decades. Both King Hassan II and Mohammed VI, alongside all parliamentary governments, have ignored these rulings and maintained their claims of sovereignty over the region. They view the territory as rightfully belonging to Morocco – an undeveloped uncivilised wasteland occupied by foreign dissidents. Newspapers owned or influenced by the monarch, state, and patron-clientelist networks related to the monarch decry opposition as “separatist and anarchist agenda[s]... fueled with hatred, defamation, and violence” (MWN, 2022).

Stagnant Crisis

While the 1991 ceasefire and attempted referendum might have seemed like a valuable solution at the time, it has proven to be effective only in mitigating conflict, not violence. Moreover, the unfortunate reality of the conflict is that neither side holds a competitive advantage, further exacerbating tension and prolonging the suffering of the Sahrawi people.

Given the positions of the two parties, it has become clear that the Moroccan government is not negotiating in good faith, nor are either side willing to compromise their position, leading to a prolonged ceasefire with no proper conclusion. Evidence of this, amongst many others, includes reports of

widespread human rights abuses, the coerced resettlement of Moroccans into the Sahara through mass subsidisation, and rapid development indicates a subversive agenda built around delaying negotiations to further disrupt the Sahrawi goal of self-determination (Niarchos, 2018). Indeed, it is worth noting the “Sahrawi people have benefited little” from the economic development and subsidies while the settlers have enjoyed prosperity (Grass, 2019).

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Consequently, it has done nothing but breed tensions during the ceasefire, a fact made worse by the aggression against Sahrawi protestors, activists, and journalists. As reported by Human Rights Watch (2019) and Amnesty International (2019), the Moroccan government and police have been involved in silencing journalists for dissenting, covering up rampant human rights violations and brutal crackdowns against the populace. While Morocco has announced investigations into many of these incidents, they “have not

disclosed the investigations' outcomes publicly," and continue to refuse to allow the UN to monitor human rights in their refugee camps (Human Rights Watch, 2019; Amnesty International, 2020). This is symptomatic of a culture of corruption and abuse stemming from the Palace to local police, and a primary driver of the current political deadlock (Jalal & Mustapha, 2016; Moustakbal, 2017; Hmimnat, 2021). Unfortunately, the regime's harsh tactics have been ineffective at quashing the protestors or their spirit, as the *New Yorker* has reported a palpable sense of vigour, especially amongst the younger generation of Sahrawi peoples, with some going as far as to say, "we are convinced war is the only way forward" (Niarchos, 2018). Since 2020, the ceasefire has been declared null and void by the SADR, citing stalled talks, blockades preventing the movement of goods, and violations of sovereignty and human rights.

Regional Autonomy

While many argue that the only feasible way forward is through the proposed *Baker Plan* or its later iteration as the *Moroccan Initiative for an Autonomy Plan* in April of 2007, autonomy has proven to be a contentious resolution. Dubbed the Sahara autonomous Region, the King claims he would grant its own government and parliament made up of directly elected representatives and those from local tribes. The region would have limited power over local taxes, budgets, and courts, issued in the name of the King. However, the territory retains Moroccan flag and currency, ceding authority over its foreign relations, security, defence, and ensuring its laws, regulations, and court ruling are consistent with the Kingdom's constitution. The King also claims the plan provides amnesty for political opponents, including SADR

leaders, who rebelled against the state. While it might be useful in mitigating ethnic conflict, as I will argue below, it has only served to forestall proper democratic order, subvert the international community, and entrench divisions, both isolating and marking the King's enemies for security forces.

Under the proposed Moroccan autonomy plan, the Western Sahara would be wholly annexed by the Kingdom of Morocco, with its sovereignty falling under the King. While the autonomous region would maintain day-to-day affairs, economic and institutional development, as described by the agreement, the King retains the right over exceedingly vague clauses such as “the constitutional and religious prerogatives of the King... territorial integrity... [and] the Kingdoms Juridical Order” (Embassy of Morocco, 2007). While one could classify this form of autonomy as a federacy, an autonomous region with constitutionally protected rights; the King can amend the constitution, ensuring the Sahrawis cannot feel safe under territorial autonomy (Government of Morocco, 2011).

Given their failure to uphold the terms of the MINURSO mandate, as well as the inclusion of possible autonomy on the ballot of the referendum itself, any and all ‘good faith’ the Moroccan Government might pretend to bargain under appears to be a façade. This narrative is reinforced by the open resettlement of Moroccans into the region through economic incentives which began with the Green March in 1975. For every 7 dirhams spent on state services, 1 dirham is made by the state in the region (El-Khalfi, 2015). From one perspective, this is a benevolent investment program for the people. However, it ignores the foreign governments,

multinational corporations, Moroccan elite, and creditors who benefit from this repressive and colonial apparatus. These resettlements, much like the autonomy plan, are solely to distract the international community and allow Morocco to reaffirm control. There are clear similarities between this system of forced resettlement and the Israeli efforts to dislocate and marginalize Palestinian claims for political rights, land, and autonomy (Williams, 2015; Crivelente, 2018; Badarin, 2021).

Considering this, one might be concerned about the prospect of a forced annexation and the creation of an autonomous state only leading to more violence. In 2019, the Arab Barometer found that 70% of Moroccans aged 18 to 29 had thought about emigrating, while an additional 49% desired rapid domestic political change: the highest of any country in the region (2019). As a country which narrowly avoided the deposition of its monarch during the Arab Spring, security remains of paramount importance to the Moroccan regime.

With the coming of the COVID-19 pandemic and staggering droughts, Morocco's GDP shrank by 13.8%, and is expected to contract an additional 6.3% (World Bank, 2020). The Russo-Ukrainian War has dramatically harmed their agriculturally oriented economy due to shortages of grain and fertilizer, while the spike in energy prices crippled overdrawn state budgets funding a country dependent on importing 90% of energy (Moustakbal, 2017; 2021; Fitch, 2022). Moreover, high government debt-to-GDP ratios (72%) with unemployment even pre-pandemic sitting at 10.2%, and almost twice as many exports as imports, economic growth has been difficult (Fitch, 2020; CIA, 2023). However, these

are not new developments. While today the poverty rate has dramatically fallen, NGO Oxfam found that 1 in 8 Moroccans are just above the poverty line and unlikely to fall below, deemed the “vulnerability rate” and explained that in spite of falling poverty, the GINI Coefficient, which does not factor offshore savings or expenditures, has stagnated: 39.9 in 1985; 39.5 in 2014 (2019). Coupled with the decades of neoliberal privatisation observed, there has been a stark and stagnant division between the wealthy and poor within Morocco (Najem, 2001; Moustakbal, 2017; 2021).

In light of these facts, autonomy seems unlikely to succeed in a country plagued with political repression, volatility, and economic uncertainty even prior to the radically world-altering pandemic and sharp inequity within and between classes. There is little reason for the Sahrawi people to accept the plan for autonomy given the state does little to benefit its own citizens. Additionally, what guarantees do the SADR or the Sahrawi people have that the King will abide by his word in respect to many aspects of the autonomy plan, from cultural freedoms to amnesty for SADR fighters. Moreover, the Sahrawi peoples have yet to be assured in the security of their existence within this autonomous state, and the refusal to uphold the MINURSO plan as agreed to only continues to reaffirm that fact. However, autonomy shall always remain a possibility given the support by the UN for peace, and the regional interests of states like Spain, France, and the US in security policy in North Africa (Zunes, 2020; Hmimnat, 2021). In short, the undemocratic unstable nature of Morocco’s current political and economic situation means it does not have the current strength to integrate a new and resistant province. Should this position or that of the

Polisario Front change, autonomy could be revisited as a potential solution.

Secession: A Means of Last Resort

Having acknowledged the shortcomings and potentially fatal consequences of autonomy, I will now explore how secession might be co-opted as a means of resolution. That being said, it must be noted that this paper by no means provides a panacea by which to resolve this conflict. The complex historical narrative and deeply entrenched factions have polarised both sides. Rather, the final section of this paper will focus on secession and the likely necessary steps to feasibly accomplish secession as a means of last resort.

For the sake of this paper, I shall use the phrases ‘irredentism’ and ‘secession’ interchangeably to describe the secession of the annexed territory of the Western Sahara and the repatriation of its peoples, the Sahrawi, as well as the installation of an independent legitimate government. This is primarily because, while talk of secession is frequent, the SADR technically controls up to 20% of their claimed territory and are a legitimate recognized state (Grass, 2019). Additionally, some pragmatic scholars engaging in realpolitik might speculate that the Western Sahara is economically non-viable due to its size and peoples. Scholars like J Peter Pham (2010) claim the only realistic solution is autonomy. This analysis is a false colonial narrative predicated on the absence of normative values and the imposition of an objective political science (Tickner, 1997; Leite et al, 2006). In 1974, the World Bank found the Western Sahara was one of the richest potential regions of the Maghreb, with a population of 250,000 and 266,000 km², it is difficult to believe these

arguments were made in good faith (World Bank, 1974; Minority Rights, 2015).

The SADR operates as the recognized government-in-exile in Algeria and is a founding member-state of the AU, a fact that gives their claim far more legitimacy (Cowell, 2013). The unfortunate nature of the conflict has resulted in a major schism of the Sahrawi peoples, as many were expelled to refugee camps in Tindouf and elsewhere, while some were caught in the annexed territory and chose to remain (Arnell, 1991). While the referendum might have given a voice to many of these peoples, the Moroccan government has blocked all efforts, and thus secession has been viewed as the only way forward for these peoples. The result is a divide between the few Sahrawi who wish to remain with Morocco alongside 75% of the foreign-born population who are Moroccan settlers, and those who wish to see their homeland independent and free (Leite et al., 2006). Moreover, the Kingdom and its regime cannot abide by complete and total abdication of their territory, as it is likely to cause fragmentation within the Moroccan identity itself and could indeed be a catalyst for the change sought by Moroccans in previous anti-government protests.

Whatever the case, the avoidance of violence and bloodshed is of the utmost importance. This has become impossible following the resumption of hostilities. Additionally, sharp demographic changes in urban areas because of government resettlement programs will complicate the irredentist movement (CIA, 2023). Therefore, any plan must accommodate this, as well as the invariable truth that some Sahrawi might wish to stay under the Moroccan regime. As

such, it is likely that bilateral negotiation between the Polisario Front and the Moroccan government might yield promising results, rather than simply appealing and prolonging the process through the United Nations. This does not obstruct the UN from being involved in the process of facilitating the transition and ensuring its peaceful resolution, but rather that, like in the case of Syria, Rwanda and other Middle Eastern or African conflicts, their involvement often adds complicating dimensions. There is also literature and tangible evidence to suggest that regional organisations like the AU or ECOWAS can play a significant role in negotiating and defusing conflicts or intervening through peacekeeping operations (Söderbaum, 2005; Seaman, 2014).

Additionally, any deal negotiated must come with concessions, as the stark reality is neither side must or shall be content with the final agreement, but rather, both sides must be satisfied with its conclusion. Concessions on fishing agreements, for example, could offer sections of the northern coastline for dual-national use by trawlers, or perhaps contributions by the SADR towards the repatriations of Moroccans in the territory formerly annex by the Kingdom of Morocco may propel the conflict forward out of its current stagnant phase. Likewise, Morocco financing the deconstruction and demilitarisation must occur. This could be assisted by external pressure on the part of the international community. Preventing the development or expansion of multinational corporations seeking exploit vast mineral deposits, teeming fisheries, and offshore oil & gas by the Moroccans government might incentivise King Mohammed VI to reconsider his position: something that can be facilitated by both the UN and the AU (Visram, 2017).

Most troubling of these developments remains the prospect of voluntary or, more dangerously, forced resettlement. While one cannot turn a blind eye to those living on the ground, they moved there most often at the behest of the King and their occupation is illegitimate (Visram, 2017). As such, demographic partition becomes the consideration, done widely through incentivised government programs and economic cooperation on the part of both countries. However, this carries with it great risks of increased ethnic, political, and religious violence and should be viewed with extreme caution. These obvious have echoes, both in past (Greek-Turkish Population exchanges) and contemporary (Israel-Palestine conflict & Indigenous sovereignty movements in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the US) resolutions to inter-ethnic conflicts. However, given the intransigent positions of their respective leaderships

While secession remains the ultimate goal of the Sahrawi peoples, the condition of their existence as of this moment is precarious and indeed unfortunate. Barriers to their success are numerous, as even if they manage to ascertain their independence, they must work tirelessly to rectify the ravaged landscape. Even now, 40 years on, 24 out of 61 minefields and 44 out of 522 cluster strike areas remain, with thousands of munitions still strewn across the desert (UNMAS, 2020). Extraction and development occur in a socially constructed political vacuum, absent meaningful environmental regulations or economic benefits for local communities (Brour, 2020; Allan & Ojeda-García, 2022). In short, secession appears to be an extreme option than many realize and brings its fair share of challenges and risks, yet it may be the necessary and most successful long-term solution. However,

the succession of the Western Sahara would precipitate a political crisis for Mohammed VI and his personalised authoritarian fiefdom, potentially catalyzing its downfall due to the social, economic, and political consequences. This is reflected in the current position of the Kingdom, which will likely cede no ground in future negotiations. The Western Sahara has been enshrined as Morocco's crown jewel of foreign policy – a poison pill which can make or break relations. Israel, the US, France, and Spain have capitulated, enjoying strong commercial and military relations in exchange for silence (Zunes, 2020; AJIL, 2021). For Germany, it meant the end of diplomatic relations, at least temporarily (DW, 2021). It has become central to their migratory and green initiatives, alongside their attempts at regional détente with Algeria and the AU broadly (Zerhdoud, 2013; Hasnaoui, 2017; Norman, 2020; Nicolai, 2022).

Conclusion

The Western Sahara conflict is beyond complex, and it is unfortunate that its importance to the stability of the region has largely been sidelined by international apathy. While it may seem like recent memory, many young Sahrawi refugees have grown up not knowing the violence prior to the ceasefire, and only remember the camps and the Berm. To the international community, this should be unacceptable, as while many continue to hope and pray for a resolution, they have become political players for resources and the maintenance of a regime. However, the logic of secession as the means of last resort, not only to protect themselves and their land, but to draw international attention, is clearly what motivates the SADR's call to arms.

As such, one must be cautious when approaching a resolution to the Western Sahara conflict and be wary of any single solution being offered as conclusively or distinctly 'best.' While secession might provide the self-determination that is guaranteed and deserved, it is by no means the only solution and carries with it many negatives. While the current international consensus might suggest that autonomy is the only solution moving forward, this too is wrong, and as I have argued, one should reject this binary form of thinking, and moving forward, scholars should attempt to perhaps stray from these tendencies and force bilateral negotiation through external pressures and suggested diplomatic incentives.

PROJECT PINK

Photo Series

By King-David Olajuwon

My name is King-David Olajuwon. I have a few goals I wish to achieve with my photography and one of them is to document the lives of Black People at Queens so that my photos can be used as a reference point in the future for how we live right now.







Durag Activity

Photo Series

By King-David Olajuwon

Models:

Peter

Noah

YT



Nexum
Photo Series
By King-David Olajuwon








Model:
Caitlin Johnson

Half Angel, Half Amazing

By King David





Models:
Binyat Akrem
Al-Barr Ajiboye
Kesha

Contextualizing Roma

By Zachary Davis

Zack Davis is a third-year English major interested in investigating music and literacy's social and cultural impacts. He is currently pursuing Language, Literacy, and Culture courses, with a research focus on ethnomusicology, studying multimedia representations of historical and contemporary cultures.

Within Alfonso Cuarón's *Roma*, the 2018 film displays the rigid confines of cultural hegemony in Latin America through Cuarón's contrasting representations of middle-class Latin American hardships with the empowerment and privilege of white skin. By analyzing *Roma* through a social lens of acquired historical and cultural knowledge achieved through enrolment in the LLCU 248 curriculum and external sources offering additional perspectives on the movie, intricate thematic understandings of class relations and disparities in Latin American culture are visible. Denying viewers expected commonalities in film-viewing by restricting the colour palette to a two-tone black and white and including cinematographic techniques of framing experiences using wide-angle shots, Cuarón challenges preconceived notions of arthouse films, providing introspective rumination on Latin America's hierarchal structure as a result.

Roma presents the experiences and societal mistreatment of Cleo as an indigenous housekeeper with little dialogue or close-ups, denying viewers proximity to her hardships. Instead, by characterizing Cleo through her intellect, selflessness and ambitious determination to excel not just as a housekeeper but as a compassionate and multifaceted individual, *Roma* elucidates the deep-rooted extent of racial discrimination in Latin American culture, emphasizing its arbitrary but disempowering limitations. Cleo's social structure within the postcolonial narrative of class division perpetuates eurocentric conceptions of racial purity by proximity to whiteness. Through shaping the silence of middle-class Latin American hardships and mistreatment by providing a visual representation of Cleo's minimal pay, healthcare, education and possibility for personal opportunities of social mobility outside her subservient role as a maid, *Roma* emphasizes the extent of social inequalities maintained through hegemonic oppression.

The LLCU 248 curriculum's central focus on defining Latin America's cultural and geographic history through gendered and racial perspectives of social inequalities exposes the distinct separation between the colonial forces of control and domination and the marginalization of Indigenous and African populations through representations of generational cultural domination. Within analyzed chapters from John Charles Chasteen's *Born in Blood and Fire: A Concise History of Latin America*, the author illustrates the extent of inequalities in wealth disparity and prosperity through historical contexts among Latin Americans, emphasizing the differentiation between Latin America and external international presences. Chasteen explains: "Today many

Latin Americans live and work in circumstances not so different from those of middle-class people in the United States. But many, more than those who seem middle-class by international norms, still inhabit hovels and endure poverty and deprivation rare in the developed world" (Chasteen, 2016, p. 3). Within the excerpt from Chasteen's written perspective, the author highlights how despite the diversity among the expansive Latin American population, pressure from the exerted power of colonial forces creates a binary distinction between cultural "winners and "losers" (Chasteen, 2016, p.9). By precluding aspirations of an empowered middle-class majority for Latin Americans with indigenous and African backgrounds, distinct generational segmentation into a rigid hierarchal arrangement favouring European colonial influence is the conflict "at the heart" of Latin American history (Chasteen, 2016, p.9). The lasting legacy of wealth and class disparity among Latin American populations is visible through descendants of colonizers of Portuguese, Spanish, and European backgrounds exerting hegemonic subjugation of indigenous and African populations to the extent of systemic oppression. The continuous effects of cultural hegemony throughout history, apparent through patterns of social domination and colonization, reveal how hegemonic domination as a social design rejects the possibility of a prosperous Latin American middle class.

Chasteen's text emphasizes the degree of historical prejudice against indigenous and African proximity, upholding traditional European standards and beliefs that, by extension, benefit the colonizers themselves. The written perspective of the course reading connects to Cleo's treatment and depiction within Roma through Alfonso Cuarón, providing a visual

viewpoint of indigenous mistreatment within Latin America. Occupying a social role at the bottom of Mexico's social hierarchy as a maid to an affluent caucasian family, Cuarón accentuates the impossibility of Cleo existing outside of her imposed racial and class restrictions. The film blurs the cultural lines of ethnical discrepancy through Cleo's constantly evolving role within the film. For example, when Cleo is tending to house maintenance while Sofia is watching television with her children, Paco and Sofie, Cleo sits on the floor after receiving an invitation to watch with the family. When Paco embraces Cleo, wrapping his arm around her, Cuarón exposes the inherent disconnect between restrictive racial intolerance expected throughout the film's Mexico setting and the childlike innocence of Paco perceiving Cleo not solely as a maid and housekeeper but as a member of the family. By contrast, while including Cleo in the collective family time, Cleo's role within the household dynamic is inherently one of continuous subservience and subjugation. Although Cleo has the empowerment and independence to sit with Sofia's family, she is still Sofia's employee, tasked with her duties as a servant. Cleo's minimal social mobility, even at the conclusion of the film's narrative, relates to Chasteen's writing, illustrating how even after Cleo saves Paco and Sofie on a family trip to the beach, the children still request favours and demands of Cleo after arriving back at their home. Despite displaying gratitude for Cleo's selflessness by risking her safety and life to rescue Paco and Sofie in the water, the class divisions of Latin America continue to oppress Cleo to the confines of her expected subservience to the family.

In the video interview "Alfonso Cuarón on '*Roma*' and Getting Personal" by Variety Uncovered, the director presents

background information surrounding filming and creating *Roma*, explaining creative decisions made for the movie. At the beginning of Cuarón's series of questions and answers, the filmmaker explains the difficulties surrounding choosing a central focus character to depict the movie's narrative and Latin American experiences. He describes how during the pre-production preparation process before filming, Cuarón was initially conflicted between portraying the narrative through Cleo's perspective as a depiction of middle-class restrictions of social empowerment and mobility or referencing the real woman whom Cleo represents from Cuarón's childhood (Variety, 2018). Insights from the director in the interview reveal the extent of parallels between the artistic representation of *Roma* as a film and art piece by its merit while additionally serving as an autobiographical depiction of Cuarón and his lived experiences. Analyzing explanations behind visionary stress on visually portraying "a look at the past from the standpoint of the prison of the present" from Cuarón's contemporary social understanding of Latin American hegemonic effects, the director emphasizes the degree of recreating a realistic depiction of 1970s Mexico (Variety, 2018).

Cuarón's interview reveals the blurred intersection between the fictitious theatrics of filmmaking for public audiences and his aspirations to depict the most authentic portrayal of his childhood memories to the extent of recreating streets complete with cars and stores he remembers. By disclosing the complex artistic identity of *Roma* and highlighting the difficulties involved in the creation process, Cuarón's vocalization of his internal conflicts while directing the movie reinforces the social purpose of providing a narrative

depiction of Latin American class disparities through Cleo using realism. The fact that Cuarón consulted the woman, Cleo, as a character represented from the director's childhood during the creation process reinforces Cuarón's commitment to realism within his filmmaking. In a clip from the interview, he describes the real-life housekeeper from Cuarón's upbringing reacting to the water scene where Cleo rescues Paco and Sofie at the beach. Cuarón describes how, after shooting takes of the scene, the director visited the woman to check if she was okay due to the emotional gravity and tension on set that day. Sitting in the production video seats, Cuarón recalls how he arrived to discover the woman crying (Variety, 2018). When asked if witnessing resurfaced shared trauma recreated and depicted within the context of creating *Roma* was too upsetting to endure, the figure who inspired Cleo's portrayal refused. Cuarón reflects: "She says, 'no, it's about the children, I worry about the children'" (Variety, 2018). Accentuating how the nonfictional Cleo and the character in the narrative display concern and empathy towards the well-being of the children and child actors, respectively, the extent of Cuarón's visionary focus on recreating experienced personal memories through a lens of realism and authenticity. The characterization of Cleo's character and the presence who inspired her portrayal within the narrative of *Roma* reveals the central focus on contextualizing past depictions of 1970s Latin American society in Mexico from a contemporary point of view, embodied in artistic representation for modern movie-watching audiences.

"The Uncomfortable and Profound Authenticity of *Roma*" by Keshia Naurana Badalge from The Atlantic serves as a

written perspective from a voice of firsthand authority through the author's investigation into *Roma*, referencing Badalge's background as an individual "raised by maids and who later worked as one" (Badalge, 2019). Commending Alfonso Cuarón's narrative and visual commitment to representing an authentic and realistic depiction of housekeeper work through an empathetic perspective, Badalge's insights within her article serve as a different communicative bridge between interpreting *Roma* from viewpoints of authority. For Cuarón, the filmmaker holds a voice of authorization by representing lived childhood experiences, while Badalge serves as an "expert" viewer by possessing lived experiences as a maid herself. Through providing discernment and interpretations of creative elements and decisions made in the film's narrative, Badalge's observations further develop an understanding of housekeepers' social dynamics with the families they serve. Badalge explains: "As someone who was raised by maids and who later worked as one, I found that the most authentic moments in *Roma* were also the subtlest: the silent expressions and gestures of tenderness that blur the line between family member and employee" (Badalge, 2019). In the author's interpretation of *Roma*, she stresses how Cuarón utilizes film to capture the "tedious, filthy work maids do" through a sympathetic and uncompromised perspective of authenticity, revealing the degree which Latin American housekeepers endure dehumanizing and isolating working conditions where personal boundaries between professional and personal circumstances intertwine to create an environment of confusion and pain (Badalge, 2019). Both Badalge's written insights and Cuarón's illustrative representation of how historical and contemporary Latin

American issues of perpetuating racialized subjugation and inequality degrade housekeepers' senses of self, apparent in Cleo's characterization and attested lived experiences from Badalge's time working as a maid. Under expectations of occupying the assumed familial role as a problem-solver and housemaid to appease Sofia, Cleo suffers imposed oppression through her skin colour and her service and assistance profession, allowing Sofia to release internalized frustration and anger on Cleo with little consequence. Badalge highlights how social expectations for Cleo to exist as an ever-present source of calmness and assumed position as a pacifist and peacekeeper within Sofia's familial dynamic reveal further complexities in "employer-maid relations" (Badalge, 2019). The author of the article's investigation into the "delicate dance maids must perform" reveals the deep-rooted complexities within Latin American hierarchal class divisions and the resulting discomfort and tension visible while witnessing Cleo's tribulations in the movie.

A thought-provoking and introspective investigation into Latin American class relations in 1970s Mexico through a contemporary filmmaking perspective, Alfonso Cuarón's 2018 film *Roma* serves as an artistic representation of racialized disparity between high-class colonizers and oppressed members of hegemonic pressure. By depicting Cleo with emphasis on her selfless and ambitious traits in her employed position of limited mobility or empowerment, Cuarón reveals the rigid impossibility for Cleo as a victim of enduring postcolonial weight in Latin America to elevate beyond the confines of her social role of minimal empowerment and imposed dominant restrictions. Cuarón moulds the lack of authority and voice granted to Cleo by her physical and social

environment to capture the relationship between the assumed role of Latin American housekeepers and the complex social hierarchy which oppresses Cleo despite her devotion to caring for Sofia's household and children. By empathetically portraying Cleo's hardships and suffering in a role of little recognition, independence, or respect, Cuarón grants Cleo visual empowerment by capturing her viewpoint on film.

Roma brings into question how those occupying roles of minimal authority can elevate outside of expected positions of subservient subjugation when inalienable traits like race and skin colour within Latin American social contexts serve as grounds for categorizing and sorting populations into confinements.

Journey

By Fatimah Ibn-Ali

My name is Fatimah Ibn-Ali. I am in 2nd year of BHSc at Queens University. I love creative writing, especially poetry.

In the spring
 when I was a child
 I lived firmly on the land.
 I felt safe in my body, my mind, my heart, and my soul,
 in this place, we call Canada,
 filled with beautiful mountains, rivers, and lakes.
 I was proud of my geographical identity,
 secure in the idea that we did not harbour racism
 like our neighbours down south.
 I walked on the beaches
 looked out onto the raging waters,
 wondered what was out there
 that was so troublesome that riots, protests, and wars ensued.
 I ignored the urge to find out,
 turned my face away,
 (an option that is a privilege, but I didn't know that then)
 slipped back into my cozy bubble
 of polite hellos, goodbyes, excuse mes, and apologies.
 I buried my head in school books
 I read a whole bunch of novels
 the white man was always the "hero", despite his dubious
 actions.
 But one day,
 the ground split open,
 and I found myself caught in tumultuous waves.
 My world was badly shaken,

as the foundation crumbled away and the ugly truth revealed itself.

I read Indian Horse, Medicine Walk, All Our Relations,
and so, I tumbled into the summer of my youth,
but there was none of that summer joy.

There was only fire and anger.

Mr. Richard Wagamese and Ms. Tanya Talaga,
pulled back the curtains,
showed me glimpses into what Canada's real history is,
with residential schools, broken oaths, hatred for people
different from their own, the
systemic racism against Indigenous Peoples.

My body was fine, but my mind was lost at sea.

I read about the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
the 94 Calls to Action, about Mr. Wagamese himself,
first-hand accounts by Indigenous individuals.

I found pieces of driftwood in the truth I was finally seeing,
and I began building a raft,
hoping to travel farther down the waters of discovery.

I was always aware

that colonialism stole everything from the Indigenous Peoples,
I just did not know how severe the damage was,
how it continues to affect Indigenous communities today,
how there is so much to unlearn.

I battled big emotions,
anger, disgust, sadness, and I felt helpless.

I can only imagine how Indigenous Peoples feel.

I looked around me,
started realizing how everything in this country,
and I mean every single thing,
from the judicial system to the healthcare system,
from the way the government is run,

to the way knowledge is taught,
everything is based on a colonial framework.
The colonial way of thinking, and learning, and doing, is so
ingrained in us Canadians,
so deeply a part of me, that I don't even notice it.
I live on the land of the Indigenous Peoples,
but engage in practices that were brought here by settlers,
like taking joyfully from Mother Nature,
without giving anything back.
I am on a journey
learning everyday about Indigenous peoples, past and present,
and how to deconstruct the colonial matrix we live in.
I know it begins with myself,
so working to actively decolonize my way of thinking and
doing,
brings peace to my body, mind, heart, and soul.
I have yet to reach the fall of my life and the shore of my
journey,
there are many storms and squalls on the path,
my raft is far from becoming a boat and is full of holes,
therefore I'm here, listening and learning,
looking to strengthen my planks and knots
as I navigate these troubled oceans.
I hope that once I enter the winter of my life,
wisdom will have humbled me,
and I will walk upon the earth once again,
gently, with the wind by my side,
knowing that I still have a lot to learn,
for my lifetime will not be enough
to grasp the magnitude of the history
that my Indigenous brothers and sisters have experienced,
and are making today.

The Role of Migration in Building the Nation

By Emma Farrell

As a fourth-year History major and Political Studies minor, studying at Queen's has afforded me the opportunities to find my passion in working to uplift marginalized voices, both as a historian and in my everyday life. I hope that my work and the entirety of this published journal inspires readers to continue advocating for historically silenced voices – in the face of adversity and against all odds.

During the late nineteenth century, many newly formed countries were consumed with the tremendous undertaking of becoming a consolidated “nation-state”. This nation-state was to be comprised of people with similar ethnic origins and religious beliefs. However, the process often involved assimilation of Indigenous peoples, suppression of women’s rights, and limitations on racial diversity.(1) Canada was no exception to this pattern. Here, the nation-building effort involved a great deal of movement, of both people and ideas, to achieve the ultimate goal of a white, Christian, and male-dominated settler society.(2) The migration of people included settlers from Britain, citizens from other colonies in the empire, immigrants, and the forced domestic migration of Indigenous peoples. Moreover, Indigenous peoples were marginalized, stereotyped, and segregated into reserve areas because of racialized perceptions by settler societies. Immigrants were discriminated against for not conforming to the Canadian standard of desirability which explicitly referred to the race, class, and gender of an individual. Furthermore, the migration of people also brought the movement of their

ideas, sparking feminist “waves” which were entrenched in notions of the racialized “other”. Indeed, migration facilitated the social construction of ideas about desirability and inclusion. These notions were founded in race, gender, and class, shaping the nation-building process in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Canada.

To understand how migration influenced the nation-building process in Canada, it is important to understand what migration means in relation to “the nation” itself. While the United Nations defines migration as people who are moving across an international border or internally within a state, the term can be expanded to describe any movement of people as well as the ideas and material culture they carry with them.(3) Geographer Harald Brauder notes that the conventional definition of migration is firmly entrenched in the concept of a “nation-state”.(4) However, there are many “complex identities of mobile communities”, like Indigenous peoples in Canada that must be understood within the category of migration.(5) Fundamentally, migration propagates new ideas through society, while also acting as the starting point for formations of sociocultural identity.

Perhaps one of the more overlooked yet most important types of migration that informed the nation-building process was the domestic migration of Indigenous peoples. Often, these groups were forced to move north, away from white settler communities out of the fear of diluting the purity of the “dominant race”.(6) Historian Sarah Carter’s *Categories and Terrains* provides critical insight into the nation-building project in western Canada. Carter uses Mary E. Inderwick’s writing from 1884 as an example of the “perspective on

stratifications” of race, gender, and class that formed among western settlers.(7) For instance, settlers believed that the historically Indigenous lands were rightfully theirs, as it was their destiny to affirm British superiority.(8) Evidence suggests that these sentiments of distrust and fear of Indigenous communities were not isolated nor unique to people like Inderwick. Instead, the stereotypes were embedded in the socioeconomic consciousness of western Canada or what Rayna Green calls the “Pocahontas perplex”.(9)

The goal to remove Indigenous peoples from their lands to make space for white settlers was not a hidden agenda, but an explicit one for colonial administrations. To achieve this end, the government employed a great deal of immigration propaganda, like Jessie Saxby’s *West nor West*.(10) Here, the deliberate propagation of ideas, in this instance through printed and written material, furthered the government’s nation-building goals. More specifically, the government used negative images of Aboriginal women to explain poverty in those communities and supposed “incapacity” of Aboriginal men to act as more than hunters, warriors, and nomads.(11) Similar stereotypes were also employed to justify legislation such as the Dominion Land Survey in 1871-1872 and the Dominion Land Acts, both being precursors to the 1876 Indian Act.(12) Though the logic of elimination, colonizers sought to marginalize Indigenous peoples while also fostering a reliance on the state to avoid future resistance.(13) An expression of this logic was the physical segregation of Indigenous and settler communities, by way of reservations, which was justified by the perceptions of Indigenous people as “dangerous” and “dissolute”.(14) Hence, the migration of ideas and people, with settlers moving west and Indigenous

peoples moving north, was a foundational element of the nation-building process.

Another form of migration that is commonly associated with nation-building is immigration. For Canada, this process involved the movement of settlers from Britain itself, its crown colonies, or other independent nations.(15) While Canada may be celebrated today for its multinational or “mosaic” nature, this problematic identity has roots in a historically discriminatory and racist past.(16) Specifically, immigration law was shaped by ideas about race, class, and gender making some “suitable permanent citizens” and others “undesirable”.(17) As a result, the need for labour and desire to maintain the purity of the race was continuously at odds with one another.(18) For example, Chinese migrants were integral for the completion of railroads in Canada, yet the racist policies previously excluding them saw a resurgence once the need for cheap labour ceased.(19) The Canadian government also levied a “head tax” against immigrants to discourage family settlement and promote solitary immigration.(20) Increasingly, immigration sparked fears of miscegenation in the country, fuelling attempts to bar Chinese and south Asian immigrants completely.(21) Historian Enakshi Dua argues that such fears, which are underscored by ideas of racism and sexism, often motived inclusion.(22) For example, the desire to include Chinese wives in immigration was primarily to avoid racial mixing between Chinese men and the vulnerable white women, who lacked self-control. 23 Dua highlights the contradictions in immigration policies, as the government drew on the same points of race, reproduction, and sexuality for exclusion as they did for inclusion.(24) Thus, the proclamation that Canada was a

“white man’s country” by Sir. John A. Macdonald never proved true despite efforts to maintain whiteness by the colonial administration and the Canadian government.(25)

When connecting immigration policies to nation-building, it important to consider the role of resistance to these explicitly racist policies. Indigenous peoples, women, and other racialized groups were important actors in their own paths to equality. For example, in 1910 two Chinese men lobbied the government to exempt their spouses from the head tax, and in 1911 two Indian men challenged restrictions of the entry of their spouses in response to the Continuous Journey Regulation.(26) Though both instances did not result in direct changes to legislation, they represent important attempts by minority groups to voice their opinions and influence public opinion. Another example of resistance to immigration practices involved bilateral relationships, between Canada and Caribbean countries that were part of the British empire. Many Caribbean states were vital trading partners but called for boycotts on Canadian goods due to the government’s discriminatory immigration regulations. Specifically, British Guiana’s *Daily Chronicle* aided in the protest of Canada’s “limits on brotherly love” with its Caribbean counterparts.(27) Here, the connection between class, gender, and race in immigration was also tied to commercial relations between countries, where many became hostile when Canada welcomed their goods but not their people.(28) Scholars can often get lost in the ethnocentric, “white saviour” view on equality, attributing progress only to the colonizers who recognized that what they were doing was morally wrong. Rather, many marginalized groups were prominent actors in securing their own equality.

Another element of migration, the spread of ideas, helped to shape the nation-building process through feminist movements. At this time, women's citizenship and status were inextricably linked to the man. Likewise, female identity was intertwined with the idea of motherhood, not just for the individual, but for the nation as a whole.(29) This lack of autonomy for the woman became widely recognized and developed into what we now refer to as feminist "waves", though it may be more useful to describe them as feminist "streams".(30) Regardless of how historians use the metaphor, it is clear that many first "wave" leaders adopted racist policies for feminist ends.(31) In connection to migration, Caribbean women immigrating to Canada were seen as lesser than, and not fit for motherhood. In terms of migration of Indigenous communities, the stereotype of the "vulnerable white woman" was used as a rationale for the forced displacement of Indigenous communities in the west. (32) Moreover, the presence of women moving to the West didn't initiate the spatial segregation, but this presence was used as a justification for it.(33) This marginalization of Aboriginal women was an integral aspect in the colonial nation-building project. Carter underscores the formal mechanisms employed by the government such as the pass system to limit the autonomy of women further, cementing women's identity in the control of white men.(34) Carter's position on the issue can be compared to Valverde's work which argues that feminist movements made progress for white women in freeing the "mothers" of the race, though "not all women were qualified as a mother to their own children or the race".(35) Accordingly, feminist and migration scholarship points to the dichotomy between the methods that were employed to advance feminist ideals and

the fundamental goals of the feminist movements themselves.

Ultimately, migration is an important framework to connect diverse themes of inclusion and exclusion involved in the nation-building process. The movement of people and ideas often facilitates the creation of new minorities and socially constructed fears in society. Though the world may now view Canada as a diverse, multi-national, and peaceful country, late nineteenth century Canada provides a stark contrast to its self-proclaimed identity today. Consequently, our past and present identity cannot be analyzed in isolation but instead put in dialogue with one another. It is evident that migration assumed many forms in the nation-building process, including the movement of settlers west and the forced movement of Indigenous communities north. Immigrants were also met with discriminatory policies which were intended to exclude them from the larger society. Similarly, the migration of people and ideas contributed to the feminist movements in Canada, moving closer to equality for some, but excluding others in the process. This evidence suggests that migration is inextricably linked to the nation-building project, acting as a catalyst in Canada's development. Thus, the complex history of nation-building can be tied to the present through one common theme: the inequitable structures of past which have manifested themselves in the present must be dismantled at all costs.

(Dis)honour: A Historiographical Analysis of Honour in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Brazil, 1860-1920

By Ashlyn Gregory

Ashlyn Gregory (B.A.H. 2022) is a first year M.A. student in the Department of History at Queen's University studying Canadian social history. Under the supervision of Dr. Steven Maynard, Ashlyn's M.A. research will explore truancy and the regulation of students in Kingston, Ontario. Ashlyn also has a keen interest in public history and Latin American history.

For many, the idea of honour in Latin America evokes images of elite, virginal women sequestered in the home until marriage, and proud men defending themselves against those who would dare to insult their virtue. These images may be representative of how some Latin Americans understood honour, but for most people, honour was embroiled in everyday interactions and behaviours. Contrary to popular belief, all members of society were defined by their honour, or lack thereof, not just the elite classes.(1) While most working-class people could not assert their honour in the same ways as the elites, they too defended their version of honour. Furthermore, honour reflected not just gender and class, but also occupation, freedom, family ties, and, perhaps most importantly, race. In this paper, I will examine how honour functioned as a racialized system of social hierarchy in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Brazil in the latter half of the long nineteenth-century, which I define as 1860-1920. This period is significant for several reasons: it encompasses abolition and its immediate aftermath, the shift towards liberalism, emerging feminist ideas, and, for Puerto Rico and Cuba,

independence from Spain. The first section of this paper examines definitions of honour and how honour codes functioned in Latin American society. The subsequent sections focus on the historiography of honour in Puerto Rico,

Cuba, and Brazil. While historians typically study honour on a national or local level, by comparing three different countries, I argue that there is a universal understanding and experience of honour for Afro-descendant people in Latin America

What is honour?

One of the difficulties of studying gender and race in Latin America is the lack of a clear definition of honour. As historian Eileen J. Findlay points out in her book *Imposing Decency: The Politics of Sexuality and Race in Puerto Rico, 1870-1920*, “honour discourses did not constitute a singular, unitary code of social respectability that all people interpreted in the same way.”(2) Honour could mean something different depending on the time period, region, and one’s place in society. In many ways, honour is highly localized and situational, but the general concept of honour can be applied more broadly across several regions in Latin America.

Ideas about honour as a racialized practice in the latter half of the long nineteenth-century evolved from the colonial period. Historian William Ian Miller describes honour in the colonial period in terms of reputation and public scrutiny, “Honor is above all the keen sensitivity to the experience of humiliation and shame, a sensitivity manifested by the desire to be envied by others and the propensity to envy the success of others.”(3)

In this way, honour was determined through complex systems of negotiation, social hierarchy, and the constant reaffirmation of one's status. Honour required that stark distinctions be drawn between those considered to be honourable and those considered to be dishonourable. Similar ideas about honour persisted into the nineteenth-century, but rather than honour being understood as one's birthright, honour came to be couched in terms of individualism, a change which reflects the adoption of liberalism that came with independence in Latin America.⁴ While ideas about the foundations of one's honour changed, the function of honour remained the same: to stratify and divide society along the lines of gender, class, and race. Referring to the period immediately after abolition in Latin America, Diana Paton and Pamela Scully describe how ideas about honour were adapted to maintain racial and gender hierarchies in a society without slavery:

In this process, proponents of liberalism attacked "old-fashioned" forms of patriarchy such as the slaveholding household, the aristocratic patriarchy of the European and Latin American great landed estates, and the honor codes of Latin American elites. While these attacks opened up spaces in which women were able to claim new rights, the main outcome was the reconfiguration, rather than the overturning, of gender inequality. (5)

While honour may have become more about individual merit, honour still functioned to maintain the dominant forms of social hierarchy.

Even in the post-independence period, which emphasized

individualism and merit-based success, ideas about honour-as-birthright did not change immediately: White elites still clung to the idea that honourability was something inherited through a pure bloodline. Conversely, racialized people and the lower classes came to believe that honour was something that could be achieved through merit and hard work.(6)

In a way, this understanding of honour was more accurate in nineteenth century Latin America. Certainly, elites were born with privilege, but their honour was not immutable; it depended on their continued acceptance by the community and the constant rearticulation of acceptable and honourable behaviours.(7) Honour was not stable and could be challenged by economic hardship, scandal, or other means. In her ground-breaking book *Marriage, Class and Colour in Nineteenth-Century Cuba*, Verena Martinez-Alier discusses the tenuous nature of honour in terms of race, “Those within the white community are pure and those outside it are impure, and both purity and impurity are transmitted through the blood. Yet the relationship between the pure and the impure is not symmetrical. The pure can all too easily become contaminated and impure, precisely by marriage to a member of the impure category. The impure, can in theory never shed their impurity entirely.”(8)

While it may be true that lower-class and racialized people could not reach equal status with White elites, they were able to “lighten” themselves by adopting markers of elite White status, such as wearing respectable clothing, having money, owning property, and maintaining good manners.(9) In other words, race was only one factor in the complex calculation of honourability. This allowed for "a considerable measure of

fluidity in the middle sector, to the dismay of many.”(10) Interracial marriage was one such way that elite people of colour could lighten themselves. Factors other than race, such as wealth, occupation, property-ownership, and kinship, came into play when determining whether a marriage across racial lines was socially acceptable.(11) For example, an elite White man with a tarnished reputation could marry a rich and well-regarded woman of mixed race, and their marriage would be judged as roughly equal between the partners.(12) Clearly, while race was a dominant factor in the judgement of honour, it was not the only determinant. In fact, another factor played a more decisive role in calculating one’s honourability: sex and gender.

The elaborate system of honour in Latin America constructed strict boundaries not only between men and women, but also between men and women of different racial backgrounds. For example, the expectations for white men were different from Afro-descendent men, and these social codes were nearly impenetrable. To simplify greatly, honour can be best understood as a socially constructed, racialized practice of sexual respectability.(13) Honourable traits for elite White men included sexual virility, trustworthiness in business, independent wealth, and the ability to provide for their families.(14) Perhaps most importantly, the honour of elite men depended on their ability to simultaneously exercise control over and guard the purity of the women in their family, while still maintaining sexual dominance over other women.(15) Maintaining control over “their” women was of utmost importance, because the honour of elite women was directly tied to the honour and reputation of the entire family.16 While elite women were expected to remain chaste

and sexually pure, men were free to pursue premarital and extramarital sex, so long as they did not neglect their lawful wives and legitimate children.(17) Elite men often pursued women of lower economic classes and racialized women, thereby “[asserting] the right to rape, seduce, and establish long-term informal sexual relationships with plebeian women, while marrying women of their own class.”(18) This was not seen as contradictory, because one’s reputation and social standing within the community was more important than one’s actual behaviour – so long as they managed to keep dishonourable activities a secret.

Racialized communities articulated similar ideas about honour and gender. For example, upper- and middle-class racialized families also took pride in the seclusion and purity of their women. Working-class people, however, relied on female labour and were, therefore, unable to sequester their women and prevent them from interacting with non-family members. This reality led to the development of other signifiers of working-class honour.(19) In their anthology about law and honour in Latin America, historians Lara Putnam, Sarah C. Chambers, and Sueann Caulfield argue that racialized and lower-class people had honour as well; although it may not be readily recognized by elites, “Middling and plebeian men asserted that their honest conduct of work, their control of female subordinates, and their strength and courage earned them honorable reputations. [...] Women of the lower classes challenged elite stereotypes of their immorality, taking pride in fidelity to a husband or committed partner, modesty, and a well-ordered household.”(20) Even male Afro-descendant peasants or slaves could express their own forms of honour based on

skilled work and subservience.(21) Overall, honour in Latin America was a highly contested concept that meant different things to different communities.

Parameters

In the second half of this paper, I will examine several key texts relating to honour in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Brazil. While most of the scholarship about honour in Latin America focuses on a single country or region, I argue that a universal, generalizable concept of honour as a gendered and racialized practice is made apparent through the comparison of several nations. For the purposes of this paper, I have limited my scope to three distinct regions in Latin America: Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Brazil. These regions may seem disparate, but they share many similarities in history, racial demographics, and socio-ethnic hierarchies that allow for effective comparisons to be made.

Prior to abolition, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Brazil relied heavily on the importation of slaves to produce labour intensive crops like sugar and coffee. The prevalent nature of slavery in the nineteenth-century created highly stratified societies with powerful planter and merchant classes at the top of the social hierarchy, and enslaved Afro-descendant or mixed-race people at the bottom.(22) Over the course of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, over four million slaves arrived in the Caribbean and over three million arrived in Brazil to satisfy the demand for slave labour.(23) Correspondingly, these regions had large Afro-descendant populations prior to and immediately following abolition, which occurred in Puerto Rico in 1873, Cuba in 1886 – although Cuba stopped participating in the slave trade in 1867 – and Brazil in 1888.

Similarly, these three regions experienced a significant decrease in their Afro-descendant populations by the early-twentieth century.

In 1877, the non-white population of Puerto Rico made up 43% of the population, with 238,228 *pardos* (people of mixed-race) and 78,025 *morenos* (Afro descendant or Black people). (24) The percentage of the population who identified as Afro descendant decreased dramatically to 27% in 1920. 25 In Cuba, the population of Afro-descendant people peaked in 1862, with 368,550 slaves and 221,417 free people of colour, which constituted roughly 44% of the total population. 26 By 1919, Black and mestiza populations made up only 27% of the population.(27) While the racial demographics of Brazil are more difficult to study because not all Brazilian censuses include data about race and ethnicity, the same demographic trend is evident. In 1872, the Black and pardo populations made up 58% of the population, (28) but by 1940 the percentage shrunk to 35.8%.(29) The dramatic decrease of Afro-descendant populations in Latin America following abolition is historically significant because it demonstrates the mutability of racial and ethnic identity. These communities did not simply disappear, die out, or cease to reproduce. Rather, Afro-descendant people were largely absorbed within the white or mixed populations, which is reflected in the census data. For many people of Afro-descent, presenting themselves as White or of mixed-race afforded them more opportunities, lessened discrimination, and increased honour associated with White or light skin over dark or Black skin.

Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Brazil have unique relationships to independence that set these regions apart from other countries

in Latin America and provides an interesting point of comparison for this paper. In Latin America, most countries gained independence from Spain in the early nineteenth century: Mexico, Chile and Colombia in 1810; Paraguay and Venezuela in 1811; Argentina in 1816; Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and El Salvador in 1821; Ecuador in 1822; and Bolivia in 1825.(30) In contrast, Puerto Rico and Cuba did not gain independence from Spain until 1897 and 1898, respectively, following the Spanish-American War. Cuba became independent following a brief period of American administrative control from 1898-1902.³¹ Meanwhile, Puerto Rico became a territory of the United States, as it remains today.⁽³²⁾ Brazil, too, has an interesting history of independence. While Brazil technically gained independence from Portugal in 1822, it remained under the control of a monarchy until 1889.⁽³³⁾ Overall, these countries have very different relationships to independence than most Latin American countries. While these differences make Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Brazil outliers, it also allows us to examine how the state used honour as a tool of nation-building prior to and following independence in the late-nineteenth century.

Honour and Race in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Brazil

In this section, I will examine the work of historians whose scholarship is foundational to the study of honour as a racialized and gendered system in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Brazil. For each country, I have chosen a monograph that makes a sizeable contribution to the understanding of honour in the country that it studies. For Puerto Rico, I will examine Eileen J. Findlay's book *Imposing Decency: The Politics of Sexuality and Race in Puerto Rico, 1870-1920* which discusses

honour as a gendered and racialized hierarchy upon which the Puerto Rican state was created. Relating to Cuba, I will analyze Verena Martinez-Alier's foundational book *Marriage, Class and Colour in Nineteenth-Century Cuba: A Study of Racial Attitudes and Sexual Violence in a Slave Society* about cross-racial interactions and relationships. Finally, I will discuss Sueann Caulfield's book *In Defense of Honor: Sexual Morality, Modernity, and Nation in Early Twentieth-Century Brazil* which examines public debates about morality and honour. These texts have been chosen because they are frequently cited in discussions about honour. There are several similarities between these books, for example, all three primarily rely on court cases about marriage, whether it be the politics of interracial marriage in Cuba or the restoration of lost honour in Brazil. Furthermore, these books all assert that systems of honour had a significant impact on the formation of national identities. Ultimately, my analysis of these books and other secondary sources will demonstrate that there is a universal experience of honour in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Brazil.

There are several historians who have studied honour, gender, and race in Puerto Rico in different ways, but Eileen J. Findlay's work stands out as particularly influential. In her book, *Imposing Decency*, Findlay identifies sexuality as the lynchpin of honour and she argues that sexuality is the medium through which discourses about race were articulated in Puerto Rico. Upper class anxieties about Afro-descendant Puerto Ricans were couched in terms of sexual morality, with White women being associated with purity and racialized women being associated with sexual aggressiveness.(34) In her book about Cuba, Verena Martinez-Alier takes this argument

a step further, claiming that “it was not physical appearance as such that caused prejudice and discrimination, but what physical appearance stood for, i.e. an individual’s occupational role in an economic system based on the exploitation of one group by another.”(35) While Findlay identifies that concerns about race were disguised in the language of sexual morality, Martinez-Alier asserts that these fears were less about race and more about the unstable hierarchies created by slavery.

Although honour is not the explicit focus of her book, Martinez-Alier makes several important contributions to the scholarly understanding of honour in Cuba. She suggests that “the value attached to virginity is inversely proportional to the degree of social mobility and thus of individual freedom obtained in a social order. That is to say, in an unstratified egalitarian society no restraints should be applied to its women’s sexual freedom.”(36) While she is talking about gender here, this statement has a very clear parallel to race and intermarriage in Cuba. There is a high value attached to honour in Cuba that is proportional to the lack of social mobility and individual freedom in the country. White elites were, therefore, able to use honour as a convenient medium to control the underclasses and assert their authority. Moreover, honour played another key function in Puerto Rican, Cuban, and Brazilian society: nation-building. In Puerto Rico, Findlay claims that racialized definitions of honour became “key to ascertaining who will be included or excluded in the nation or community being imagined.”(37) She identifies the prevalent narrative of *la gran familia*, or the idea that Puerto Rico constituted a great family with the “carefully subordinated incorporation of social inferiors rather than

their blatant subjugation.”(38) She frequently discusses the role of maternal feminism in *la gran familia* and how early elite White feminists saw their lower-class, racialized counterparts as *hermanitas* or “little sisters” to be mothered or else as sexual threats to be nullified.(39) Unfortunately, there is no discussion in Findlay’s book of how these *hermanitas* reacted to the imposition of elite White women. This oversight may be due to the types of sources Findlay relies on throughout her book. She mainly consults sources from the elite women themselves, such as articles and stories in Puerto Rican women’s magazines. Undoubtedly, it can be difficult to examine the reactions of people who often leave little to no textual records, but it makes for an unbalanced argument to completely omit their perspectives.

Similarly, Caulfield’s book about honour in Brazil examines sexual honour and the formation of a gendered and racialized nation akin to the Puerto Rican *gran familia*. She identifies that “sexual honor was the basis of the family, and the family the basis of the nation. Without the moralizing force of women’s sexual honesty, modernization [...] would bring the dissolution of the family, rampant criminality, and general chaos.”(40) Caulfield identifies urban planning policies in downtown Rio de Janeiro as a prime example of how the state acted to maintain sexual and racial honour as a reflection of a pure, honourable Brazilian nationhood. The municipality physically separated the honourable from “the dangerous classes” through social hygiene and public health initiatives that targeted racialized people and segregated them in undesirable neighbourhoods, although the lines between these communities were not always clear.(41) Ideas about honour as a medium through which to articulate nationhood are also

present in Martinez-Alier's book about Cuba, which is demonstrated through the state's complicated relationship to intermarriage.

Prior to abolition, intermarriage in Cuba was a highly contested social issue, "Merchants, slave dealers and the colonial powers opposed interracial marriage in order to preserve slavery, but tolerated concubinage and sporadic sexual contacts, which rather than being an expression of equality of the races was only one more facet of a social system based on the exploitation of the coloured people by the whites." (42) When slavery ended, Cubans had to grapple with how to best manage the large population of recently freed slaves. Like in Puerto Rico, where liberals supported interracial couplings to create *la gran familia*, Cubans identified intermarriage and whitening as necessary to create a united national race. (43)

Another commonality that the books share is a discussion of honour in the public and private spheres. White elites saw the home as the feminine realm of honourable women, and the streets as the masculine realm of influential men. Elite families prioritized the confinement of their women to the domestic sphere in order to protect them from outside influences and unfamiliar men. Conversely, women that dwelled in the public sphere were seen as immoral. Although women were expected to remain in the home, their honour was constantly contested in the public sphere and public opinion was incredibly important to the maintenance of honour. In fact, a person's reputation often mattered more than their actual behaviour behind closed doors.

As Findlay asserts, “If a young woman as considered a virgin, she was one.”(44) Caulfield notes that this distinction was even applied to female domestic servants, who were classified as either indoor or outdoor servants, “indoor servants, generally young and inexperienced, were much more severely restricted and usually confined to their employer’s house, whereas outdoor servants, implicitly not virgins, worked and socialized in the street.”(45) Although this distinction was intended to protect young domestic servants’ honour, Caulfield explains that domestic servants often preferred the anonymity of the streets where they could interact with people from their own communities.(46) Findlay explores similar ideas about domestic labour and honour in Cuba. While elite White women were expected to remain in the home, they were not expected to engage in menial domestic labour, “being served, rather than having to serve others, was important to [their] understanding of what it meant to be a respectable woman.”(47) Not having to engage in labour was a significant aspect of elite White women’s honour that ironically put them in closer contact with the racialized and lower-class people who engaged in this labour. Domestic labour blurred the lines between the public and private and acted as a point of contact between the elite and their racialized domestic servants.(48)

Zones of contact between the White elite and the racialized lower-classes were highly contested and even criminalized. Dance culture in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Brazil provide a compelling example of how the boundaries between public and private, Black and White, were negotiated, transgressed, and policed. Dancing venues represented dangerous “contact zones” where hierarchical boundaries were negotiated,

typically between elite White men and racialized women.(49) In Puerto Rico, Findlay identifies that upstanding White elites criticized dancing styles that evolved from African tradition, such as the danza or the plena. Quoting a prominent liberal, Findlay demonstrates the controversial nature of the danza in Puerto Rican society, “Unlike the ‘pure, virile, patriotic’ notes of the ‘Marseillais,’ which so inspired enlightened Europeans, the danza represented all that destroyed elite Puerto Rican men’s love of nation as it drove them to ‘intoxication with soft luxuriousness and moral decay’.”(50) European dances like the waltz were seen as proper and even patriotic, whereas dances with African roots were seen as immoral and overly sexual. There were several venues where curious elite men could dance with Black or mulatta women. In Havana, *academias de baile*, or dances held at private residences, were a discreet way for White men to interact with Afro-descendant women with whom they paid to dance.(51) These dances were often targeted by the police and the press as “fronts for hiding prostitution.”(52) Inspectors circulated through the city to shut down *academias*, but they were largely unsuccessful at preventing interracial dancing.(53) Masquerade balls were another point of concern for moralizing citizens. 54 While these balls typically did not feature African-style dancing, the ability for attendees to conceal their identity was deeply concerning.(55) It eventually became standard practice for attendees to be asked to remove their mask before coming inside to ensure that White elites, particularly honourable women, did not unwittingly dance with Afro descendant men. (56) Similarly, Carnival celebrations were regarded as a dangerous, and more public, point of contact for White and Afro-descendant people in Latin America. (57) Overall, while these books are foundational to scholarly

understandings of honour, there are some critiques to be made about how well the texts address race. While Findlay's book provides insightful analysis about the gendered experience of honour, the discussion of honour as a racialized system is less clear. While the honour of racialized and lower-class people is frequently mentioned throughout the text, it is often in juxtaposition to the honour of White elites. Her discussion of racialized honour typically focuses on how "wealthy white women's honor was [premiered] on the disreputability of poor and Afro-Puerto Rican women."⁵⁸ There is very little analysis of racialized honour as its own phenomenon within Afro-descendant or working-class communities. In Chapter 1, there is a section about popular respectability which examines "the multiracial reality of the popular classes."⁽⁵⁹⁾ However, this section mostly focuses on gendered rather than racialized expressions of honour. There is some discussion of racialized honour in the popular classes, such as how mixed-race artisans and merchants, who she calls "marginal Dons," attempted to lighten themselves to increase their respectability.⁽⁶⁰⁾ She also briefly discusses racialized language and how, for example, being called a slave was a grave insult to one's honour.⁽⁶¹⁾ It would have been more impactful had she included more examples of how race and Blackness functioned in popular society. For example, how did colourism function within lower-class families in Puerto Rico? Or, how did racialized ideas of honour influence people's choice of partner in the lower classes? Still, Findlay's book is a valuable contribution to the scholarship on honour in Latin America.

In her book *Marriage, Class and Colour in Nineteenth-Century Cuba*, Verena Martinez Alier provides a nuanced

examination of how race, gender, and sexuality influenced interracial relationships in Cuba. By far, Martinez-Alier's book presents a more comprehensive sketch of honour and race than *Imposing Decency* by Findlay. Originally published in 1974, Martinez Alier's book must be understood as a product of its time. Despite this, the book does hold up well to modern scrutiny. One major issue throughout the book, however, is the lack of agency that the author assigns to female, non-White, and lower-class people. For example, in a section entitled "The Honour of Coloured Women," Martinez-Alier asserts that "such frustrated marriages [between *parda* women and white men] were bound to have a demoralizing effect on coloured women."(62) She characterizes these women as the victims of male lust and concubinage. She does not consider the potential benefits of these relationships, like Findlay does. Findlay explains that white men offered economic advantages and status to the racialized women that they maintained relationships with, "for women of the laboring classes, whose lives were often consumed by the daily grind of poverty, the prospect of material advantages, no matter how small, must have been a powerful incentive to participate in sexual relationships."(63) These benefits were often precarious and could be withdrawn by the man at any time, but these women had agency and honour, and many entered these relationships strategically. Overall, Martinez-Alier effectively demonstrates that honour in Cuba was a highly racialized and gendered system. While some sections of her book are dated, the value of her arguments outweigh the issues.

Conclusion

The historiography of honour and race in Puerto Rico, Cuba,

and Brazil is substantial and varied, with many different scholars offering unique insights into the functions and expressions of honour. The scholarship overwhelmingly points to a universal understanding of honour as a racialized system of hierarchy in Latin America. Of course, this paper only considers three countries, and more work must be done to articulate a shared understanding of honour in Latin America. Nonetheless, this paper demonstrates that it is possible to compare experiences of honour in different countries. While historians of Latin America tend to focus on specific regions or countries, there are certain advantages of understanding a concept as it relates to Latin America as a whole. For example, studying honour as a universal experience sheds light on the impacts of Iberian culture – where discourses of honour were also prevalent – and helps scholars understand the social and structural impacts of colonization. That systems of honour continued to be articulated following independence is demonstrative of how deep-seated these ideas are in Latin America. Furthermore, studying racialized honour as a universal system of hierarchy allows marginalized groups from different countries to articulate a shared experience of oppression, but also resistance. Being able to name an intangible system of oppression like honour allows people to critically examine its impact on society. As a shared consciousness of Blackness in Latin America continues to develop, understanding that Afro-descendant people across Latin America were subject to the moral regulation of honour codes will help bring these communities together. Ultimately, by comparing different countries, a shared understanding of honour can be constructed, which allows scholars to examine questions about culture and society in Latin America as a whole.

Colonialism in the Prison Industrial Complex

By Veronica Kiang

Veronica is currently pursuing a Master's with the political studies department in political and legal thought. Her research pertains to mass incarceration and its disproportionate effects on BIPOC. She did her undergrad at the University of Toronto, where she did a specialist in political science along with a major in criminology and sociolegal studies.

Introduction

In North America, racial hierarchies have historically discriminated against Black, Indigenous, and people of colour (BIPOC). While institutional racism may no longer be overtly discriminatory towards them, many racialized groups are still disadvantaged. In particular, the Canadian criminal justice system is supposed to protect its citizens, yet trends of mass incarceration have targeted various groups of people more than others. Indigenous people are more likely to be victimized and convicted compared to their non-indigenous counterparts (Government of Canada, 2022). This essay argues that mass incarceration disproportionately affects Indigenous peoples, especially Indigenous women, thus perpetuating colonial ideologies that can be decolonized by a restorative approach to criminal justice. To understand this claim, there will first be a historical account of discrimination against Indigenous people in Canada, followed by an analysis of colonialism has impacted the carceral state, ending with proposals on how to decolonize the criminal justice system.

The Colonial History of Canada

Canada's dark history of colonization and residential schools has created a colonial legacy that is exercised through the penitentiary system (Monchalin, 2010; Chartrand, 2019). The ramifications of such a violent past continue to displace Indigenous offenders as seen through the history of carceral logic. From the 1800s to the 1950s, Indigenous people were assimilated and oppressed through residential schools rather than prison (Chartrand, 2019). In fact, Indigenous people only made up 1-8% of the prison population during this time (Chartrand, 2019). This carceral logic was based on the idea of prison as a place of reform (Chartrand, 2019). Indigenous people were seen as inferior to white settlers and assumed to not have the same capacity to be incarcerated. Native offenders were perceived to be more susceptible to diseases like tuberculosis, lacked the ability to adapt to long prison sentences, and were overall seen as a waste of prison resources (Chartrand, 2019). While they were not regulated through prisons, Indigenous people were managed through institutions and policies that aimed to assimilate them. Government policies forced Native people to give up their land and culture, mandated residential schools, and restructured Indigenous sovereignty (Chartrand, 2019). In an attempt to regulate Indigenous bodies and spirits, punishments were severe inside and outside of the penitentiary system. It was common practice to force them into labour, beat them or harm them with whips, deprive them of food, and put them in solitary confinement (Chartrand, 2019).

However, in the mid-1900s, the post-war era changed carceral logics. In 1950, the Indian Act repealed the government's ability to intervene in potlatches and ceremonies (Chartrand,

2019). One year later, Indigenous women were allowed to participate in band democracy (Chartrand, 2019). Overall, the paradigm of this era was the politics of recognition that aimed to reconcile with Indigenous tribes in settler sovereignty. However, this did not come without a catch. While Indigenous people were gaining political rights and recognition, the carceral logic shifted in accordance. Punishment was no longer centred around labour, but rather based on corrective philosophies (Chartrand, 2019). Penitentiaries aimed to treat prisoners through training or re-education. Consequently, Indigenous incarceration in federal prisons increased by 1-3% every year. In 2019, Native offenders accounted for 26.4% of the federal prison population (Chartrand, 2019).

The increase of incarcerated Indigenous offenders created the notion of the 'Native criminal,' which projected the stereotype of Indigenous people as savages, or a 'drunk Indian' (Chartrand, 2019, p.77). The dichotomy and segregation of Indigenous people promote the idea that they are ontologically more violent or sexually deviant (Murdocca, 2009). By using culture as a signifier for criminality, Indigenous people are subjected to more severe treatment and sentencing from the criminal justice system (Murdocca, 2009). It becomes clear that politics of recognition was rooted in the idea of liberal citizenship and the inclusion of Indigenous people, yet it simultaneously maintained settler privileges (Chartrand, 2019). While residential schools were no longer mandatory, penitentiary systems became the new form of oppression that carried out the legacy of colonialism. The colonial logic from the 1800s to 1950s that emphasized settler superiority and Indigenous inferiority remained prevalent

even during politics of recognition; it was merely repackaged through a language of criminality and carceral logic (Chartrand, 2019). Therefore, the carceral space remains to be a colonial project that disproportionately targets Indigenous people.

The Criminal Justice System as a Colonial Project

In Michelle Alexander's book, *The New Jim Crow*, she proposes that contemporary American politics are based on caste systems determined by race (2010). Alexander does not deny that there has been great progress in civil rights for African-Americans, yet she does assert that Black people are still discriminated against due to racial hierarchies (2010). While slavery and Jim Crow laws have been dissolved, mass incarceration acts as a new system of control and oppression (Alexander, 2010). She writes, "The emergence of each new system of control may seem sudden, but history shows that the seeds are planted long before each new institution begins to grow" (Alexander, 2010, p.22). This quote showcases how new systems of oppression build off the history of previous forms of control. While Alexander's focus was on the history of discrimination against African-Americans and how mass incarceration acts as the new Jim Crow laws, her logic can be applied to the overrepresentation of Indigenous offenders.

Canada's history of colonization has sowed the seeds of oppression that remains present to this day. The segregation and assimilation that Native communities faced in the 1800s made them more vulnerable to Eurocentric governance (Chartrand, 2019). The colonial logic of that era created a paradigm in which Indigenous people were seen as inferior to white settlers (Chartrand, 2019). This ideology remained even

as carceral logic shifted and Native people became more politically recognized (Chartrand, 2019). Even though residential schools have been eradicated, mass incarceration has become a new form of oppression for Indigenous people (Monchalin, 2010). Therefore, the racial caste system is prevalent in the Canadian criminal justice system as mass incarceration acts as an oppressor for Indigenous people. Colonial ideologies are still embedded in the justice framework, leading to more severe consequences for Indigenous offenders.

Consequences of the Colonial Legacy on the Carceral State

The significance of this study lies in the inequalities that Indigenous people face in the prison industrial complex. The criminal justice system and all of its facets are supposed to be neutral arbitrators of justice (Chartrand, 2019). However, if Indigenous people are being mistreated in every step of the justice system from police officers, courts, and prisons, then the justice system is not as neutral as perceived to be. Data shows that Indigenous people are more likely to be overpoliced, face severe sentences, and are less likely to be paroled and receive support once released (Grekul, 2020). The Office of the Correctional Investigator (OCI) noted that from 2005 to 2015, there was a 50% increase of Indigenous people in federal prison, even though there was only a 10% population growth (Chartrand, 2019). From 2016 to 2017, Indigenous adults made up 30% of provincial custody, and 27% of federal custody, yet Indigenous adults only accounted for 4.1% of the Canadian population (Government of Canada, 2022).

They are further discriminated against inside the carceral state

as many are subjected to medium and maximum security institutions (Grekul, 2020). They are also more likely to be released later in their sentence compared to non-Indigenous offenders (Gutierrez, Helmus, and Hanson, 2017). Even when they are released, there are negative consequences. Compared to non-Indigenous men, Native male offenders had more conditions upon release (Government of Canada, 2018). While non-Indigenous male offenders had less than five conditions, Indigenous men had five or more (Government of Canada, 2018). 79% of Indigenous prisoners that are released receive minimal support (Grekul, 2020). Since many Native offenders are denied the support of a halfway house, they lack a structured return to their community, which increases the likelihood of recidivism (Grekul, 2020). Native offenders have higher rates of recidivism, especially in regard to sexual crimes or violent crimes (Gutierrez, Helmus, and Hanson, 2017). From 2013 to 2017, 53% of Indigenous male offenders returned to federal custody due to violation of conditions, while only 30% of non-Native male offenders were reincarcerated (Government of Canada, 2018). However, higher rates of Indigenous recidivism may be due to social, economic, and historical disadvantages that are unique to Indigenous offenders (Gutierrez, Helmus, and Hanson, 2017). Overall, the statistics highlight the disparities that First Nations people undergo in the prison industrial complex.

Indigenous Women in the Carceral State

Indigenous women are one of the fastest growing populations in prison (Sheehan, 2017). The intersectionality of their identity puts them at further risk of being discriminated against in the criminal justice system. The overrepresentation of Indigenous people in prison is even more drastic for Native

women. A study from the OCI showed that from 2007 to 2017, the population of women in prison increased by 30%, but the proportion of Indigenous women that were incarcerated was twice that at 60% (Grekul, 2020). From 2001 to 2012, the population of Indigenous women incarcerated grew by 109% (Smith, 2020). When considering female Indigenous offenders, it is important to consider their trauma trails. Trauma trails are used to describe the forms of victimization that they have gone through to account for how trauma has impacted their journey in the carceral state (Grekul, 2020). Indigenous women often commit crimes out of survival as victimization is often a precursor to criminality (Grekul, 2020). Effects of marginalization and colonization increase the likelihood of substance abuse, mental health issues, and family violence (Grekul, 2020). Indigenous people are twice as likely to be the victims of violent crimes compared to their non-Indigenous counterparts, and Indigenous women are three times as likely to experience violent victimization compared to other women (Grekul, 2020). Moreover, stereotypes about Native women being prostitutes have impacted the way they are perceived in the criminal justice system. Rather than focusing on the brutalization they suffer, discourse surrounding Indigenous offenders tends to focus on their sexual deviance (Grekul, 2020). This stigma often contributes to their security status, putting them in maximum security facilities (Smith, 2020). They are first victimized by the crime, then victimized again when they are labelled as criminals (Grekul, 2020). Thus, they are “double victimized” both by the settler society and by their own Native community (Grekul, 2020, p.8).

The treatment of female Native prisoners in the carceral state

is also a dire situation. In 2015, the OCI reported that assaults against Indigenous women have doubled, and “use of force” incidents have tripled (Grekul, 2020). Indigenous women in prison are also more likely to harm themselves due to a lack of mental health support (Grekul, 2020). Even if there are doctors available to support them, overmedication for mental health issues is a common form of management that may make matters worse (Grekul, 2020). There is also a lack of counselling available for Indigenous women due to long waitlists and a distrust of correctional staff (Grekul, 2020). Additionally, Indigenous women are more likely to serve their entire sentence since they are labelled as high risk offenders (Smith, 2020). Due to long sentences, the children of Indigenous mothers who are incarcerated are often sent into foster care (Smith, 2020).

Furthermore, once female Indigenous offenders are released from prison, they face numerous obstacles. Research has shown that a structured return is important to reintegrate successfully into society (Sheehan, 2017; Grekul, 2020). While halfway homes provide this structure, many are denied entry. Those who are sent to halfway homes face the fear of being assaulted by male parolees (Grekul, 2020). Those who are immediately sent back to their communities face the following issues: abstinence from substances and alcohol, reconnecting with family and peers, lack of housing, lack of employment, mental health issues, and parole meetings (Sheehan, 2017). While reuniting with family and children often serves as a coping mechanism for Indigenous women, the pressures of returning to a normal life may inhibit their ability to attend parole meetings (Sheehan, 2017). Prison-based support interventions also provide minimum support for Indigenous

women due to long waitlists and a lack of availability. Often, the onus falls upon the released offender to contact and follow up with their social workers (Sheehan, 2017). With a lack of support, Indigenous women may feel as if they have more respect behind bars and women who are imprisoned at a young age are “groomed for a life behind bars” (Smith, 2020, p.65). Therefore, the little support Indigenous women receive once released from prison has contributed to a pattern of recidivism and imprisonment.

Decolonizing the Prison Industrial Complex

The criminal justice system is part of the colonial legacy since it oppresses indigenous people through its discriminatory actions. As a remedy to this unfair treatment, the carceral state needs to be decolonized. To unroot the justice system in colonial dogmas, there needs to be a consideration for Indigenous cultures, which may look like a more restorative approach to justice and support for Indigenous women (Government of Canada, 2022). In 1967, a report called “Indians and Law” claimed that there needs to be an increased presence of community liaison between Indigenous communities and settler society to create a more restorative approach to justice that is culturally relevant (Chartrand, 2019). There also needs to be more support for released prisoners, and legal advocacy for them. In regards to administrative changes, the criminal justice system should encourage less policing in First Nations communities, reduced sentences for alcohol offences, and more Indigenous sovereignty (Chartrand, 2019).

In terms of carceral principles, the criminal justice system may not be best suited for Indigenous offenders due to a difference

in values. Western correctional facilities are based on principles of deterrence, incapacitation, denunciation, and rehabilitation (Government of Canada, 2022). Conversely, Native justice has more of a restorative approach that is focused on kinship and community (Government of Canada, 2022; Murdocca, 2009). Western penitentiaries consider crimes as an offence against the state. Thus, the punishment inflicted on prisoners is a reflection of that ideology (Government of Canada, 2022). For Indigenous justice, they see crimes committed against specific people and communities. Thus, a restorative approach aims to bring peace and balance back to the community through healing and reintegration (Government of Canada, 2022).

To implement a more restorative approach to Indigenous offenders in the penitentiary system, there needs to be an acknowledgement of additional risk factors that are exclusive to Native communities. These risk factors include a history of criminal behaviour, pro-criminal attitudes and friends, family issues or growing up in foster homes, education or employment issues, and substance abuse (Gutierrez, Helmus, and Hanson, 2017; Grekul, 2020). Government programs targeting these issues can help lower recidivism rates among Indigenous offenders. Thus, a restorative approach would provide more support for Native offenders, which can prevent them from re-offending as well. For example, in Nova Scotia, there was an Indigenous led program called “Nemi’simk, Seeing Oneself Intervention Programme” (Monchalin, 2010, p.126) This program was designed to reduce underage drinking among Indigenous boys. It used culturally relevant teaching strategies, such as the Medicine Wheel (Monchalin, 2010). Results of this initiative were promising as participants

were less likely to engage in binge drinking and marijuana use (Monchalin, 2010). Another example is from Australia, known as the “Positive, parenting programme” otherwise referred to as the Triple P (Monchalin, 2010, 127). This program targeted the risk factor of family issues and taught parents Indigenous management strategies for child development (Monchalin, 2010). This initiative was also rather successful as children’s behaviour became less dysfunctional after parents attended these workshops (Monchalin, 2010).

Another risk factor that restorative justice could target is substance abuse and alcoholism. A study in British Columbia showed that Indigenous offenders were 1.92 times more likely to be dependent on alcohol compared to their white counterparts (Rempel et al., 2015). Abstinence from alcohol and drugs is often a condition upon release for Indigenous offenders (Government of Canada, 2018). With higher rates of alcohol dependence in Indigenous prisoners, the government should provide more support on release to prevent them from violating that condition. Therefore, the overrepresentation of Indigenous offenders can be attributed to an incompatible justice system that does not value restoration enough. By providing government programs that target risk factors, Indigenous re-offending rates could be significantly lowered (Monchalin, 2010). It is important to note that it would be most effective to have Indigenous led organizations as they can provide culturally relevant teachings that Western institutions lack.

Moreover, Indigenous women go through double victimization both from Eurocentric society and their

Indigenous community (Grekul, 2020). Firstly, to adopt a restorative approach, negative stereotypes about Indigenous women must be dissolved (Smith, 2020). Secondly, more support must be provided to them. Examples can include halfway homes that are gender segregated to prevent sexual assault. There could also be programs designated for Indigenous mothers to help with parenting and reconnecting with their children (Sheehan, 2017). Overall, the support that Indigenous women need in the carceral state may differ from their male counterparts; restorative justice must reflect these different needs.

Conclusion

To conclude, the dark history of Canada's past remains present to this day. The oppression of Indigenous people has been preserved through a colonial legacy in which racial hierarchies still put Native communities at a disadvantage. While the criminal justice system is supposed to be a neutral arbitrator of justice, Indigenous people have been discriminated against at every stage. With Indigenous people overrepresented in the carceral state, mass incarceration becomes part of the colonial legacy. In particular, Indigenous women have been especially victimized by the prison industrial complex as they are the fastest growing population in the carceral state. To decolonize the justice system, there must be a more restorative approach that resonates more closely with Indigenous offenders. Canada must take national responsibility and acknowledge how colonial violence is perpetuated through mass incarceration. The government can offer more support to reduce risk factors that make Indigenous offenders more likely to offend and reoffend. Since this essay predominantly focused on Native adult

offenders, it is worth questioning how Indigenous youth are affected in future research.

Is My Skin Not Dark Too?

By Kai Siallagan

Kai Siallagan is a third year History and Global Development Studies joint honours student with Certificates in Law, Business, and Indigenous Languages and Cultures. His research interests include labour histories in the Global South, late colonialism in Southeast Asia, and historical processes of racialisation. He is currently pursuing independent research thesis under the supervision of Dr. Awet Weldemichael on the emergence of the Sumatran tourism industry. Beyond academics, Kai is passionate about programming to address barriers for underrepresented and equity-deserving students in academia.

Here, we only know being dark.
 You are always darker than the white man;
 You are always just “dark.”
 There is no nuance, no qualification.
 Are you white?
 Or are you different?

To be white is to be a person—
 Not the throng, the huddled mass,
 Untouched by anonymity.
 To be white is to be normal;
 Un-muddled by “ethnicity,”
 Not of the “them.”

And so what of the hybrids?
The bastardised, the placeless,
Whose whiteness was tainted by foreign blood?
Are they to inherit the Earth?
Or are they to be foul reminders
Of the white man's lust?

Well, they don't call me half anyway,
I am their savage.
I am their model minority.
As if I could be half.
No, I am full-blooded—
My soul hosts no room for only a half.

So then why am I stressing
About my skin getting lighter
While I got cousins
Still decaying on those plantations?

When they say to me
You are white.
Am I whitewashed?
Or is my bloodline colonised?

I respond: "you, white man, made me dark;
Is my skin not dark too?"
Here you are not black, brown, copper;
We are all dark to the white man.

That's Enough Rights: The Supreme Court's Role in the Domination of Indigenous Peoples

By Laura Boost

I am a current Master's student in the department of Political Studies at Queen's. Previously, I received a BA of Political Science with a minor in Criminal Justice and Public Policy from the University of Guelph. My upcoming research project will investigate the conservative legal movement in Canada, or lack thereof, in comparison to United States.

Introduction

The definition of domination, interchangeably referred to as control, is "to exercise restraining or directing influence over a subject or target" and while many inhabitants of Westernized democracies may associate the term 'domination' with a powerful concept that exists only in far away, conflict-ridden countries, domination can prevail wherever necessary conditions are present, including in Westernized democracies (O'Leary 2018, p.12). With colonial rule being "the best-known specimen of a control system", a prime example of such is the domination of Indigenous peoples in Canada (O'Leary 2018, p.7). Shortly after their arrival, colonial settlers in Canada were able to control Indigenous peoples and have continued to do so into modern-day times. This control has been successfully maintained by the participation of other settler colonial institutions; one significant actor being the judiciary. Although the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) is intended to be, "in theory and practice", a nonpartisan, unbiased, neutral mediator of conflict,

judgements coming out of the institution exhibit a preference for the settler colonial government (Schertzer 2016, p.6). Throughout this paper, I argue that, through section 35 jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of Canada has explicitly and intentionally constrained Indigenous legal activism to prevent rights mobilization and thus perpetuate settler colonial domination. Such efforts are exemplified via three principle methods; the SCC's use of originalism to interpret the Constitution, the creation of constitutional tests to determine Indigenous rights issues, and the failure to enforce the Crown's fiduciary duty.

I will first begin by using Ian Lustick's framework to not only demonstrate that a system of control is indeed present in the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian government but how such control manifested. Following this, I will provide a brief overview of section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982 before using SCC cases pertaining to section 35 jurisprudence to establish how the judiciary has contributed to the preservation of settler colonial domination over Indigenous peoples. Lastly, I will argue that despite various SCC cases favouring the view of Indigenous peoples', the outcomes of cases have been unable to result in Indigenous peoples being any less dominated.

The Presence of a Control System in Canada

It is first important to understand the control which has been inflicted upon Indigenous peoples in Canada. As outlined by the work of Ian Lustick, three components are necessary for one group to control another; segmentation, dependence, and cooption. It is only when such components operate simultaneously that a system of control is formed (Lustick

1977). As I will show in subsequent paragraphs, the essential conditions for a system of control to exist, as conceptualized by Lustick, are present in the relationship between Indigenous peoples, the subordinate group, and settler colonialists in Canada, the dominant population.

First, the concept of segmentation includes two aspects. One aspect is that segmentation “refers to the isolation” of the subordinate group from the dominant population (Lustick 1977, p.108). The second aspect of segmentation is “internal fragmentation” which refers to the segregation of the subordinate group from each other (Lustick 1977, p.108). Segmentation in the examination of Indigenous peoples in Canada can be seen through the creation of reserves. Through negotiations and agreements with Indigenous peoples, although such agreements lacked transparency and truthfulness, the settler colonial government of Canada invoked legislation to create reserves that displaced Indigenous peoples from their original land and restricted them to “specific territories” (Lawrence 2003, p.7). The land on which reserves were situated was often rural and secluded from settler colonial societies so that Indigenous peoples would be “out of the way of settlers and their colonization efforts” (Monchalin 2016, p.103). In addition to being isolated from settler society, Indigenous peoples experienced internal fragmentation. With over 600 reserves geographically dispersed throughout Canada, the federal government ensured that Indigenous communities were to be kept separate and distant from one another (Carstens 1991). Further to this, to prevent movement and mobilization from one reserve to another, the government created what was referred to as the “pass system” (Monchalin 2016, p. 105). The implementation

of this system required Indigenous peoples to receive approval to go on and off the reserve from an Indian agent, otherwise known as a federal government representative (Monchalin 2016). In many instances, the creation of the pass system prevented Indigenous peoples from accessing one another as their movement was being monitored and controlled. Thus, both the creation of reserves and the pass system represent the existence of segmentation.

The second condition of control is dependence which “refers to the reliance” of the subordinate group on the dominant population “for important economic and political resources” (Lustick 1977, p.108). First, the component of economic dependence can be exemplified by the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the federal government through the seizure of prized land. By dictating where reserves were located, and ultimately where Indigenous peoples were to reside, the Canadian government was able to relocate Indigenous peoples to land which was considered less desirable (Monchalin 2016). In doing so, settler colonials were then able to confiscate land which was sought after; this land was rich in resources and resided in favourable locations for settler colonial development (Carstens 1991). The settler colonial government’s ability to swindle such land subsequently enabled them to monopolize resources. This matter is central to the concept of Indigenous economic dependence as Indigenous economic success “was determined by their access to sufficient agricultural land” (Carstens 1991, p.103). Therefore displacing Indigenous peoples to land with poor conditions for agricultural purposes significantly restricted their economic capacity and conclusively made Indigenous peoples reliant on those who had access to

resources; settler colonialists (Baxter 2020). Second, the component of political dependence can be exemplified by the relationship of Indigenous peoples and the federal government through the provisions of the Indian Act which “constrained Indigenous self government” (Kelm & Smith 2018, p.61). For example, an amendment to the Indian Act allowed elected chiefs to “displace the authority of life chiefs” who were the traditional leaders of Indigenous governance (Kelm & Smith 2018, p.63). Even then, those who were elected as chiefs through Indian Act provisions still had to have their leadership affirmed by an Indian agent (Kelm & Smith 2018). This gave authority to settler colonial representatives to more or less select the chief themselves. Obtaining this authority permitted future practises of colonialism as it was not unlikely for the representative to only affirm a chief “who would support the assimilationist goals of” the federal government (Kelm & Smith 2018, p.68). As a result of Indian Act provisions, Indigenous peoples were made dependent on settler colonists for political governance as their right to self-governance deteriorated.

The third component of control indicated by Lustick is cooption. Cooption refers to the dominant population acquiring the cooperation of the subordinate group’s elites with the undeclared yet calculated intention to penetrate the subordinate group (Lustick 1977). In the context of Indigenous relations in Canada, cooption can be represented through the signing of treaties. Treaties were agreements signed by Indigenous peoples and settlers which were constructed to permit the “Canadian government to pursue settlement and resource extraction” and in exchange Indigenous communities would receive “reserve lands,

monetary payments, educational allowances, and agricultural supplies” (Monchalin 2016, p.92). Furthermore, upon negotiating treaties between Indigenous peoples and settler colonialists, settler colonialists made promises to Indigenous elites regarding the protection of their territorial land, livelihood, and culture (Monchalin 2016). More specifically, during negotiations, Indigenous elites “stressed education as an essential provision” (Monchalin 2016, p.101). Despite the fact that settler colonial treaty commissioners ensured via oral communications that education would not only be provided but provided in the absence of colonial interference, the final written treaty signed by both sides, but not to the knowledge of the Indigenous elites, did not include any such provision (Monchalin 2016). Settler colonialists would later go on to create the residential school system which explicitly and violently subjected Indigenous children to settler colonial education and culture. Consequently, through false promises in treaty negotiations, settler colonialists solicited the support and cooperation of Indigenous elites only to then exploit and penetrate their people and thus exhibits cooption.

Conclusively, as proven above through various pieces of evidence, the three essential components of control, segmentation, dominance, and cooption, have been deployed simultaneously by the settler colonial government in a successful effort to dominate Indigenous peoples in Canada.

Section 35 of the *Constitution Act of 1982*

Now that it has been established how a system of control has come to exist between settler colonials and Indigenous peoples in Canada, the remainder of this paper will advance the central argument; the control system put in place by the settler

colonial government has been preserved by the SCC which can be seen through section 35 jurisprudence. It is first essential to understand the context of section 35 and how it came to be.

It wasn't until the repatriation of the Constitution in 1982 and the subsequent creation of section 35 that Indigenous peoples' rights were recognized in Canada (Monchalin 2016). While section 35 protected and affirmed some rights of Indigenous peoples, such as the recognition of treaty rights, definitions of who constitutes an Indigenous person, land claim agreements, and Indigenous equality rights between sexes, the section was not all-encompassing of Indigenous rights as it failed to recognize "the inherent rights of Indigenous peoples to all unceded land" (Monchalin 2016, p. 203). Section 35 was also worded intentionally vague as this allowed for uncertainty in what rights were provided. Rather than ratifying specific rights in the Constitution, the government instead expected "these rights to be defined on a case-by-case basis in the courts" (Monchalin 2016, p.203). This effectively allowed the government to defer the responsibility to define Indigenous rights to the SCC as opposed to directly providing Indigenous peoples' adequate conditionally entrenched rights. This in itself represents one of the many ways in which the Canadian government has simultaneously deprived Indigenous peoples rights through legal activism while imposing settler colonial culture. By refusing to provide inherent rights protection to Indigenous peoples through constitutional means, Indigenous groups have been forced to fight for rights through an arena that was created by and for the settler colonial legal system.

Constitutional Interpretation

A key aspect of the judiciary is the ability to interpret the meaning of the Constitution (Baker 2010). While how the meaning of the Constitution is interpreted can be viewed as controversial, two central methods of constitutional interpretation exist; the living-tree approach and the originalist approach. Where the living-tree approach interprets the Constitution broadly and progressively, the originalist approach interprets the Constitution more narrowly as it is based on the original framer's intent upon its adoption (Strauss 2010). Depending on which approach is applied by the Court to interpret the Constitution, the decisive outcome of a case can be profoundly affected. Despite a multitude of non-Indigenous cases, addressing a variety of rights issues, representing the SCC's application of the living-tree approach to interpret the Constitution, the Court has repeatedly interpreted section 35 rights issues using originalism; this is problematic.

The Court's application of the living-tree approach to constitutional interpretation can be seen in several SSC decisions but is famously highlighted in *Edwards v. Canada (AG)*. The case of *Edwards v. Canada (AG)*, also known as the Persons Case, took place in 1929 and was concerning whether or not women could be appointed to the Senate (Sharpe & McMahon 2000). To reach a decision, it had to be established if women could be considered 'qualified persons' as per the constitutional requirements for Senate appointments (Sharpe & McMahon 2000). In the lower Court's ruling, the Court found that women could not be appointed to the Senate of Canada due to the fact that women were unable to "vote or hold public office when the Constitution was written in 1867, the Fathers of

Confederation could not have contemplated the appointment of a female senator when they used the words ‘qualified persons’” (Sharpe & McMahon 2000, p.4). This was appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC), the highest court in Canada at the time of the case, where the lower Court’s judgement was overturned. The JCPC found that the lower Court’s definition of ‘qualified persons’ was too narrow and should have rather included women on the basis that “the burden is upon those who deny that the word includes women to make out their case” (Edwards v. Canada [AG] 1930, para 138). This led the Court to take a broad and liberal approach to the constitutional language which enabled the bench to find that women were considered ‘qualified persons’ and therefore could be appointed to the Senate of Canada (Edwards v. Canada [AG] 1930). While the lower Court utilized an originalist approach to come to the decision that women were not considered ‘qualified persons’, the JCPC applied a living-tree approach to interpret the Constitution which led to not only a different outcome but also a landmark decision for women’s rights in Canada.

Contrary to the Court’s application of a living-tree approach in Edwards v. Canada (AG) and although originalism “is not a generally accepted mode of interpretation” in Canada as “the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected this practise”, as seen in Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), the SCC has applied originalism in section 35 Indigenous rights issues cases (Burrows 2016, p.130). This is exemplified in the case of R. v. Marshall (No 1) where an Indigenous man was charged with fishing and selling eels out of season and in absence of a fishing license (R. v. Marshall No 1 1999). The SCC found that, on the basis of 1760 and 1761 treaty rights,

Marshall indeed had a right to both fish for and sell fish (*R. v. Marshall* No 1 1999). To come to this decision, the Court found that the treaty rights of Indigenous peoples must be interpreted by its original “intent and spirit” (Monchalin 2016, p.209). Although the SCC sided in favour of Marshall, the Court’s interpretation of the treaty right on the basis of its original “intent and spirit” refutes the ability of the Court to interpret Indigenous rights beyond their initial meaning (Monchalin 2016, p.209). This use of originalism to interpret treaty rights has allowed the Court to bind the meaning of the treaty to the era in which they were written and consequently withholds the potential for Indigenous treaty rights to be interpreted more broadly which therefore is exclusive of additional section 35 rights.

The Court’s decision to apply a living-tree approach to cases, such as in *Edwards v. Canada (AG)*, but an originalist approach in section 35 cases is not a coincidence. Knowing that the result of a case can be dependent on which approach is used to interpret the constitution, as represented in the case of *Edwards v. Canada (AG)* where the lower court and JCPC differed in interpreting the Constitution which lead to opposing judgments, the SCC has deliberately utilized the approach of originalism in determining section 35 cases as it produces conservative rights outcomes. The Court’s use of an originalist approach to interpreting the Constitution breeds colonialism in the sense that, using its original intent, the Constitution is a document created by colonial settlers for a Westernized society that is being applied to a non-Western culture. Therefore, the originalist approach to the Constitution represents an extension of colonialism which perpetuates the prolonged domination of Indigenous peoples.

Moreover, the lack of will to interpret Indigenous rights liberally through a living-tree approach subjects Indigenous rights to “greater constitutional constraints” and, as seen in *R. v. Marshall*, restricts the scope of section 35 rights (Burrows 2016, p.131). This ultimately limits Indigenous legal activism through the Supreme Court, the only avenue provided to pursue rights expansions, and therefore effectively limits Indigenous rights. Conclusively, by constraining the already limited rights provided to Indigenous peoples through section 35, the SCC suppresses Indigenous peoples’ ability to organize efforts to circumvent domination.

The Creation of Constitutional Tests

Through handing down judgements, the SCC has created multiple constitutional tests to determine what constitutes an Indigenous right. One of the first cases to create a constitutional test pertaining to Indigenous rights was *R.v. Sparrow* in 1990. Sparrow was an Indigenous man who was arrested and charged for fishing with a net that exceeded the maximum length permitted by his licence as per section 61(1) of the federal Fisheries Act (*R. v. Sparrow* 1990). While he acknowledged that the size of his net was longer than what was permitted, Sparrow contended that because he was exercising his right to fish as an Indigenous person, the limitation enacted by the fishing licence was invalid as it violated section 35(1) of the Constitution Act of 1982 (Monchalin 2016). Though SCC’s judgement ruled in Sparrow’s favour, finding that he did indeed have an Indigenous right to fish the day he was arrested, a two-part constitutional test was created out of this case. The test was invented to determine first if an Indigenous right exists and subsequently “how the government may be justified in

breaching or limiting that right” (Monchalin 2016, p.204). A second instance where a constitutional test pertaining to Indigenous rights was created can be seen in *R. v. Van der Peet* where an Indigenous woman was charged with selling salmon which were caught under a fishing license contradictory to section 27(5) of the British Columbia Fishery (General) Regulations (Monchalin 2016). The SCC sided against Van der Peet and upheld the law which stated that Indigenous rights extend only to fishing for the purposes of catching fish and not to the sale of fish (*R. v. Van der Peet* 1996). In the SCC’s decision, the bench provided ten criteria that are required to “be met in order for a practise to be affirmed and protected” as an Indigenous right under section 35 of the Constitution Act; this is known as the “Van der Peet” or the “integral to a distinctive culture” test (Monchalin 2016, p.205).

Furthermore, the constitutional tests created by the SCC have been applied to succeeding section 35 cases. The Van der Peet test was applied in *R.v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd.* where members of the Sheshaht and Opethesaht First Nations sold the surplus of their food fishing quotas to an Indigenous-owned company, N.T.C. Smokehouse, who then sold the salmon caught by their employees to non-Indigenous fish-processing businesses (*R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd.* 1996). Because these actions were contrary to sections 4(5) and 27(5) of the British Columbia Fishery (General) Regulations, N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd. was charged with selling and purchasing fish caught under the Indian food fish licence (*R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd.* 1996). Upon its application of the Van der Peet test, the SCC found that “the sale of fish did not form an ‘integral’ part of the distinctive cultures of the

Sheshaht and Opetchesaht peoples” and thus the charges against N.T.C. Smokehouse stood (Monchalin 2016, p.206).

The creation of such constitutional tests grants the SCC, a bench of non-Indigenous justices, the ability to decide not only what can and cannot be considered an Indigenous right, but also how the government can justifiably infringe upon Indigenous rights if they are found to exist as exemplified in *R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd.* Although Indigenous peoples existed before the arrival of colonial settlers, the creation of Indigenous constitutional tests permits the SCC to outright render or refuse rights to Indigenous peoples. Consequently, the creation of such tests ensures that it is more difficult for Indigenous peoples to be granted rights as they are now subject to additional criteria requirements when pursuing legal activism. Simply stated, the SCC contributes to settler colonial domination as it disallows Indigenous peoples from obtaining increased rights and thus restricts the ability for Indigenous mobilization. With limited rights, how are Indigenous peoples supposed to overcome or escape, whether to a degree or entirely, settler colonial domination? It is because of this that I argue that the creation of constitutional tests, which have been proven to be restrictive of Indigenous rights, prevent Indigenous legal mobilization and in turn allows settler colonial domination to be preserved.

The Crown's Fiduciary Duty

Evident in the signing of treaties, the government, also referred to as the Crown, has a fiduciary duty that “requires the Crown to act honourably” in its relationship with Indigenous peoples (Monchalin 2016, p.210). The fiduciary duty is defined as when passing laws, the government “must

not infringe” on Indigenous rights (Monchalin 2016, p.210). However, when laws potentially infringe upon Indigenous rights, the government has a duty to consult and accommodate Indigenous peoples where applicable (Beaton 2018). Although on the surface this might appear to be a concept in favour of upholding Indigenous rights, the negative underlying implications of such duties can be seen through section 35 jurisprudence in the cases of *Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests)* and *Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia*.

In the 2004 case of *Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests)*, the British Columbian provincial government approved a Tree Farm License (TFL) to a large forestry firm which allowed for the harvesting of trees on the land of the Haida people in 1961 (*Haida Nation v. British Columbia [Minister of Forests] 2004*). The TFL was then successfully renewed in the years 1981, 1995, and 2000 though the Haida peoples were never consulted by the provincial government despite it infringing on their territory (Monchalin 2016). In the judgement handed down by SCC, it was found that the British Columbian government did indeed have a duty to consult the Haida peoples upon the renewal of the TFL and that “consultation must be meaningful” (*Haida Nation v. British Columbia [Minister of Forests] 2004*, para 10).

Similar to the case of the Haida peoples, the case of *Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia* involved the provincial government authorizing a logging license to a forestry company to harvest trees on the traditional land of the Tsilhqot’in people. Understandably, the Tsilhqot’in

people opposed this decision and proceeded to create a blockade to prevent logging from taking place on their land (Monchalín 2016). In their ruling, the SCC stated that the provincial government “breached its duty to consult” (Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia 2014, para 153). In addition to this, the SCC noted that in the absence of Indigenous consent, the Crown needs to “establish that the proposed incursion on the land is justified under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982” (Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia 2014, para 137).

The SCC’s inability to hold the government accountable and provide not a single consequence in the cases of *Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests)* and *Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia* reiterates the central point of this paper; the Supreme Court has perpetuated the domination of Indigenous peoples in Canada. In *Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests)*, the SCC simply notes that the government must engage in ‘meaningful consultation’ but does not provide an account of what constitutes ‘meaningful consultation’. In other words, besides stating that the government did indeed violate the Haida peoples’ rights, the SCC does not provide any substantial restrictions on the government from repeating their behaviour in potential subsequent occurrences. Furthermore, while in both cases the Court condemns the acts of the government in failing to consult Indigenous peoples when their rights were to be infringed upon, they do not, in any shape or form, prevent the government from violating the rights of Indigenous peoples in the future nor do they provide an incentive for deterring congruent conduct in the future. In fact, the Supreme Court outlines that as long as the government provides legal

justification for infringing on Indigenous peoples' land, settler colonialists can legally circumvent the rights of Indigenous peoples. Thus, the SCC has not confirmed the rights of Indigenous peoples so much as they have confirmed the right of the settler colonial government to nullify Indigenous rights through legal justification (McCrossan, 2015). This then exhibits how the judiciary has once again suppressed attempts for successful Indigenous legal activism while simultaneously privileging the settler colonial government to consequently allow for the continued domination of Indigenous peoples.

Less Dominated?

Some may view the mere fact that because Indigenous peoples' rights were affirmed through section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982, this allows them to be less dominated; this is simply not the truth. The wording used in section 35 is broad and vague which provides Indigenous rights protection which is minimal and uncertain; the broad nature of the language has caused Indigenous rights to be left unspecified and thus creates confusion regards what rights are truly affirmed by the Constitution. Additionally, given the fact that section 35 does not include Indigenous peoples' right to unceded land, the Constitution is inadequate in providing Indigenous peoples comprehensive rights (Beaton 2018). Consequently, this disallows section 35 from providing Indigenous peoples rights that are constructive and effective. It is then because of the lack of constructive and effective rights protection provided in section 35 that has caused Indigenous peoples to pursue rights through the only avenue provided for them to do so; the legal system (as per the government's deference to the SCC to define section 35 rights). Despite the legal system being thought of as a

productive avenue for challenging and pursuing rights, as made evident through the contents of this paper, the opposite has occurred; instead the SCC has been successful in limiting Indigenous legal activists' attempts to pursue more expansive section 35 rights (Rosenberg 1991). While I do not disagree that some SCC cases have led to positive outcomes for Indigenous peoples, the judgments rendered in such cases have merely led to trivial progressions for Indigenous rights. An example of this can be seen in *R. v. Sparrow* and *R. v. Marshall* where the Court affirmed the Indigenous right to fish; affirming fishing rights is not what is going to lead to Indigenous peoples being significantly less dominated. It will not be until Indigenous peoples have rights over unceded land and are no longer subject to settler colonial governance, a settler colonial legal system, and economic dependence on the federal government, among other things, that they could then be considered less dominated. Thus, even though cases exist which have produced seemingly positive outcomes, these have not been able to result in any substantial expansion of rights that are needed for Indigenous peoples to become less dominated.

Conclusion

The SCC has often been overlooked as a participant in the domination of Indigenous peoples in Canada and understandably so. While at face value section 35 jurisprudence appears to aid Indigenous peoples in rights expansion efforts, such benefits are trivial and superficial. It is only when a deeper investigation into section 35 jurisprudence is taken that truth is revealed; the underlying consequences of SCC cases obstruct the ability of Indigenous legal activism to effectively achieve genuine rights wins through the Courts. It

is due to restricting the rights of Indigenous peoples that the SCC perpetuates settler colonial domination. If a group (Indigenous peoples) starts with being given only minimal rights (section 35) and the only avenue provided to pursue rights expansion (the SCC) fails to not only grant more rights but limits their rights, how is one supposed to escape or be less dominated? In conclusion, although the SCC did not initiate the dominance of Indigenous peoples nor is it the primary perpetrator, the Court is a participant in the domination of Indigenous peoples as the SCC has allowed for settler colonial control to be perpetuated which is exemplified through the SCC's use of originalism to interpret the Constitution, the creation of constitutional tests to determine Indigenous rights issues, and the failure to enforce the Crown's fiduciary duty.

The Social Glass Ceiling: The Classical Condition and its Limited Presentations of the Social World

By Ingrid Chen

Ingrid is an incoming 4th-year student majoring in Health Studies and minoring in French. Though intersecting her interests in public health and law, she hopes to one day work at the upstream level to reduce access inequality through policy approaches and interventions. She has been actively involved in the Queen's Pre-Law Society, Queen's Health Outreach, and BLOOM over the past three years, all of which have shaped her passion and experience in leadership, community engagement, and critical assessment of global health issues.

The end of the Second World War marked the beginning of the shift from the classical condition of sociology to the contemporary. Sociology has since remained an active discipline, and with immigration into Western countries from around the world, contemporary sociology includes the insights of more scholars of different social, cultural, and political influences than ever before. Despite this, ideas considered the most influential contributions to the sociological core—namely from Auguste Comte, Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim—are confined to only be about a century in total, between the mid-1800s to the early-1900s. While the significance of these thinkers is undeniable, their identification as the founders of the discipline has created the myth that sociology is an inherently Western discipline centered on the sole contributions of white, European men. As a result, the intellectual ideas and insights

from non-European, lower-class, and/or female scholars have been negated and erased from academic history.

The consequences of a lack of intersectionality will be unpacked as follows. The first half of this paper will focus on the exclusion of Ibn Khaldun, who was engaging in sociological thought far before 19th-20th century sociology, to demonstrate how the formation of the canon decidedly erased pre-existing non-Western ideas. The second half of the paper will focus on comparing the professional and personal experiences of W.E.B. Du Bois and Anna Julia Cooper, both of whom being prominent Black sociological thinkers of the 20th century. This comparison aims to illustrate how the intersection of race and gender alters the way exclusion occurs even among individuals from the same minority group. Although specific characteristics of the Founding Fathers' ideas continue to be applicable, the canon's negation of intersectionality clashes with the diversity of communities and social issues in today's globalized world, making for a sociological knowledge base that presents a limited perspective on society.

An analysis of Khaldun's principles of the social world reveals how his insights were equally comparable to and highly reminiscent of the Founding Fathers' ideas. The existence of sociological theories that predates these thinkers shows that the legacy of the canon cannot be attributed to its novelty; in a way, it is less about what was said and more about who said it. One of Khaldun's principles of the social world is that society is dynamic and subject to change by persisting psycho-socio and economic conditions (Abdullahi and Salawu 2012:29-30). As explained by Abdullahi and Salawu, Khaldun

believed that once individuals have successfully met their primary needs, they will be able to partake in mutually beneficial social relations. Individuals will divide and exchange labour, building relationships to acquire secondary material or abstract needs, whether that be owning a vehicle or political power (ibid:28). The two foundational ideas that underlie Marx's social theories echoed Khaldun's ideas: first, humans must satisfy their basic human necessities before accessing their subsequent needs; second, production and material conditions in a society determine the course of individual lives (Anderson 2016:146). Under Khaldun's view, because society is dynamic, external forces shift alongside emerging societal structures to influence the degree of access individuals have to various levels of resources in society, which define all aspects of life. The idea of disparities in access further relates to Marx's theory of capitalism: a rich minority achieving social and economic power at the expense of an exploited poor majority working-class (ibid:147). While both Marx and Khaldun agreeing that unequal access to societal resources is a broader social issue, solely applying Marxist views produces a more limited perspective on how to approach this problem.

A social problem involving unequal access to multiple fundamental resources for life would be North America's current housing and homelessness crisis. In major Canadian cities such as Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal, considerable amounts of people are at risk of homelessness because more than 30% of their income is allocated to rent, cutting down costs on other necessities such as food or transportation (Raphael 2016: n.p.). Furthermore, "homelessness [has become] a public health emergency" where

individuals are exposed to risk of violence, exposure to harsh elements, food insecurity and mental health issues (Meili 2018:105). Among existing initiatives and solutions for this social issue, the “Housing First” approach is effective in that it directly acts upon individual and community needs (ibid:106). The philosophy is that obtaining stable and affordable housing is the first step towards acquiring other secondary needs to improve one’s overall wellbeing, such as employment, quality health care, and meaningful relationships (Currie, Akm, Michelle, and Julian 2014). Unfortunately, this initiative is only as successful as the amount of funding and commitment from the municipal, provincial, and federal levels of the government in power; in other words, how much they care. For instance, the 1990s saw countless Canadians at risk of home insecurity/homeless because all three levels of government were only spending around 1% of their budget on housing (Meili 2018:103). From the lens of Khaldun and Marx, the lack of government investment in social housing deprives individuals of the basic need of shelter, preventing them from acquiring their secondary needs. For Khaldun, ending up homeless does not happen “haphazardly,” but is rather a result of “patterns and sequential structures” in other aspects of their life (Abdullahi and Salawu 2012:30). For instance, someone with a mental disorder may quit their job because their boss neglected employee-wellbeing for the sake of business success. Consequently, this person can no longer afford to pay rent and must go into welfare or social housing; however, the greater societal force of absent policies, minimum funding, and overall lack of care from the government directly influences this person’s experience in social support.

The purpose of this comparison is to show how extensively Khaldun's ideas align with “‘modern’, ‘scientific’ and ‘rational’ norms and thinking” that emerged during 19th century sociology (Abdullahi and Salawu 2012:25). That is not to say that a comparison can only be drawn between Khaldun and Marx. To give a brief example, another one of Khaldun's principles of the social world centers around how social laws are constructions by the collective society; social laws operate over, yet cannot be changed by individuals (ibid:30). This is similar to Durkheim's social facts, which describes how independent customs, moral rules, and legal criteria in the greater society shape individual experiences; social facts are also independent from the will of the individual (Anderson 2016:127). Overall, the lack of recognition for Khaldun, despite his ideas aligning with those of the canon and remaining relevant today, maintains the narrative of the West that non-Western sociological thoughts are inferior.

While Khaldun's contributions are substantial and worthy of recognition in the canon, the reality is that Khaldun's significance is continually minimized in sociological teachings. Abdullahi and Salawu demonstrate why this is the case by paying particular attention to the influence of colonialism on global education systems. The authors describe an effect called the ‘cultural-ideological clash’, which at its core illustrates the dialectical approach of current non-Western academia (2012:34). The cultural-ideological clash is explained as the adoption of Western concepts in African universities and the framing of the classical tradition to be the roots of sociology, despite how Western systems in African societies have notoriously oppressed their native cultures and

ways of operating. In other words, Eurocentrism is entrenched in the colonization of societies in Africa, meaning that the educational models will also mirror the West. Social scientists in these societies have thus “internalised the values of the imperialists ... [and] no longer see the contradictions” between learning about the canon that excludes their own sociologists, when the theories of African or Middle Eastern thinkers would apply far more to their own society (Ake cited in Abdullahi and Salawu 2012:35).

Moving on from Khaldun, the exclusion of contemporary sociologists that were active alongside thinkers in the canon sheds light on what oppression looks like paired with intersectionality; specifically, the convergence of race and gender. To start, W.E.B Du Bois’ exclusion is similar to Khaldun’s in that many of his insights were reflected in the canon, yet Du Bois was never given recognition. Hughey and Devon describe how Du Bois’ concept of the double consciousness in *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903) notably comparable to Mead and Cooley’s ideas of the Self, in that all three involve a process of “[complex reflection]” back onto the individual (2018:200). The double consciousness describes how African Americans have an inward feeling of “twoness” because they experience racialized oppression and discrimination within white-centric America, while still to a degree identifying as American (Pittman 2016). Despite this, only Mead and Cooley are given credit at the undergraduate level, as evidenced by the SOCY122 textbook that never mentions Du Bois in the Social-Interactionist Perspective chapter of Anderson’s *Thinking About Sociology* (2016:169-191). Du Bois, on the other hand, had his ideas simply “absorbed” into the canon at face value with “little

recognition of the source and devoid of [the Souls'] original significance" (Hughey and Devon 2018:200). It should be noted that social interactionism was not a core lens taken on by the four 'Founding Fathers;' on the contrary, it conflicted with Durkheim's view of a static society where new social structures and systems are capable of emerging (Anderson 2016:171). Rather, it is a core concept of the sociological perspective and represents a discipline-wide shift from studying larger social characteristics to thinking about how the "mind, self, and society emerged out of human social interaction" (Anderson 2016:170). Had Du Bois been credited, he would have offered a diverse perspective on how race differences fundamentally affect social interactions, especially when power and hierarchy are at play (Rosignio cited in Hughey and Devon 2018:201). On a more simplistic level, though, recognizing his contributions to this framework alone would have validated him as a key figure of core sociological frameworks.

In modern-day sociology, an increasing number of scholars are recognizing and calling out how Du Bois could have "come to rank with Max Weber or Emile Durkheim in stature" had his identity as a black man not resulted in racist treatment and devaluation of his insights (Lee and Hughes 2018:11). In contrast, the authors go on to note that recognition of the female black sociologists who were equal to him in academic ability or prowess remains "largely non-existent."

Anna Julia Cooper, one of the earliest contributors to black feminism, is recognized today for her contributions in methods of "[theorizing] oppression and social stratification"

and in the gendered experience of being a woman, especially one of colour, in society (Lee and Hughes 2018:5). The article *Dear Doctor Du Bois* outlines the latter case by referencing the gatekeeping of Cooper from the *Crisis*, a magazine founded by Du Bois that aimed to “set forth those facts and arguments which show the danger of race prejudice, particularly as manifested today toward colored people” (Du Bois 1910:10). Rather than amplifying the voices of female black sociologists to depict a more comprehensive picture of life in America as a black person, Du Bois himself was described to have shallowly offered support to Cooper through empty words of encouragement while simultaneously refusing to advocate for her publishing (Lee and Hughes 2018:6). This makes little sense considering they were “colleagues, contemporaries and intellectual equals” (ibid) of the same organizations that hosted the same events. If his ideas deserved a platform within black sociology, so did hers. The exclusion of female black sociological thinkers, who are equal in merit to their male counterparts, erases the perspective of minority women who experience multidimensional oppression in society. The implications of Cooper’s exclusion must be analyzed in consideration of the social, cultural, and historical contexts that affected her. Not only was Cooper born into slavery, but she grew up and pursued education soon after the Civil War (ibid). For Cooper, growing up under these “transitional and unsettled” social conditions as a black woman made her experiences of oppression unique, yet noted to be unacknowledged in the overall discourses of discrimination towards either groups (Lee and Hughes 2018:5). Browne describes Du Bois and the *Crisis*’ resistance to publishing Cooper’s work as “emblematic” of the backwards process in which black men

contributing to the marginalization and minimization of their own mothers and sisters.

Today, black women are overrepresented in the negative social determinants of health in Western societies. One social problem in particular is medical maltreatment towards black pregnant women, who pose a three to four times higher risk of dying from pregnancy complications compared to white women (American Heart Association News 2019). This issue is underlined by greater societal issues, such as access to health care, and socioeconomic factors such as income or employment, but most notably racism. The mistreatment of black women by the health care system starts even before they enter the building, as the implicit biases from healthcare professionals result in a systemic undervaluing and undermining of black women's pain (ibid). As stated by Dr. Ana Langer, "a bigger problem" lies in the reality that "black women are not monitored as carefully as white women are," with the severity of their symptoms often being brushed off (ibid). The problem of black pregnant women being mistreated is a specific yet widespread problem that illustrates how racism remains a gendered experience. To solely use the classical condition to analyze why this phenomenon persists in the United States would negate the fundamental impact of race and gender combined. The 'Founding Fathers' views on race were limited in that they most likely stemmed from the ideas of Du Bois, who in turn refused to recognize his female intellectual equals. For instance, Hughey and Devon state that Weber's theories on racism likely drew heavy inspiration from Du Boisian frameworks on how power imbalances perpetuate racial boundaries (2018:184).

Overall, the exclusions of Ibn Khaldun, W.E.B. Du Bois and Anna Julia Cooper illustrate how membership into the sociological canon was mediated by the scholars' minority status(es). In other words, despite the equally significant contributions each of the above scholars made, they remained uncredited compared to their white, European male colleagues due to the societal prejudices and sociopolitical states they operated in. Intersections of identifiers such as race, gender, or country of origin exacerbated the biases present at the time. In being oppressed and subsequently erased from history, it is no surprise that knowledge of these individuals is taught at a surface-level at best. This makes for a limited knowledge base to draw on when addressing the nuanced impact of social problems on marginalized communities. To borrow an analogy from Meili, relying on the sociological canon to explain modern social issues would be like relying on your laundry dryer to wash your dishes (2018:102). While it is a useful tool, it is ultimately not equipped to be used in that manner.

The “Illusion of Difference” Between Race in the U.S. and Race in Canada: Denials of Systemic Racism

By Erin Charlton

My name is Erin and I'm a Political Science major at Queen's. I consider myself a chronic illness advocate with a passion for disability justice, human rights, and mental health awareness.

Discussions of race and racism are rare (if not absent) in Canada, especially when compared to its neighbour to the South, The United States. Although race and racism conversations seem to take place more often and command larger attention from the media in the U.S, they are by no means commonplace in society today. Although Americans do seem more readily willing to admit systemic racism is present in the U.S., there is an absence of literature exploring this topic unlike the literature available in Canada, presenting an acknowledged limit to this paper. I will begin by providing a brief overview of each nation's history with race and racism, then will compare the two concerning how they have acknowledged race and racism in their respective countries. In doing so, this paper seeks to show that there is an “illusion of difference” between race in the U.S. and Canada due to the inability of Canada and its citizens to recognize the existence of systemic racism, therefore, maintaining and reinforcing this “illusion of difference” of race in each country.

Canada has a long history of race and racism that must be read through the history of colonization. Beginning as a white settler colony with “a liberal democracy [and] a colonial heart” (Bannerji, 2000, p. 75), the nation was built upon the marginalization of First Nations communities across Canada. One only needs to look at the history of how the Canadian Federal Government has “dealt with” Indigenous Canadians in the past; from the Oka Crisis in the 1990s (Bannerji, 1996) to the more recent raid of the Wet’suwet’en people’s lands in 2020 (Richardson, 2021), both involving mass police violence and the continuation of the Canadian government marginalizing Indigenous peoples and their lands. The longstanding “issue” of the First Nations peoples (as seen by the Canadian government), has always been about how best to manage and assimilate them with the rest of society rather than how better to protect and respect their rights as it should be. Canada doesn’t only have a race problem with Indigenous peoples, rather their tactics of oppression, elimination, assimilation, and overall historical injustice have stretched to multiple other communities as explained by Gulliver and Thurrell (2016), including: “Africville, the Chinese Head Tax and Exclusion Act, Indian Residential Schools, the Komagata Maru incident, [and] the internment of Japanese-Canadians”(p. 42), to name a few.

One need only look to what curriculum or version of history is being taught to our children generation after generation through the misrepresentations in Canadian textbooks, denying the realities of racism in both the Canadian past and present. These denials of racism in Canadian textbooks often present a past where the voices of marginalized immigrants and refugees and their stories of racism are absent from

discussions of Canadian history (Gulliver and Thurrell, 2016). This leaves the history of Canada as being presented as an inclusive and equal society for all races, which is not the case given the growing disparities in Canadian society between racial minorities and Whites.

Students grow up thinking Canada is a warm, welcoming, and multicultural society where citizens downplay or outright deny racism, rather than acknowledge the racist reality we are currently living in, where visible minorities are disadvantaged every day. Disadvantage shows up as “inequality in educational and employment opportunities, underrepresentation in political institutions, disproportionately lower pay, higher rates of incarceration, and shorter life expectancy due in part to state-sanctioned violence (Gulliver and Thurrell, 2016, p. 43). It is evident that the ‘visible minorities’ (including Indigenous peoples) in Canada have come to accept these injustices as the norm in society as the government and its citizens have not yet proven otherwise; this will be shown later on in the discussion surrounding how the Canadian state and its citizens have responded to systemic racism and the calls from the visible minority populations in the country to fix it.

Both North American Nations, Canada and the U.S. share many commonalities, including their egregious histories of forced assimilation, relocation, and overall oppression of the racialized communities within their borders. Beginning from the time of post-Civil War reconstruction, the United States has, (on multiple occasions throughout history) faced what was called “the Negro Problem”, due to the end of slavery and its long-lasting effects on African American peoples in the

U.S.(Hall, 2018). Whether in institutional, social, or political contexts, racial inequality is created and recreated through policy and procedure, relegating visible minorities as “others” while “Europeans continue the same solidarity of ruling and repression, blended with competitive manipulations, that they practiced from the dawn of their conquests and state formations” (Bannerji, 1996, p.92). Specifically in the United States, as correctly shown by Thompson (2008).:

Elite political actors, institutions and public politics have not simply been reflecting, expressing, or 'enacting' racial identities through much of U.S. history, but instead have been creating and transforming them to illuminate how strongly race is tied to other manifestations of political power, including divisions and structures of government, the construction of criminal justice systems, education, social assistance, and the like. (Thompson, 2008, p. 529)

This shows that the United States and its current institutions function in society with inherently interwoven ideas of race and racism in their policies that work to disadvantage those who are seen as visible minorities. Now the question that remains is: how have the Canadian and American governments and their citizens worked to acknowledge the presence of systemic racism within their institutions and societies at large? I will now turn to discuss the actions and inactions of both countries towards acknowledging the presence of systemic racism in their society, including in their institutions, beginning first with Canada.

Canada is often seen as friendly and welcoming around the world, including to those immigrating into the nation for

what they believe to be an opportunity of equality, only to be disheartened by a society wrought with a colonial past, institutions lined with systemic racism and citizens who are blind to, and in denial of systemic racism as a problem. As correctly stated by Ritika Goal (2019):

Canadians often embrace a narrative that separates us from the United States, positioning ourselves as the “enlightened neighbours to the north”. When we do talk about racism, our discussions focus on individual actions by individual people, labelling them as moral or immoral, good, or bad, rather than acknowledging racial stereotypes that surround—and are internalized—by us all. (p.3)

Long gone are the days of blatant racism with the new racism revealing itself as a subtle or more implicit version of the past. Now are the days of acknowledging that racism once existed, but not in the past, somewhere else or as one’s individual belief rather than as a systemic problem that works to disadvantage minorities around the nation (Van Dijk, 1992).

Rather than acknowledgement, these denials view Canadians as unlikely to be the perpetrators of racism and include “representations of past events that do not support observations of racism in Canadian history as racist, Canadian, or relevant to contemporary Canada” (Gulliver, 2017, p.83). Canadians see themselves and their country as diverse and welcoming with equality of races in every aspect of society as they continue to deny the existence of racism; as put bluntly by Gulliver (2017), Canada and Canadians are “afraid of being called racist” (p.83). This constant denial of systemic racism can work to reproduce and reinforce the same

racist ideologies Canadians are scared of, only continuing the centuries-long narrative of Canada being a welcoming, diverse, and inclusive place for all (which we know to be the opposite from the truth).

The situation of racism in Canada has been present for centuries and continues today, deeply engrained into the cultural and political institutions in society to the point where these racist ideals have become so naturalized that they are now invisible to the majority of the population that is not personally affected. As seen in a study from the Environics Institute for Survey Research (2019), “two-thirds of Canadians believe that race relations in their country are generally better than that in the USA, and indeed Americans themselves are mostly negative in their assessment” (p.3), showing that the “illusion of difference” between race in the U.S. and Canada is evident and actively working to deny racism in Canadian society to the detriment of visible minorities.

This becomes more shocking when the media, political parties and politicians, corporations and everyday citizens employ their racist beliefs when they look to immigrants or visible minorities as scapegoats for the ills of society including a failed economy or low employment rate (Bannerji, 1996). This narrative is often seen and easily accepted as it falls within the racist framework that Canada, its history and its citizens is built upon. This inherent Canadian racism shows up in individuals holding racist notions of visible minorities as being “unskilled, illiterate and traditional, thus making the presence of Third World peoples undesirable and unworthy of real citizenship” (Bannerji, 1996, p.104). This is far from the

truth but plays out as it is the truth, nonetheless.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission (2020) did an inquiry into the racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service (TPS) which concluded that “Black people are more likely than others to be arrested, charged, over-charged, struck, shot or killed by the Toronto Police Service (p.1). These disturbing statistics show that racism and racial profiling on behalf of the TPS plays a large role in why Black people bear a disproportionate burden of law enforcement whether there is wrongdoing or not, providing evidence of systemic racism at play. This is very worrisome as denials of racism often reproduce racist ideologies and accompany racism both subtle and blatant (Van Dijk, 1992), only continuing the unacknowledged problem of race and racism within Canada that has been the favoured narrative of White Canadians for centuries.

Until Canadians can admit that there is a problem with race and that systemic racism is present and embedded within institutions in our society, Canada’s history with racism will continue to be nonexistent. With generations of Canadians to be raised with an “illusion of race” that presents Canada as a multicultural hero and America as a racist beast. Now the question I will turn to is: do Americans believe they are racist and/or that systemic racism exists within the institutions in their nation?

Race relations and racism as a whole are more widely accepted ideals in the United States as can be seen through directed research and dozens of headlining media stories written by reputable outlets over many years. A survey

conducted by the Pew Research Centre in January and February 2019 provides important information about how Americans view race relations in their country (Environics Institute for Survey Research, 2019). The survey “shows that four in ten (41%) Americans describe race relations in their country as generally good, compared with almost six in ten (58%) who say they are generally bad” (Environics Institute for Survey Research, 2019, p.11). Whereas most “Canadians (67%) express the view that race relations in Canada are generally better than in the USA; one in ten (9%) maintains race relations in Canada are worse” (Environics Institute for Survey Research, 2019, p.10). This shows that Americans are more willing to acknowledge that there are issues with race relations in their country, leaving hope for change in the future, as acknowledgement is the first step. On the other hand, Canada’s continued denial of the existence of systemic racism provides a less than optimistic outlook for the future of race and race relations in Canada.

When looking to the media and the citizens of the United States, one can see a long-awaited awakening that is beginning to happen on the part of the American citizenry. There has been a reflection on racism and how white Americans have benefitted from the privilege of their whiteness to the detriment of visible minorities in their society (Harmon and Audra, 2020). Largely in part due to the violent tragedies against the Black community in the United States in 2020 and the protests that followed, it seems as for the first time White Americans alongside racialized Americans, are fighting for change in their society. As a beginning step in the long process of fighting against racism, “large numbers of White Americans have attended racial justice demonstrations,

purchased books about racial inequality and registered for webinars on how to raise children who are anti-racist” (Harmon and Audra, 2020, p.2). During the BLM protests in the Summer of 2020, over half of Americans supported the movement with many participators in cities across the nation being of White ethnicity, showing for the first time that the battle is truly joined, and everyone is fighting against the same social ill: racism (Harmon and Audra, 2020). This shift is exactly what scholars believe needs to happen in Canada before any dramatic change can be produced.

However, it can be assumed that this is not the case for all Americans as some still see race as no longer being a central factor determining the overall quality of life and chances in life of visible minorities in the United States (Bonilla-Silva, E., & Dietrich, 2011). For the true achievement of racial equality within the United States, White Americans must continue to shift their priorities (Harmon and Audra, 2020) to include the constant questioning and challenging of their beliefs about race and racism personally, politically and in society as a whole. Or better yet as claimed by Bonilla-Silva, E., & Dietrich (2011), people of colour in American need to “return to militant social movements to advance racial justice in this country” (p.203), before anything will change.

Given the culminating events of the disturbing and horrific instances of police violence in North America, especially in the U.S over the past year that led to mass protests and demonstrations around the world, it is safe to say that Bonilla-Silva, E., & Dietrich’s (2011) hope of militant social movements producing change in American society may have finally become true. It seems White Americans are beginning

to awaken to the idea of systemic racism in their society as perpetuating constant disadvantage on BIPOC communities that can be seen in the reality of their everyday lives in the U.S. This is the beginning (and only the beginning) of a long future that focuses on reconciling the abuse that has been experienced by BIPOC communities at the hands of White people in America. Although there is a long way to go, the act of acknowledging the existence of systemic racism in American society is the first step in combatting its ills.

As shown above, English Canadians often render race and racism an American problem, one that has no place in Canadian society, something the media is quick to point out that this is not always the case. Canadians often seem to forget our racist colonial past involves slavery, only making it easier for us to default to claiming racism only happens in the U.S. when discussions about systemic racism arise. This is due to what can be seen as an “orchestrated coverup and institutional denial by the country that slavery and systemic racism existed by minimizing the Canadian experience” (Miller, 2020, p.3). Now the question that remains to be seen is: how can Canada and Canadians work to re-educate themselves in their racist history to correct racial inequality and the “illusion of difference” between race in the U.S. and Canada?

Decades of denial come with decades of hard work needed to reframe and replace the harmful, racist narratives that Canadians have been taught are true. Unfortunately, as Van Dijk (1992) notes, it is “the power of a national myth of tolerance that makes it ‘much more difficult for minority groups to challenge remaining inequalities, to take unified

action and to gain credibility and support among the (white) dominant group” (1992, p. 96). Therefore, it is up to White Canadians to listen and learn from experiences of racism from minority groups, to fight for representation of minorities in all aspects of society, including in governments at the very least.

Beginning with the federal and provincial governments in Canada, we must take sweeping measures to identify, apologize and act on correcting the misrepresentations of Canada’s history with race, racism and BIPOC communities in our public education curriculum that has been taught to generations and generations of Canadians. This misinformation has left a nation of people with false ideals in the history of Canada - the good, the bad and the extremely ugly, including the centuries of horrific history of RCMP and police brutality towards BIPOC and specifically Indigenous communities in Canada.


Both governments must actively work together to rewrite this improper history to include the voices of visible minorities and immigrants alike that have been silenced over centuries, whether in the Canadian government and policy creation, the media, or the lack of representation in both provincial and federal governments in Canada, the absence of BIPOC is blatantly obvious. Canada has been a country in denial of having a race problem, or of having inherent systemic racism woven into its institutions and society as a whole, reinforcing the racist ideals that have been present for centuries and remain present to this day.

Beginning with a brief history of race and racism in both Canada and the United States, then moving onto the current

day and our acknowledgement or lack of acknowledgement of systemic racism in our societies, I have attempted to show that there is indeed an “illusion of difference” between race in the United States and Canada. This “illusion of difference” is due to the blatant denial of racism or the inability of Canadians to recognize the existence of systemic racism in their society and/or how it works (and has worked for centuries) to deny equal opportunities to BIPOC Canadians every day. As mentioned above, Americans are not perfect in their acknowledgement and have a lot of work to do, however, acknowledging their past as being wrought with racism is the first step in the long process of reconciliation with BIPOC communities in America. Canada and White Canadians can do themselves a favour by looking to the White Americans that have begun this process of self-reflection and change to learn a thing or two about where to begin to make changes in their personal lives. Until Canada faces its racist history head-on, acknowledging and apologizing for it to the communities that have been affected, true change can never happen.

Addressing Structural Failings and Inequalities in the Banking Model of Education: A First Year's Guide to Liberatory Education

By Sara Din



Dear First Year,

Congratulations on your acceptance! Entering university marks the start of a new and exciting experience. You will have the opportunity to form connections, explore new environments, and engage with a wide selection of courses.

Yet, it is essential to know that you are also entering into an educational system limited by deep structural failings and inequalities that can restrict learning, negatively impact your sense of self, and limit your potential to affect positive social change.



In this envelope, I am including a collection of bookmarks that provide insights into key ideals of a more positive and empowering model of education: Liberatory Education, based upon Feminist and Critical Pedagogies. While these approaches face significant resistance to implementation within the university system, you can still benefit significantly by applying them to guide your own engagement with learning, thinking, and social interaction.

I sincerely hope you will take the time to engage and reflect upon the ideals and theories communicated in this package. Indeed, they provide insights that can transform your experience and relationship to education and your ability to positively impact the world around

you.

All the best on your undergraduate journey,

A Fourth Year Student.



Learn to engage reflexively to

ensure your behaviour does not recreate harmful power dynamics

create safer, more inclusive spaces

consider using your voice to share with, support, and/or empower others

HOW CAN I ENGAGE MORE RESPONSIBLY IN THE CLASSROOM AND OTHER ASPECTS OF MY LIFE?

HOW CAN I USE MY POSITIONALITY OR PRIVILEGE TO ADDRESS STRUCTURAL INEQUALITIES AND THEIR MANIFESTATIONS?

IS MY VOICE SILENT OR OTHER?

**Transformative
Methods of Social
Engagement**

Education can be a site of joy - try to search out situations that inspire your love of learning (e.g., interactive classes, community lecture series) to

derive personal fulfillment and intellectual stimulation

motivate yourself and your peers to utilize their education in meaningful, transformative ways

provoke a life-long commitment to critical thinking and engagement

**Fostering Internal
Empowerment and
Self-Realization**

The Banking Model of Education



- NEVER QUESTION AUTHORITY
- REGURGITATION > CRITICAL THINKING
- INEVITABILITY OF CAPITALIST MODELS
- WESTERN SUPERIORITY
- MAINTAIN OPPRESSIVE STRUCTURES OF POWER
- BE PASSIVE
- TEACHERS = ULTIMATE AUTHORITY
- INDIVIDUAL SUCCESS
- STUDENTS = IGNORANT
- EUROCENTRISM
- COMPLETE WITH PEERS



ENGAGE AND THINK CRITICALLY

RESIST AND COMBAT ALL OPPRESSIVE SYSTEMS

BE AN AGENT OF POSITIVE TRANSFORMATIVE CHANGE

JOY AND PASSION FOR LEARNING

LEARNING AS A METHOD FOR LIBERATION

LEARN FROM EDUCATORS AND PEERS

AND YOUR OWN INSIGHTS

APPLY EDUCATION BEYOND THE CLASSROOM

BUILD COMMUNITY

QUESTION AUTHORITY

BE REFLEXIVE


DIVERSE PERSPECTIVES

THINK BIG PICTURE


Liberatory
Education
based
in
Critical
&
Feminist
Pedagogies



Access diverse forms of documentation,
evidence, and knowledge communication to




decolonize your sources of
knowledge



recognize the integrity and
applicability of non-Western and
non-hegemonic ways of knowing
in their own right

gain insights to challenge the
'inevitability' of oppressive
societal structures

ORAL HISTORIES



KNOWLEDGE AND EVIDENCE
COMMUNICATED AND
CULTIVATED OVER GENERATIONS

Access diverse approaches to theorizing and conceptualizing history and education to

decenter colonial, patriarchal, and racist narratives

re-examine utilizing more representative and critically aware approaches

understand the ongoing structural manifestations of violent histories and ways to combat these realities

PROBLEM-POSING EDUCATION



PAULO FREIRE: CRITICAL THEORIST SEEKING TO RADICALLY TRANSFORM SOCIETY THROUGH EDUCATION

CONSCIOUSNESS + INTENTIONALITY + LEARNING THROUGH DISCUSSION-BASED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN EDUCATORS AND PEERS. PARTICIPANTS LEARN TO CRITICALLY SITUATE THEMSELVES WITHIN THE STRUCTURES AROUND THEM TO LIBERATE THEMSELVES AND WORK IN SOLIDARITY TO LIBERATE ENTIRE COMMUNITIES FROM OPPRESSION.

Learn to engage reflexively to

ensure your behaviour does not recreate harmful power dynamics

create safer, more inclusive spaces

consider using your voice to share with, support, and/or empower others

HOW CAN I ENGAGE MORE RESPONSIBLY IN THE CLASSROOM AND OTHER ASPECTS OF MY LIFE?

HOW CAN I USE MY POSITIONALITY OR PRIVILEGE TO ADDRESS STRUCTURAL INEQUALITIES AND THEIR MANIFESTATIONS?

IS MY VOICE SILENCING OTHERS?

HOW MAY I BE COMPLICIT IN MAINTAINING OPPRESSIVE STRUCTURES? WHAT STRUCTURES MIGHT I BENEFIT FROM?

DO I HOLD PARTICULAR INSIGHTS THAT MAY NOT BE ACCESSIBLE TO OTHERS? ARE THERE WAYS I CAN SAFELY SHARE THESE INSIGHTS?



Engage in change-oriented social action to

be accountable to yourself and your community

commit to establishing and maintaining solidarity and cross-cultural bonds

apply your knowledge and education to deconstruct oppressive structures

further efforts to create a more just society

COLLECTIVE ACTION



Seek out opportunities to form community to

become part of a community of learners
that grows through engaging with each
other

feel less alone in an educational and
regional environment that might be hostile

lead + commit to initiatives for positive
social change

imagine new methods through which to
make decisions and set learning outcomes
(e.g., by consensus)

CLUBS AT QUEEN'S



Queens Native Student Association

[OPEN TO ALLIES AND CO-CONSPIRATORS]



QUEEN'S
ONSENSUAL
HUMANS

Access Queen's Club Directory @
<https://myams.org/home/clubs/clubs-directory/>

Education can be a site of joy - try to search out situations that inspire your love of learning (e.g., interactive classes, community lecture series) to

derive personal fulfillment and intellectual stimulation

motivate yourself and your peers to utilize their education in meaningful, transformative ways

provoke a life-long commitment to critical thinking and engagement



Your worth and voice are not dependent on academic evaluations or recognition from those in authority positions. Accept this early to

engage in learning without the constant fear of personal failure

maintain or develop confidence in your independent, critical inner voice

critically challenge those in positions of authority when there is a need for action (e.g., problematic comments by a boss or lack of representation in the curriculum)



The Duality of Being a Woman of Colour

By Niroshini Mather

My name is Niroshini Mather and I am in my fourth year of Health Sciences. I credit my family and the area where I grew up for igniting my passion in racial advocacy and genuine interest in learning about other cultures, customs, and people!

What does being a woman of colour mean to you?

This is not only a loaded question, but one I cannot give a concrete answer to. The significance of being a woman of colour has changed so drastically over the course of my life and will continue to change as I gain new experiences, meet new people, and grow as an individual. As of right now, I see the term as holding a complex duality; a good and a bad.

I was one of the few people of colour (POC) in my classes growing up. However, I always saw my identity as a “woman of color” as a source of pride, a hidden superpower. While this may have stemmed from my appreciation for the overt “uniqueness” it brought with it, I never shied away from vocalizing my love for my culture with my peers and embracing the numerous customs, art forms and languages. As I saw it, being Tamil was as much a part of my identity as being Canadian.

However, somewhere along the way, it all changed. Maybe I became a little less naive about the world or maybe the world around me became a little more intolerant. I don't know what

catalyzed this overt change, but it was most probably a culmination of events; experiences of overt racism, a disconnection from my peers or just a sense of exhaustion from the continual subjection to daily microaggressions.

All I know is one day I was unabashedly proud of my heritage and the next, I felt ashamed when my mom spoke to me in Tamil in front of my friends. I began to feel consciously aware of my race during seemingly minute moments such as discussions about makeup with my friends or during a job interview. I had a growing realization that, in order to be taken seriously, I needed to put in additional effort and dedication than what was expected.

And even then, my successes were often met with a condescending sense of “surprise”. And then, just as quickly as the appearance of their feigned disbelief, my successes were overlooked once again.

Somewhere along the way I began to see my status as a woman of color as an impediment, an additional burden that only exacerbated the difficulties of teenage life.

What did I do? I guess you could say I took the “assimilation approach”. I tried to fit in. It started with small changes like going on private mode on Spotify when listening to Tamil music to purposely mispronouncing my name during introductions so it would be “easier” to say. Looking back, I now recognize that in trying to fit in I not only lost my attachment with my culture, but part of my own identity as well.

So where does that lead me too today? In a full-circle fashion, I chose a university that, while esteemed in other regards, has a troubled reputation regarding its small POC population. While I was scared that this would push me further away from my cultural identity, the reality was the exact opposite.

Over the past two years at Queens, I have been able to regain the pieces of my cultural identity that I had lost and regain a sense of pride in being a Tamil-Canadian. I made the recognition that no matter how hard I tried to assimilate, I would always be “different” to some people. Thus, I regained a strengthened resolve to embrace those differences and learn to appreciate them rather than have them vilified.

I became more involved in the Tamil community by attending events and joining clubs that encouraged the sharing of cultural backgrounds. **I recognized that while there are many additional struggles associated with being a woman of color, the benefits it provided, such as a secondary community, were incalculable.**

Of course, this realization is not perfect. My appreciation comes in waves, as does my discouragements. However, seeing the rise and leadership of powerful women of color, such as the election of an indo-african American woman as the US vice president, Kamala Harris, has been inspiring and encouraging.

So, what does a woman of color mean to me today?

Embracing your cultural identity as a source of pride and finding a meaningful balance between both communities.

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